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ROYAL COMMISSION ON BILINGUALISM AND BICULTURALISM

ARMED FORCES HISTORICAL
STUDY

PART I

THE ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY
(initial draft)

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4. Page 4, paragraph 475: read "RNCVR" for "RCNVR".
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PREFACE

1. This short historical sketch of the RCN is concerned with the part French-Canadians have played in its growth and development. As a consequence, little or no attention has been paid to the policies, organization or practices of the RCN not directly related to this central problem. Neither, it must be added, has great attention been paid to detail. The aim of the paper is to try to establish and trace general trends in the RCN which bear directly on its ethnic structure and to use this general survey as an introduction to the work on the armed forces being done by the Commission. The usefulness of the historical sketch will be its use as a measure of comparison for present policies and practices. In this respect, there are two distinct periods corresponding - for our purposes - to two major trends. Prior to 1939 the needs and aspirations of French-Canadians were ignored by the RCN. After 1939, increasing attention was paid to the problem of French-Canadian representation in the Navy but the search for a solution was in one direction only: integration of French-Canadians into an English speaking RCN. Little or no attention was paid to giving the RCN an atmosphere more congenial to French-Canadians.

2. The format decided upon for this study was to use three general functional divisions: ethnic representation; language use; and cultural milieu. The section on ethnic representation forms the basis of the paper and in it is included a very general sketch of the growth and development of the RCN, the ethnic representation of RCN personnel and the policies and practices affecting this ethnic representation. The section on language use is limited to that single subject and really forms little more than a comment on the preceding section. Cultural milieu is a nebulous topic in the best of circumstances. Here it is used to attempt to describe the atmosphere of the RCN, its outlook and orientation over the period since its formation. It is the most difficult section to define properly and it may, in fact, be little better than a catch-all for topics that do not fit readily into either of the preceding sections.

3. Within each of the three functional categories a chronological division corresponding to given periods of development has been used. The chrono-

logical divisions used are:

- a. Formation to World War I, 1910-1914;
- b. World War I, 1914-1918;
- c. The inter-war period, 1918-1939;
- d. World War II, 1939-1945;
- e. The post-WW II period.

The last division - post-WW II - ends generally in the Korean War period and after the passage of the National Defence Act, 1950. This is not a definite breaking point but it does mark the last significant change in policies and practices for the RCN. The trends established by 1952 have generally continued and will thus be further studied in the specific and detailed studies of the armed forces now being done by the Commission. These studies will, of course, determine whether there have been any recent changes in the trends of the past decade or whether there are any changes planned for the near future.



THE ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY

A - INTRODUCTION

1. The development of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is a relatively recent phenomenon in Canadian history. From the British conquest of Canada during the Seven Years War until well into the present century, Canada enjoyed the unequivocal protection of the strongest naval force then in existence - the Royal Navy (RN). Thus protected and isolated from any overseas threat to her own territory, Canada did not develop an indigenous naval spirit despite the existence of a considerable maritime industry throughout most of her history.
2. Attempts by the British government to persuade her colonies to contribute something to their own naval defence failed to move any Canadian provincial government before 1867 or any Dominion government after 1867. It is true that the Province of Canada after 1855 was the only British colony to contribute any significant amount to her own land defences but it is equally true that after Confederation, Canada was the only Dominion contributing nothing to her own naval security. Not until 1909 did Canada show any interest in naval affairs or take any steps to contribute to her naval defence. The reasons for this change in attitude are complex and need be mentioned only briefly; the growth of imperial sentiment both at home and in the UK; the rise of the German navy and, perhaps most importantly, the acceptance by the Admiralty and the British government of the idea of local Dominion navies---all combined to make Canada abandon her habitual negative attitude towards the adoption of a national naval policy.
3. The passage of the Naval Service Act in 1910, marks the formal beginning of the RCN. Before the passage of this Act Canada participated on a very small scale in naval affairs, notably by forming the Provincial Marine following the Seven Years War; by establishing Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) companies and manning gunboats on the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes system during the American Civil War and the ensuing unrest; and by the forlorn experience with the Charybdis (Canada's first warship) in 1880-82.

But the Naval Service Act marked the adoption of Canada's first positive naval policy. This policy was short-lived and the terms of the Act were never fully implemented, but the RCN survived.

4. The Jellicoe Report of 1919, while not formally adopted by the Canadian government, did supplement the basic principles agreed upon at the Imperial Conferences of 1911 and 1917 and supported by various Admiralty memoranda prepared at Canada's request. These principles formed the policy framework within which the RCN was constructed, and in particular they formed the basis for the prolonged and intimate relationship between the RCN and the RN which has been such a salient feature of the RCN's short history. It was only with the Mainguy Report of 1949 and the acceptance of international obligations by Canada in the 1950's that a Canadian navy began to develop relative self-sufficiency and an awareness of specifically Canadian problems. It is with the Mainguy Report and the re-establishment of the Department of National Defence under a new National defence Act in 1951 that this brief history will end. This period marked the beginning of a new awareness and new policies for all of Canada's armed forces and, although they may be theoretically regarded as history, these new policies and doctrines are still active and directly affecting the RCN and the other services. Thus, they are more fit to be dealt with in studies dealing with specific topics related to the armed forces.

B. - ETHNIC REPRESENTATION IN THE RCN

1. Even before the final passage of the Naval Service Act Canada began to acquire both ships and personnel. Both came originally from the RN. Two old cruisers were bought by Canada and supplied with skeleton RN crews, most of whom were to remain with the ships until adequate Canadian naval personnel were available to take over their duties. RN personnel were also loaned to Canada to fill the military posts in the Ministry of Marine and Fisheries into which the Naval Service had been placed. From the beginning it was the intention of the Canadian government to staff the RCN completely with Canadian personnel at all levels but obviously this goal could not be immediately achieved. All RN personnel were however, only on temporary loan so as not to block the promotion of Canadian officers and ratings.¹

2. Recruiting in Canada began immediately on the arrival of HMCS Niobe and Rainbow at Halifax and Esquimalt respectively. Initially recruiting was done at the naval stations, but soon this task was also given to district postmasters throughout the country. By March 31, 1911, 223 recruits had reported for duty, with 28 of this total coming from Quebec.² Recruiting was short-lived and the following year, after a change in government and hesitation over the formulation of a permanent naval policy, recruiting fell off and no attempt was made to interest young Canadians in the RCN. Only 126 recruits reported for duty in 1912 while 149 recruits and ratings deserted during this same period.³ No record was kept of the ethnic origin of RCN personnel in this period but a photograph in the Report of the Department of Naval Service entitled "French Canadian Personnel in the RCN" shows three officers and fifteen men.

3. The need to supply Canadian naval officers for the RCN was met by opening the Royal Naval College of Canada at Halifax on 19 January, 1910 with accommodation for 45 cadets. Entry was through

1. Tucker, GN, The Naval Service of Canada, 2 vols., Ottawa, 1952, vol. 1, p. 152.

2. Canada, Department of Naval Service Report, 1911, p. 18.

3. Ibid., Report, 1912, p. 8.

annual examinations held by the Civil Service Commission. The first class consisted of 21 cadets, including as the first French speaking naval cadet in the RCN, the son of the first Minister of Naval Services. Cadets took two years of academic training at the college followed by a year in an RN training ship. The first classes of cadets then returned to Halifax for another six months training at the naval college followed by further training in HM Ships. In 1914 the college was reorganized to bring its curriculum more in line with that taught at RMC.⁴

4. After this initial burst of interest the fortunes of the RCN rapidly declined. For the next two years the recruiting situation can be summed up in the laconic one-line comments in the annual reports which stated that no recruiting took place at all.⁵ Entry of cadets into the naval college still continued, but on a reduced basis, and an RCNVR unit was finally formed only through the efforts of enthusiastic citizens of Esquimalt and Victoria. At the outbreak of war in 1914, the RCN was thus very close to extinction.

World War One

5. At the start of the Great War RCN ships and personnel were placed on active service, offered to the RN and accepted. Recruiting was again started in Canada but mainly for the RN and even in this respect no major effort was made until 1916. In that year the Canadian government offered to enrol men in the RCNVR at Canadian rates of pay and allowances, for service with the RN. An overseas department was established in the RCNVR with a recruiting committee in each province. Altogether 1700 men were enrolled in this organization with another 580 men enrolled in the Royal Naval Air Arm and various miscellaneous branches of the RN.⁶

Recruiting was also carried out for the coastal defence force operated by the RCN and in all 700 officers and 4,768 men served in this force.⁷ But compared with the Canadian army, naval

4. Ibid., Report, 1914, p. 18.

5. Ibid., Reports for 1913 and 1914, p. 8 and p. 8.

6. Ibid., Report, 1919, p.10.

7. Ibid., p. 10.

participation by Canada was very modest indeed. The emphasis throughout the war period was based on supplementing the RN and not on developing a distinct Canadian navy.

Inter-war Period

6. After the war the RCN suffered the fate of the other armed forces, being demobilized almost completely prior to reorganization on a permanent basis. However, this permanent reorganization was never started and with the election of a new government in 1922 the RCN was reduced to the lowest possible strength, although one destroyer was finally retained in service on each coast. The Royal College of Canada, which had moved to RMC after the Halifax explosion and later to Esquimalt, was also closed in 1922. From that year all RCN cadets were to enter training directly in one of the RN's training ships, but this new policy was not started until 1925. During the preceding six years no Canadian naval cadets had been enrolled in the Naval Service. This scheme of supplying RCN officers trained wholly in RN ships and establishments was to last until the demands of the Second World War forced a change in policy.

7. The conditions of enrolment and recruiting of RCN ratings also deteriorated in the inter-war years. With the intention of replacing as soon as possible the RN personnel on loan to the RCN a Youth's Training Establishment was started at Halifax in 1921 and promptly closed the following year to meet the ordered reduction in naval strength. By 1930 the naval establishment had been raised to a total of 710 all ranks. Recruits entered the RCN directly and in the economic depression of that period, there were more applicants than were needed to meet the slight increase in strength and losses due to normal attrition.⁸ No special attempt was made either to attract or train French speaking recruits and those few French speaking recruits who entered the service had to adapt

8. Ibid., Report, 1930, p.7-8.

to an English speaking environment as best they could.⁹ In short, prior to World War Two, Canada's large French speaking minority had a negligible effect on the personnel policies of the RCN.

8. The training of this very modest establishment was done on board ship at either Halifax or Esquimalt and largely under the direction of Canadian Officers and instructors. As Canadian officers and ratings gained rank and experience they replaced seconded RN personnel and by 1933 only seven officers and 68 senior specialist ratings remained for whom no adequate RCN counterparts existed. By 1937 these numbers had dropped to two officers and only ten ratings still on loan from the RN.¹⁰ Advanced training for RCN ratings and virtually all officer training was done in the RN and the RN was also used by Canadian personnel to gain experience.¹¹ The training and service environment was thus entirely English speaking and no language training whatever was conducted by the RCN.

9. The only innovation during this period was the establishment of the RCNVR, including the establishment of two French speaking half companies in Montreal and Quebec in 1923. In May of that year French recruiting posters were sent to these establishments along with French copies of a recruiting questionnaire and explanations of the conditions of service in the RCNVR. Reaction was good and by June the Montreal half company had received 44 applications and the establishment of the unit was formally authorized on June 9, 1923. The commanding officer of the unit noted that even La Presse, usually opposed to any naval policy whatever, encouraged enlistment in this unit.¹² In May of 1928, the Montreal French half company was amalgamated with the Montreal English half company but this amalgamated organization was in turn reorganized into the

9. Canada, RCN, File No. 4900-68, memorandum from the Director of Naval Education to the Human Resources Research Section, Defence Research Board, 8 November, 1952.

10. Canada, Department of National Defence, Report, 1937, p.24-25.

11. Ibid., Report, 1930, p.8.

12. Canada, RCN, File No. 1700-170/6-1, letter to the Naval Secretary from the Commanding Officer, Montreal (F) Half Company, RCNVR, 5 January, 1924.

Montreal (E) and Montreal (F) divisions in 1938. The Quebec half company, formed in April 1923 retained its identity throughout the period. By 1927 the strengths of the half companies in Montreal and Quebec were 42 and 29 all ranks respectively, while the total RCNVR had a strength of 70 officers and 930 ratings,¹³ its complete allotted strength. By 1937 this strength had grown to 58 all ranks for the Quebec unit and 108 for the Montreal unit although this latter figure is for the amalgamated company.¹⁴ During the winter training was carried out at the home establishments of the units and during the summer training was done in RCN ships and establishments, under RCN instructors.

World War Two

10. When the Second World War started in 1939 the RCN consisted of an establishment of 137 officers and 1582 ratings.¹⁵ By the end of hostilities in 1945 RCN strength was 9,310 officers and 83,276 men.¹⁶ This vast increase in effective strength meant that for the first time in its history the RCN had to consider the one third of the Canadian population which spoke French as its mother tongue.

11. The selection of officers for the wartime navy followed closely the pattern established in the RN. Regular officers of the RCN continued to be trained in the UK until 1942 when the Royal Naval College of Canada was re-opened at Royal Roads, near Victoria, B.C. The function of this college was to supply regular officers for the permanent RCN establishment. RCNVR officers were trained at HMCS Stone Frigate in Kingston until 1940 when the school was moved to HMCS Stadacona in Halifax and HMCS Naden in Esquimalt. In 1941 HMCS Kings was opened to train reserve officers and this school continued to operate until the end of the war. Reserve officers were also trained at Royal Roads until 1942 when that establishment was taken over for the naval college. RCNVR officer

13. Canada, Département de la Défense Nationale, Rapport, 1927, p. 17.

14. Canada, Department of National Defence, Report, 1937, p.26.

15. Ibid., Report, 1939, p.20.

16. Ibid., Report, 1945, p. 14.



candidates were directly recruited from civilian life during the first two years of the war, but by 1940 qualified RCNVR ratings were also being selected for officer training. By 1943 this latter plan was brought more closely in line with the British practice and it finally superceded the direct entry plan for RCNVR executive officers. In 1943 the University Naval Training Divisions were formed at fifteen Canadian universities to provide more RCNVR officers and particularly technical officers. Included in this list were the universities of Laval and Montreal. In spite of this inclusion of the two large French speaking universities in the UNTD plan, no other special effort seems to have been made to attract or train French speaking officer candidates through the other officer training programmes of the RCNVR organization. Similarly, the position of French speaking officer candidates aspiring to permanent commissions in the RCN was no better. Indeed, it was probably worse since the curriculum at the naval college at Royal Roads and the age requirements for entry did not fit in readily with the Quebec educational system and not until the war ended were there any amendments made to these requirements.¹⁷

12. For the early part of the war, no provisions were made for large-scale recruiting of naval ratings mainly because of the lack of adequate training facilities. Recruitment led originally into either the RCN or the RCNVR but direct entry into the RCN was stopped in 1941. Starting in 1941 all recruits then entered the Navy through the RCNVR divisions for active service with the RCN. Direct entry into the RCN was only resumed in 1944.¹⁸ Recruiting was done through the 21 RCNVR divisions existing in the major cities throughout the country, their recruiting teams making forays into the areas adjacent to their headquarters in order to balance recruiting from urban and rural areas. Whatever the intention, however, recruiting hinged mainly on the urban centres of the country with HMCS Discovery (Vancouver), HMCS York (Toronto) and

17. Tucker, op.cit., vol. 2, p. 261.

18. Ibid., p. 269.

HMCS Donnacona (Montreal) supplying a substantial proportion of the RCN's total enlistment.¹⁹

Figures for recruiting by provinces are as follows:²⁰

Total Enlistments to August 15, 1945.

Exclusive of the WRCNS

<u>Province</u>	<u>Male Pop.</u> <u>(18-45)</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Total</u>
PEI	19,000	57	1,337	1,394
NS	123,000	632	6,353	6,985
NB	94,100	168	2,542	2,710
Que.	699,000	1,294	11,135	12,429
Ont.	830,000	2,331	38,896	41,200
Man.	159,000	287	7,464	7,751
Sask.	191,000	191	6,310	6,501
Alta.	178,000	226	7,367	7,593
BC	181,000	1,143	11,280	12,423
Other		292	410	702

Recruiting was based on the same educational standards for all provinces and entrance tests for French speaking recruits were translations of the English language tests. Not until 1943 was it made explicitly clear that no recruit was to be refused entry solely because he did not speak English and that recruitment of French speaking personnel was to be done by French-speaking officers.²¹ Publicity material supplied in French was not original copy but was a translation of the original English copy. Finally, there were only two RCNVR divisions engaged in recruiting in Quebec opposed to the seven divisions recruiting in Ontario.

13. Early in 1941, NSHQ began to receive complaints from the Commanding Officer, RCN Barracks, Halifax, respecting the high failure rate of French speaking recruits. He recommended that French speaking recruits be given English language training for three months

19. Ibid., p. 274.

20. Ibid., p. 275.

21. Canada, RCN, File No. 4900-68, memorandum to the Commanding Officers Reserve Divisions from the Secretary of the Naval Board, 2 July, 1943.

at the Quebec and Montreal RCNVR divisions. The reason for this recommendation was that there were not enough French speaking instructors at Halifax to handle the task of training these French speaking recruits.²² In August 1941 an eight week training course for non-English speaking recruits was started at the Montreal and Quebec divisions.²³ This system lasted until July 1943 when HMCS Prevost was established at London, Ontario, to give a twelve week English language course for French speaking recruits.²⁴ On completion of his twelve week language course at London the recruit then passed directly to New Entry Training at HMCS Cornwallis in Halifax. Recruits failing the course were employed in shore establishments until their English was judged to be adequate for them to continue their training at Cornwallis. If the English of the recruit still was not adequate after this three months employment and if he again failed his language examination, he was considered for discharge. This plan and the English language school existed until 1945 when a drop in RCN manpower requirements meant that there would be insufficient French speaking recruits among the reduced intake to justify maintaining the training establishment at Prevost.

Post-war Period

14. Following the war, RCN personnel policies continued much the same, only being readjusted to meet the lower manpower needs of the regular peace-time RCN. English language training for French speaking recruits was continued on a more or less ad hoc basis at HMCS Cornwallis and for a short period at HMCS Naden. The new arrangement did not reduce the high wastage rates of French speaking personnel nor did it lead to an increased enrolment of French speaking recruits. In 1951 Commander Marcel Jetté made a specific study of this problem and issued a "Report on the Recruiting of French-speaking Canadians". The aim of this report was to determine

22. Ibid., series of letters from the Commanding Officer RCN Barracks, Halifax to the Naval Secretary between 14 February 1941 and 15 July, 1941 followed by departmental memoranda in July and August, 1941.

23. Ibid., memorandum to Commanding Officer Quebec Division, Cartier Division and RCN Barracks, Halifax, 21 August, 1941.

24. Ibid., memorandum to the Commanding Officers Reserve Divisions from the Secretary of the Naval Board, 22 June, 1943.

why French speaking Canadians were not enlisting in greater numbers in the RCN.²⁵ Among the many reasons enumerated for this lack of enthusiasm were the following:

- a) The feeling that the RCN was more British than Canadian;
- b) The feeling that French-Canadians were not wanted in the RCN;
- c) The feeling that the RCN was not willing to compromise and that all co-operation had to come from French Canada;
- d) The feeling that the language problem of French-Canadians slowed their advancement and that favouritism was shown to English speaking Canadians;
- e) The feeling that entrance tests were not adapted to the French-Canadian mentality;
- f) and the fact that there were only two recruiting stations in Quebec compared to seven in Ontario.²⁶

15. The main recommendation of this report was that an English language school be established in Quebec to teach not only English but also mathematics, seamanship and field training. In particular it was felt that such a school would help meet some of the objections mentioned above. Approximately 40 French speaking recruits per month were enrolled at HMCS Cornwallis between September 1950 and January 1951, of whom at least half had insufficient English to carry on training. It was recommended that the proposed English language school should handle a minimum of 30 men per month with this number possibly being extended to 50 per month.²⁷ In addition, the facilities of the school should be made available to all RCN personnel who were having language problems and should not be limited to the training of recruits.

16. When the decision was made in 1946 to continue English language training in the RCN it was decided at the same time that

25. Jetté, Marcel, Cdr, RCN, Report on Recruiting of French-Speaking Canadians, p. 1.

26. Ibid., p. 1.

27. Ibid., Appendix C.

similar educational standards were to apply to both English speaking and French speaking recruits.²⁸ The resulting entrance test for French speaking recruits was thus only a French translation of the original English version and the Jetté Report noted that this test, apart from the initial problems of translation, took no account of Quebec's cultural milieu or its system of classical education. For this reason the report suggested the use of a new test based on the needs of candidates from Quebec.²⁹ Included as an appendix to the report was a letter from the Director of French services for Walsh Advertising Company of Montreal. Among other things, this letter stressed the need for a distinct advertising approach to French speaking Canadians and stressed that the present policy of merely translating English publicity material was inadequate.

17. Largely as a result of this report, an English language school was established in 1951 at Quebec and named HMCS D'Iberville. The course was six months long and was a combined English language course and basic training course. After graduating from this school the recruit went to Cornwallis where he entered into the ninth week of New Entry training. If his English was still not considered adequate, he entered a New Entry division at an earlier stage of training to gain further proficiency in English through some repetition of his previous basic training.

18. A report for the Defence Research Medical Laboratories by E.J. Brazeau in 1955 noted that recruits at this school were eager to learn English.³⁰ The greatest problem in the training of these French speaking recruits was not encountered until the recruit entered Cornwallis where he was treated individually and fitted into training divisions at different levels of advancement. Repetition of training,

28. Canada, RCN, File No. 4900-68, memorandum to Commanding Officers Pacific Coast, Atlantic Coast, Naden, Donnacona and Montcalm from the Naval Secretary, 24, January, 1946.

29. Jetté, op.cit., Appendix D.

30. Brazeau, EJ, Interim Report on Survey of RCN Procedures for Training French-Speaking Recruits, Defence Research Medical Laboratories, March, 1955, p. 4.



isolation from other French speaking recruits and the problems of integration into an English speaking community were serious difficulties that the new arrival from D'Iberville had to face. As a result of these findings this report recommended that English language training at D'Iberville be made a collective class effort and that the whole class then be drafted as a group to Cornwallis. At Cornwallis the recruit should then have complete freedom to use whichever language he wished outside of actual instructional periods.³¹ By June of 1955 the majority of these recommendations had been implemented.³² With some adjustments, and the removal of the school to HMCS Hochelaga in Montreal, this method of training French speaking recruits has continued.

19. The production of RCN officers immediately following the war followed closely the RCN's early practice. The naval college, opened at Royal Roads in 1942, continued to function after the war. Cadets entered the college through annual competitive examinations and the two year course was taught entirely in English. Following graduation from Royal Roads the cadets then went to the UK as midshipmen where they did their sea training with the RN. On completion of this training period they were then free to return to the RCN or to remain with the RN. There was no instruction given in French for French-speaking cadets and there was no English language instruction given to French speaking cadets to enable them to follow a course given in English. Not until the establishment of the Collège Militaire Royal (CMR) in 1952 as a tri-service institution was any serious attempt made to enroll French speaking officers in the RCN even though the problem had been under discussion for some years.³³ Officers could also enter the RCN through the short service plans established in 1951 and the Venture Plan started in 1953 but once again training was wholly in English and no special consideration

31. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

32. Canada, RCN, File No. 4900-68, letter to the Naval Secretary from the Commanding Officer HMCS Cornwallis, 3 June, 1955.

33. Canada, RCN, see File No. 4600-35, during 1951 for correspondence relating to officer training and proposal by Laval University to establish a Department of Military Science. File is entitled "Recruiting and Entry, French-Speaking Personnel".

was extended to French speaking candidates. Sea training in Canadian ships was begun in 1950 for officer candidates from the Canadian Services Colleges and the University Naval Training Divisions but advanced and specialist course training continued to be done in RN ships. In short, officer training in the RCN was geared to the needs of English speaking officer candidates and French speaking candidates had to adjust to this environment to the best of their abilities. The following figures for officer cadets in the Canadian Services Colleges for 1951 show the results of this process. These figures are for naval cadets only.³⁴

RMC	first year	-one out of 19
	second year	-two out of 11
	third year	-one out of 8
	fourth year	-zero out of 9
		-Total 4/47 or 8.25% French speaking.

Royal Roads

	first year	-one out of 32
	second year	-three out of 18
		-Total 4/50 or 8% French speaking.

20. By 1953, all the factors mentioned above - recruiting, training, language instruction and working environment - helped produce the personnel structure listed below.

List of French-speaking Personnel by Rank.³⁵

<u>Rank</u>	<u>English</u>	<u>French</u>
Commodore	11	-
Captain	42	2
Commander	148	21
Lt. Commander	399	60
Lieutenant	705	76
Sub Lieutenant	202	26

34. Ibid., memorandum to the Secretary of the Chief of the Naval Staff from the Chief of Naval Personnel, 31 January, 1952.
35. Ibid., memorandum to the Defence Secretary from the Secretary of the Personnel Members Committee, 25 March, 1953.

<u>Rank</u>	<u>English</u>	<u>French</u>	
Commissioned Officer	173	8	
Midshipman	63	15	
RCN Cadets	<u>82</u>	<u>26</u>	
	1,825	234	(7.79%)
Ratings (Leading			
Seaman and above)	4,865	497	(9.78%)

C - LANGUAGE USE

Before World War Two

1. English was initially chosen as the language of the RCN for training and operations because of its close association with the RN and because the great majority of its personnel were English speaking.³⁶ Thus the early years of the RCN were years of complete English unilingualism. The RCN's dependence on RN personnel to fill training and administrative positions; its use of RN facilities, (especially for officers) and the integration of RCN and RN officers all worked together to produce an English speaking navy. In short the existence of a large number of Canadians who spoke French as their mother tongue had a negligible effect on the formation and growth of the RCN despite the fact that the first two ministers and the first Deputy Minister of the Naval Service were all French speaking Canadians. Prior to 1939, any French speaking recruit had to adjust as best he was able to an English speaking service.³⁷
2. The single exception to this English unilingualism was the existence of two predominantly French speaking RCNVR units in Montreal and Quebec. This was, however, but a partial recognition of the French language. All external correspondence from these units was English and, more importantly, summer training was conducted in RCN ships and establishments where the language of training and operations was invariably English. By 1939 inquiries reached Naval Service Headquarters from these divisions requesting the use of interpreters because they were receiving more correspondence in French than in English. The Naval Secretary replied that Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ) had no intention of appointing any interpreters within Quebec divisions.³⁸ Interpreters were not felt to be necessary for the Naval Service and any translation needed could easily be handled by available bilingual officers and ratings.³⁹

36. Tucker, op.cit., vol. 2, p. 277.

37. Canada, RCN, File No. 4900-68, memorandum from Director of Naval Education to the Human Resources Research Section, DRB, 8 November, 1952.

38. Ibid., letter from the Naval Secretary to the Commanding Officer Quebec Division, 4 December, 1939.

39. Ibid., letter to the Commanding Officer Quebec Division from the Naval Secretary (JSO Cossette), 27 November, 1939.

Further requests the following year asking for the payment of a teacher to teach English to French speaking personnel in Quebec were also denied.⁴⁰

World War Two

3. This policy of refusing to recognize the needs and aspirations of French speaking Canadians was soon to end. The necessity of making the most efficient use of available Canadian manpower during the Second World War led the RCN to establish for the first time an English language training establishment, first in Quebec and later in London, Ontario. The establishment of a corresponding French language school was apparently never considered. English language training was regarded primarily as an instrument for the more efficient integration of French speaking recruits into an English speaking navy. In fact, if a French speaking recruit failed his language examinations at the end of his language course and failed to show sufficient improvement during a further three months training and employment with an English speaking division, he was then to be considered for release as being "unsuitable".⁴¹

4. Following graduation from the English language school the recruit went to training establishments where all instruction was given in English. Once past this initial training period the new rating wanting to transfer to the RCN from the RCNVR then had to write the required examination in English. Before the war these examinations were set in French for Quebec and Cartier (Montreal) divisions but during the war only the examination for entrance into the RCNVR was set in French.⁴² All training and professional examinations were, of course, set only in English.

5. No special provision was made to teach English to French speaking officer candidates and there was no set program to teach French to English speaking candidates, although before the war Canadian officer candidates training in RN ships received some

40. Ibid., letter to the Naval Secretary from the Commanding Officer Quebec Division, 30 January, 1941 and the reply from the Assistant Naval Secretary. (J.O'B. Le Blanc), 6 March, 1941.

41. Canada, RCN, File No. 4900-68 memorandum to Commanding Officers Reserve Divisions, 2 July 1943.

42. Ibid., letter to Professor Richardson, Education Director NSHQ, from DB Angus, HMCS Stadacona, 29 November, 1941.



instruction in French from a "qualified teacher".⁴³ At the various reserve officer schools operated during the war all instruction was in English as it was at Royal Roads. At Royal Roads "modern languages" were taught but French was not a stipulated subject nor was it a requirement for admission.⁴⁴ The training of officers who came from enlisted personnel stressed achievement in an English speaking environment and thus placed French speaking ratings at a disadvantage unless they had a good command of the English language. In addition RN personnel sat on some officer selection boards and it was found that they were often unfamiliar with Canadian problems.⁴⁵

Post-war Period

6. Immediately following the war RCN establishments were greatly reduced. The English language school at London was closed and language training then followed an irregular career for the next few years, moving between Cornwallis and Naden. The predominance of the English language was preserved and English language training was still used as an instrument to integrate French speaking Canadians into an English speaking service. Although some instruction was given in French at the various language schools, and in particular at D'Iberville when it was established in 1951, this was basically done for the purposes of indoctrination.⁴⁶ In fact, this new language school was called in internal correspondence a "School for the Indoctrination of French-speaking Recruits (Quebec)".⁴⁷ Some basic training instruction was given in French but instruction in French was gradually dropped as progress was made in the English course, while at Cornwallis, all training was done in English and no language instruction was given.⁴⁸ All examinations at Cornwallis

43. Canada, RCN, Entry of Officers in the RCN, Ottawa, 1937, p.8.

44. Tucker, op. cit., p. 259.

45. Ibid., p. 247.

46. Canada, RCN, File No. 4900-68, training syllabus for the Basic Training School for French Speaking Recruits, Quebec, section entitled "Objectives"; Brazeau Report, op.cit., Ch.2,p.3.

47. Canada, RCN, File No. 4600-35, memorandum to the Chief of Naval Personnel from the Director of Naval Recruiting, 9 April, 1951.

48. Canada, RCN, File No. 4900-68, letter from Commanding Officer, HMCS Cornwallis, 3 June 1955.

were in English although the suggestion was made that French speaking recruits who failed these examinations should be allowed to take a supplementary oral examination.⁴⁹

7. Officer training continued to be unilingual until the opening of CMR in 1952 when French speaking cadets could then enter on their own merits and using their own language. Formal academic instruction and examinations were taken in French or English according to the cadet's mother tongue, but at the end of their two or three year course at CMR cadets passed to the English speaking environment of RMC. Summer training for cadets, while done in Canadian ships and shore establishments, was still carried on entirely in English. For short service officer candidates at HMCS Venture all instruction was in English and it was not until very recently that a course for French speaking candidates was started. At both the Service Colleges and Venture French was taught as an academic subject although the plan at CMR was to make both English speaking and French speaking cadets bilingual.

8. The predominantly French speaking naval reserve divisions in Montreal and Quebec were continued after the war, using French for their own benefit but English for all their formal external contacts. Summer training for these reserve divisions, including training of the UNTD units, was done in RCN ships and shore establishments. UNTD cadets took their training at either Halifax or Esquimalt while reserve officers and ratings took their training at the Great Lakes Naval Training Station established at Hamilton, Ontario in 1953. All training instruction was in English and there was no language instruction given in either English or French. This training in English caused difficulty for French speaking reservists and recently there have been requests from the Commanding Officer Naval Divisions for the establishment of English language training at Quebec along similar lines to that done for the Montreal

49. Canada, RCN, File No. 4900-68, letter to the Director of Naval Training from the Commanding Officer of HMCS D'Iberville, 15 September, 1955.

reserve division at NMCS Hechalaga.⁵⁰ This request was not approved⁵¹ nor was the request for the recruitment of French speaking WRCNS personnel approved. All applicants for enrolment in the WRCNS needed to have an adequate command of the English language before their applications were considered.⁵²

9. Not only was the French language rejected as a language for training or operations,⁵³ but French was rejected as a working language for written documents. In January 1950, however, the RCN, with the two other services, was subject to the Minister's direction concerning the use of the French language. All correspondence with the Quebec government, French speaking municipal governments, and individuals known to be French speaking was to be written in French and all correspondence received in French was to be answered in that language. These instructions were implemented by Naval General Orders in January, 1950.⁵⁴ All correspondence in French, whether received or sent, was (and is) first translated by the translation bureau of the Department of the Secretary of State and the English copy is placed on file with the French original. In June of the same year, in accordance with a decision taken by the Defence Council, another Naval General Order was issued stating that all Captains of establishments were to ensure that the bilingual nature of Canada would be recognized in all appropriate places and circumstances where necessary and practicable. This was held to be especially important where French speaking personnel were carried on strength.⁵⁵ In particular, bilingual signs were to be used in all establishments in Quebec and northern New Brunswick and wherever else commanding officers deemed them appropriate. In April of the following year it was pointed out that only the Army printed King's

50. Ibid., letter from the Commanding Officer Naval Divisions to the Naval Secretary, 20 December, 1961.

51. Ibid., letter from the Naval Secretary to the Commanding Officer Naval Divisions, 7 August, 1962.

52. Ibid., letter from the Naval Secretary to the Area Recruiting Officer, Montreal and the Recruiting Officer, Quebec, 8 April 1963.

53. Canada, RCN Historical Section, File No. 8000, vol. 1, comments by Commodore PD Taylor as reported in the Quebec Chronicle Telegraph, 24 January, 1961.

54. Canada, RCN, File No. 1000-22, draft Naval General Order, 17 January, 1950.

55. Ibid., draft Naval General Order, 9 June, 1950.

Regulations and General Orders in both English and French. In effect all the orders stressing the bilingual nature of Canada issued by the RCN were printed solely in English! The RCN and RCAF contended that no requirement existed for them to publish regulations and orders in French and in any case the translation services were already overloaded, being six months behind in their work.⁵⁶ In spite of the protests of both of these Services the Defence Council decided that the Navy and Air Force would publish their regulations and general orders in both languages.⁵⁷ These measures - the use of French in recruiting, the use of some publicity literature issued to French speaking recruits at the school of English (but only issued if the recruit is unable to understand English)⁵⁸ and the use of French to a limited extent in the basic training course at Rochelaga - constitute the only formal acceptance of the French language within the RCN. The possible use of French speaking crews for ships had been briefly considered and recommended against in the Jetté Report.⁵⁹

10. French language training for English speaking RCN personnel was not undertaken until 1952. The Army had been operating a French language course for some years for officers employed at AHQ. In 1952 the man giving the course suggested that a similar course could be given for Navy officers.⁶⁰ The offer was accepted and the course started on a purely voluntary basis. At the same time requests began to flow into Naval Headquarters requesting French language training and facilities. The requests were met in part by making linguaphone records available to ships and units requesting them and allowing some officers to attend language courses at Laval and Carlton universities on a part-time basis. There was no French language course within the Navy comparable to the course

56. Canada, RCAF, File No. 013-2, memorandum to the Secretary of the Defence Council from the Secretary of the Personnel Members Committee, 25 April, 1951.

57. Ibid., memorandum to the Air Member for Personnel from the Secretary of the Chief of the Air Staff, 12 June, 1951.

58. Canada, RCN, File No. 4000-68, memorandum to Flag Officers Pacific and Atlantic Coasts from the Naval Secretary 15 December, 1949.

59. Jetté, op.cit., Appendix E.

60. Canada, RCN, File No. 4340-8, letter from JAP Hurtubise, 21 April 1952.

given by the Army at the Citadel in Quebec City. The commanding officer of HMCS D'Iberville suggested, in 1959, that such a course be instituted⁶¹ but the suggestion was turned down because of a lack of bilingual instructors.⁶² A similar proposal was made in 1962 after the language school was moved to HMCS Hochelaga⁶³ but no firm decision was made. The lack of French language courses within the Navy led to several requests for Naval officers to attend the Laval summer school in Quebec City but these requests have been systematically refused because of a lack of funds within the Navy estimates.⁶⁴

61. Ibid., letter from Commanding Officer HMCS D'Iberville to Flag Officer, Atlantic Coast, 14 July 1949.
62. Ibid., memorandum to Chief of Naval Personnel from Director of Naval Training, 8 October, 1959.
63. Ibid., letter to Naval Secretary from Commanding Officer HMCS Hochelaga, 2 February, 1962.
64. Ibid., series of letters from Flag Officer, Pacific Coast to the Naval Secretary and the replies, 19 June, 1962 to 24 October, 1963.

D - CULTURAL MILIEU

Formation to World War Two

1. "The Royal Canadian Navy was patterned on the Royal Navy and remained so throughout the period.....Titles of rank were the same.....The regulations governing examinations, advancement and promotions, and uniforms of all ranks and ratings were identical in the two services. Almost all of the Naval Discipline Act and of the Kings Regulations and Admiralty Instructions applied to the Canadian service. The professional idiom and to a lesser extent the colloquialisms were the same, while the customs and etiquette of the Royal Navy as well as its incomparably rich traditions, were accepted by the younger service".⁶⁵

2. For several decades prior to 1910 Canadian opinion on naval policy could be classified under three main headings.⁶⁶ First there were those who held that a Canadian navy was unnecessary, inexpedient, or both. This was the position taken by all Canadian governments during the series of Colonial and Imperial Conferences from 1887 to 1909 and it also became the opinion of the Quebec nationalists: any Canadian naval policy, whether a direct contribution to the Royal Navy or the formation of a Canadian fleet would only embroil Canada in British foreign policies and the resulting wars. In any event, the Royal Navy would protect Canadian interests whether Canada participated in naval affairs or not. The second view was that Canadian efforts in the naval sphere must be closely integrated with the RN either through direct contributions or through the provision of integral fleet units. This was the policy held by Canadian defenders of the Empire. Emphasis gradually shifted from the provision of fleet units to the idea of direct contributions since the RN was said to need immediate aid in the face of a strengthening German navy. The final position assumed in the naval debate was that held by the supporters of the original Naval Service Act: Canada should possess a Canadian navy for Canadian

65. Tucker, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 154.

66. Ibid., p. 17.

interests and under Canadian control. Co-operation and integration with the RN in time of emergency was acceptable but basically any naval effort by Canada was to be principally for Canadian benefit. Briefly, this was the policy that prevailed, and the Naval Service Act was passed in 1910.

3. The navy created by the Naval Service Act was closely modeled on the decisions taken at the Imperial Conference of 1909 and reaffirmed by the Imperial Conference of 1911, held during the dying days of the Laurier government. Admiralty officials and representatives of the Canadian and Australian governments met at this latter conference and decided on the following conditions. The Dominion navies were to be controlled by the respective Dominion governments, but training and discipline were to be similar to the practices of the RN. Personnel were to be interchangeable and service in one navy was to count equally as service in the other. Any changes to King's Regulations, Admiralty Instructions, and the Naval Discipline Act, (already adopted by the Dominions in question) would be requested through the Imperial government. RN personnel were to be loaned to the Dominion navies as needed. Canadian and Australian naval stations were established. To avoid disputes over seniority, Dominion naval officers were to be shown on the Royal Navy List. When placed at the disposal of the British government in time of emergency, Dominion ships would become an integral part of the RN. Finally, the White Ensign was to be flown at the stern and the Dominion Flag at the Jack-staff. These arrangements were implemented and governed the relations of the RCN and the RN throughout the period of its formation and early development.⁶⁷

4. In 1911 the Canadian government changed and the RCN became stagnant while awaiting a decision on a new naval policy. The First World War intervened and interest in naval matters revived to some extent, but the Naval Service Act was never fully implemented.

67. Ibid., p. 166-167.

Even during the war the "emphasis was upon supplementing as far as possible the undertakings of the Admiralty, rather than developing a large and distinctive Canadian effort".⁶⁸

5. Following the war the Canadian government asked Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa to prepare a report on the possible form the peace-time RCN might take. One of Jellicoe's recommendations, presented in 1919, was that close co-operation be established with the RN in personnel and that standardization of discipline, training and equipment should also be undertaken.⁶⁹ Although the Jellicoe Report was not fully accepted and although the renewed attempts by the Admiralty to have its "one navy" policy accepted were rejected, the RCN remained firmly under the influence of the RN during the inter-war years. This influence was strengthened throughout the period by the use of RN personnel in instructional and administrative capacities. It was not until 1934 that a Canadian naval officer became Chief of the Naval Staff and not until the following year that a Canadian became Naval Secretary.⁷⁰ After the closing of the Royal Naval College of Canada in 1922 RCN officers were trained exclusively in the UK. Canadian officers were not only trained in the UK but spent approximately one third of their entire service career in HM ships.⁷¹ Thus, the RCN presented to French speaking Canadians not only an English speaking environment but a non-Canadian cultural milieu. Earlier, the formation of the Department of National Defence in 1922, and the creation of the post of "Chief of Staff, Department of National Defence and Inspector General of Militia, Navy and the Air Force," had threatened absorption of the RCN into the much larger and more Canadianized militia. This trend was consistently opposed by the Director of Naval Services and in 1927 the old organization was abolished and the post of Chief of the Naval Staff created, thus returning control of the Navy to an ex-RN officer.⁷²

68. Ibid., p. 220.

69. Jellicoe, John RJ, Report of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa on the Naval Mission to the Dominion of Canada, November-December, 1919, Ottawa, 1920, pp. 33-40.

70. Department of National Defence, Reports, 1934 and 1935, p. 16 and p. 19.

71. Entry of Officers, op.cit., p. 8.

72. Tucker, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 340-341.

World War Two

6. When the Second War started, the RCN found itself in the awkward position of having to expand rapidly without the trained personnel to undertake this task. Aid was sought from the RN and was readily given on a considerable scale. Even by 1945, the RCN was not completely self-sufficient and RN personnel still filled some instructional and administrative posts.⁷³

Although operational command of most Canadian ships remained in Canadian hands, training, organization and doctrine were based almost exclusively on RN lines. Even the methods adopted by her closest neighbour and most powerful ally, the USN, were only adopted after the RN had already done so.⁷⁴ In short, the standardizations in the Jellicoe Report were adhered to closely.

Even the command of the major technical training establishments, including the complex at HMCS Cornwallis, were entrusted to RN officers, at least in the early part of the war.⁷⁵ The RCN, instead of outgrowing its pre-war British traditions and practices was only more solidly confirmed in these practices.

Post-war Period

7. The close integration of the RCN and the RN continued on a non-operational basis after the war, particularly for officers and senior specialty trades who still took their advanced sea training and specialty training in the UK. In 1949, Rear Admiral E.R. Mainguy was appointed to report on certain disturbances in some RCN ships and he found that one of the most universal complaints by the men concerned was the lack of a Canadian identity within the RCN, resulting in confusion of Canadian and British personnel in foreign ports. Uniforms were identical and did not even carry a distinguishing shoulder patch. Coupled with this objection was the complaint that the RCN lacked Canadian traditions and the feeling that the RCN was trying to be but a pale imitation

73. Tucker, op.cit., vol. 2, p. 334.

74. Ibid., p. 334.

75. Ibid., p. 333.



of the "Nelson Tradition" of the RN. While RCN officers were found not to share this concern over a lack of Canadian identity and traditions, the commissioners recorded themselves as ".... unanimous in our sympathy...." with the sentiments expressed by the men.⁷⁶ These complaints and others of a more immediate and professional nature formed the basis for the report's recommendations in favour of a somewhat more Canadianized navy, especially through increasing the training of RCN officers in Canadian ships wherever possible. The lesson learned was that Canadian officers trained in RN ships and commanding British ratings were not then necessarily capable of effectively commanding Canadian crews.⁷⁷ The report went so far as to say that if adequate Canadian ships were not available then the possibility of using American ships should be investigated.⁷⁸ Enough adequate Canadian facilities were found the following year when preliminary sea training was started in HMC Ships.⁷⁹

8. The Mainguy Report and its immediate effects may then be regarded as a watershed in the history of the RCN. It marks what is, properly speaking, the RCN's past history from its present policies and practices. Standardization and integration almost immediately began to take place in another direction; towards the Atlantic Alliance.⁸⁰ At the same time a new National Defence Act was passed to standardize the practices within the three armed services as much as possible and other reforms already alluded to, began to be introduced to deal with specifically Canadian problems. These policies and reforms, started in 1951 and later, cannot be treated justly in a brief and general historical sketch. They will be studied in detail in future reports, dealing with specific problems of the RCN and the armed forces in general.

76. Canada, RCN, Report on Certain "Incidents" which occurred on board HMC Ships Athabasca, Crescent and Magnificent, by Rear Admiral ER Mainguy, Ottawa, 1949, p. 33.

77. Ibid., p. 37.

78. Ibid., p. 45.

79. Canada, Département de la Défense Nationale, Rapport, 1950, p. 389.

80. Ibid., Rapports, 1950 and 1951, p. 50 and p. 48.

Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism

ARMED FORCES HISTORICAL
STUDY
Part II

The Canadian Army
(Preliminary Draft)



Errata

1. Page 10, paragraph 2: There was no British offensive in 1778. For "offensive" read "campaigns".
2. Page 11, paragraph 4: The Royal Canadian Volunteer Regiment was a provincial corps, not a fencible regiment. For "1793" read "1794".
3. Page 24, paragraph 23: Army historians say that many of the qualified officers from Quebec were English-speaking from Montreal, Quebec and the Eastern Townships.
4. Page 42, paragraph 48: It was not decided to split the Canadian Army. The original idea was to send 1 Cdn. Inf. Div. and 1 Cdn. Army Tank Brigade to Sicily for battle experience and then to return them to the U.K. to indoctrinate the rest of the First Canadian Army.

General Comments

1. One comment made on this paper deplores the lack of a study of French-Canadian attitudes toward the Army. The commentator believes that these attitudes were a major factor governing policies which have developed or been adopted within the services to French-Canadians. Is not the reverse of this contention more pertinent?
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PREFACE

1. No attempt has been made to make this paper a detailed and exhaustive study of the role French-Canadians have played in the growth and development of the Canadian Army. The paper is intended as a broad and general introduction to the study being done on the Army as it exists today. To fill this task, only the general trends of development which have affected the representation of French-Canadians in the Army have been identified and traced. Three general trends thus appear which have affected the ethnic composition and the cultural pattern of the Canadian Army. The first of these trends corresponds with the period covered by the Sedentary Militia and the early years of the Volunteer Active Militia. Service in the Canadian militia was, in theory, universal and compulsory for all male Canadians of military age, and this principle produced, at least on paper, a Militia accurately reflecting the ethnic composition of the Canadian population. In practice the Militia was of little military significance, possessing no concrete and effective organization except in times of stress when it provided men to fill-out British regiments or to form ad hoc units in support of the British regulars. After the withdrawal of British troops following Confederation, a gradual shift began in the outlook and composition of the Militia. As the Militia and the small Permanent Force grew and became more professionally competent, French-Canadian representation began to decline. The Canadian Army depended increasingly on British resources for instruction and leadership as it began its professional development and as these ties increased, French-Canadians found the Army increasingly less congenial. The Boer War and the Great War accelerated this process which was then more solidly entrenched during the lean inter-war years. Between 1867 and 1939 Canada became increasingly independant of Britain but the Canadian Army during the same period,



as it became more professionally mature, also became increasingly patterned on the British model. The third general trend started during the Second War and marks the emergence of the Canadian Army as a relatively self-contained Canadian institution. Much of the pre-war Army's British pattern remained, but during the war and in the uneasy peace which followed, the Canadian Army relied to an ever greater extent on its own resources. In the process it became much more sensitive to the ethnic division of the country and instituted policies and practices to reflect this division within its own structure. The change was not complete, to be sure, and in many instances there was no evidence of a change taking place, but a shift in emphasis was apparent. The Army remained an English-speaking institution but it did become much more aware of itself and the problems affecting its composition.

2. The procedure used in this paper follows the same functional outline as that used for the study on the RCN: ethnic representation, language use, and cultural milieu. Within each functional section, a four-part chronological division has been used: 1763-1855; 1855-1902; 1902-1939; 1939 to the present. Emphasis has been placed on the sections dealing with the development of the Canadian Army since 1902 but the paper has traced its general development from the seventeenth century. Some description of the physical organization of the Army was necessary and this has been placed within the first functional section - ethnic representation. These descriptions have been kept as brief as possible and appear in the first few paragraphs of each chronological subdivision, sacrificing some continuity in this section. One alternative was to use a completely new section outlining the organization and characteristics of the Army as it developed. A second alternative was to weave the physical description of the Army in with the text concerned specifically with its ethnic composition and the policies and practices affecting that composition. A middle course has been followed, however, which may only prove to be an unsatisfactory compromise.



THE CANADIAN ARMY

A - INTRODUCTION

1. The Treaty of Paris in 1763 ended French rule in North America, and marked the beginning of the British civil administration of the former French colonies. This change in government had two important effects on the Canadian military organization. The continuity of militia regiments and their traditions was interrupted and the old system of relative self-reliance in military affairs was ended. From the beginning of the establishment of British government in Canada, Canadian defence was based on two basic principles which were to rule Canadian military policy for many years. The first of these principles was reliance on the supremacy of British sea-power which safeguarded Canada from any overseas attack and which also meant that Britain could rapidly move troops to Canada in time of need. The second principle was that there was to be a fairly large garrison of British troops maintained in Canada.¹ In time of war, Canada would supply the men to supplement the British forces but Britain would supply the leadership, professional and technical skill and the costly equipment and armament.² These two policies dominated Canadian military thinking up to very recent times. The growth of goodwill and peaceful intentions between Britain, the United States and Canada virtually precluded any military threat from a North American source and the naval strength of Britain and later the US eliminated any serious overseas threat to Canada. Similarly, it was not until the withdrawal of British Troops in 1870-71 that Canada had to give any serious consideration to supplying her own regular troops. Even then, no great progress was made because Canada was virtually assured of unconditional aid from Britain and the rest of the Empire if needed, and, in any case, there was no immediate threat to Canadian territory after the settlement of the Alabama Claims in 1871. One result

1. Stacey, CP, The Military Problems of Canada, Toronto, The Ryerson Press, 1940, p. 54.

2. Ibid., p. 55.

of this policy of depending on British Imperial forces for defence and on Canadian relative isolation from any military threat, was that the Canadian Army has been characterized by several periods of intense growth and achievement followed by periods of stagnation.

2. If there has been one consistent aim pursued by Canadian governments - both before and after 1867 - it has been one of the strictest economy in military expenditures. The result, not unnaturally, has been that the Canadian Army has not been able to develop all the facilities needed to become a true national institution reflecting the bi-racial character of the country. Instead, through long periods of its history, the Army has had to rely to a large extent on external resources for its professional development. Conversely the periods of growth and expansion of the army have usually been periods of great tension and the immediate demands for action have meant that the bi-racial nature of the army has often been overlooked in haste or else over-ruled in favour of "efficiency".

3. There is another factor that has actively operated to affect the ethnic composition of the Army. In threats to the territory of Canada - the American invasion of 1775, the War of 1812, the unrest surrounding the American Civil War and the Fenian raids, and to a lesser extent the troubles in the Red River area and the North West Territories - there has been considerable unanimity of opinion and universal enthusiasm for the Army. When Canadian troops have been used outside of Canada, however, there have followed serious rifts between French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians. While the effects of these differences have been felt mainly on the political level, they have also produced changes in the composition of the Army and it is with these effects that this paper will deal. Threats to Canadian territory have aided in developing a rough racial balance in Canadian military institutions. Use of Canadian troops abroad

has resulted in large and enthusiastic English-speaking participation and the withdrawal of French-speaking support, resulting in very low French-Canadian participation in the Army. The acceptance of external commitments following W.W.II and their wide acceptance by both major racial groups has, it is hoped, ended the feeling that external use of the Canadian Army is not in Canada's best interests, since little or no objection has been voiced with regard to using Canadian troops (French and English) from Korea to Cyprus.

4. There are four broad periods of development in the history of the Canadian Army. The first period stretches from 1763 to 1855 when the defence of Canada depended on British troops aided to a limited extent by a Canadian militia. The militia of this period was a sedentary militia and existed on paper on an impressive scale. Every Canadian male of military age (usually 16 to 60) was liable for military service and a muster of this militia was held in each county annually. In 1855 the Province of Canada created a Volunteer Active Militia which was armed, clothed, trained and paid for its services. This new militia organization was not a balanced force of all arms and services but it was nevertheless, a departure from the old sedentary militia system and the almost complete reliance on British troops. This system formed the pattern for the militia organization of Canada after Confederation, and when British troops were withdrawn in 1870-71 it became Canada's main defence force. The third period stretches from 1902 to World War II and marks the formation of a balanced army of all arms and services with the appropriate headquarter staffs. A permanent army developed in this period and Canada possessed for the first time in its history a standing military force, albeit a very modest one. A permanent force had been established before 1902 but that date marks the beginning of the formation of a balanced military system. The final period covers the dates from 1939 to the present. In this period Canada's army grew to a considerable size in the war and it continued to exist on a fairly large scale during the uneasy peace

following the war. This period, in fact, covers Canada's "present" army. On purely historical and military grounds there may be some disagreement with this division but considering the special topics this paper is concerned with, that is the ethnic and linguistic nature of the Army, this seems to be the most logical method of studying the development of the Canadian Army; from sedentary militia to voluntary active militia to an embryonic permanent force to a well established standing army. The report on the Army will approximately end in the 1950s. As with the Navy, this period marks the start of policies and reforms that are more closely connected with current operation of the Army rather than with its historical background and this period can best be studied by research into specific problems rather than in a general historical sketch.

THE OLD REGIME

1. With the end of company rule of New France in 1663 and the assumption of Royal government, there gradually came into being a Canadian defence system and militia organization. The Governor General was the Commander in Chief of all troops in Canada, both regular troops and militia. The first regiment of regular troops stationed in Canada was the Carignan-Salières Regiment which served in Canada during the Indian wars between 1665 and 1668. When this regiment was due to return to France the officers and men were encouraged to remain in Canada and many of them took advantage of the generous offers of land and gratuities and settled in Canada. These ex-members of the French regular army were to prove an important element in the formation of a Canadian militia system.

2. In April, 1669 a letter from Louis XIV to the Governor of New France instructed the latter to establish a militia system by appointing officers and organizing companies based on the parish. All males of a military age were liable for service and these militia companies were to drill once a month and to have arms and ammunition available at all times.³ It was not until 1673, however, under the Governship of Frontenac that any concerted effort was made to fulfill these orders of the King. As the organization of the militia progressed under the guidance and leadership of Frontenac, the militia captains began to acquire important civil functions and they became more and more the executive agents of the government.⁴ The militia companies themselves were rarely called out en masse except in extreme emergencies, but rather they formed a convenient manpower pool for use on special projects and missions. There was no higher militia organization than the company and when called out for service militiamen were used to form ad hoc units or else were incorporated into French regular or Colonial units, as they were for example in 1759 and 1760.⁵

3. Stacey, CP, An Introduction to the study of Military History for Canadian Students, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1955, p. 3.

4. Stanley, G.F.G., Canada's Soldiers, Toronto, MacMillan & Company, 1960, p. 23.

5. Stacey, Military History, op. cit., p. 4

3. The Canadian militiaman was not a regular soldier and he excelled in the form of fighting he knew best and which he had learned from a hard master - the Iroquois. Thus it was that the Canadian militia proved most successful in border raids on the English colonies to the south and in ambush actions such as those carried out against Washington's force in 1754, the defeat of Braddock's large force at the Monongahela in June of the following year, or in the many raiding expeditions led by d'Iberville.

4. In 1690 "Les Compagnies franches de la Marine" were formed in France for service in her various colonies. These troops were not part of the French regular army but were under the control of the Department of Marine which administered France's colonial empire. The marine troops were, in all but name, regular troops for service in the colonies. Approximately 28 companies of these troops served in Canada and in 1691 Canadian "Troupes de la Marine" were attached to the organization. From 1697 Canadians were enrolled as officers in the "Troupes de la Marine" and in quite large numbers. Canadian men were also enlisted in the ranks but, not to such a large extent.⁶ The Governor was commander in chief of these troops and there was an "Intendant" appointed to provide the administrative and supply requirements of the organization. In short, the "Troupes de la Marine" companies stationed in Canada became in fact, if not in theory, Canada's first permanent army. These Marine companies and the militia organization were Canada's major - and often only - defence. Between the withdrawal of the Carignan-Salières Regiment in 1668 and the dispatch of 3000 troops from France on the eve of war in 1755, there were no French regular troops in Canada. Thus, while not having the strength to seriously consider a large-scale offensive war against the large and restless English colonies to the south, Canada was able, through an efficient militia organization, daring and able leaders and the adoption of frontier methods of raiding and ambush, to protect

6. Stanley, op cit., p. 27

herself and to often demoralize and worry the much stronger English colonies. It was not until the introduction of European methods of warfare during the Seven Years War that this organization and its rough frontier tactics became inadequate.

5. In 1755 a large body of French troops under the command of General Montcalm and the Baron Dieskau were sent to Canada in anticipation of the war that was declared the next year. The attempt to combine the Canadian militia with French troops was soon to lead to considerable disagreement between the commanders of the French regular troops and the Governor (Vaudreuil). This disagreement arose not only from the split command of the military forces in Canada - the Governor as Commander in Chief versus the French regular officers Montcalm and Dieskau - but also was concerned with the tactical use of the troops. The colonists favoured the irregular warfare with which they were familiar and the French officers favoured the form of European warfare with which they were familiar. As the war progressed, the regular soldiers on both sides became more and more the masters of the situation and the Seven Years War was fought largely between French and British regular troops with the militia playing a subordinate role.⁷ In the end, New France fell to superior British forces and with the treaty of Paris, 1763, Canada became a British possession.

6. A military government was established in Canada in 1759. The first act of the military authorities was to return to France all the regular regiments and those colonial troops who also wished to return to France, although many of the latter chose to remain in Canada. The militia was then disarmed except for a fowling piece which the habitant was allowed to keep if he took an oath of allegiance, or was certified as being of a pacific nature.⁸ Militia officers had to resign but they were often recommissioned by the

7. Ibid., p. 73

8. Ibid., p. 98



British and left in control of the old militia organization which was retained by the British Military authorities. These militia officers retained most of their civil functions and carried out their tasks without any apparent disloyalty to their new rulers or without inciting their companies against the British. The militia officers lost their civil powers in 1764 when, as Roman Catholics, they were barred by the terms of English law from holding civil posts, but their prestige and informal influence and power remained for many years.

B - ETHNIC REPRESENTATION

The Sedentary Militia, 1763 - 1855

1. The retention of the old French militia system in Canada after 1763 meant that the militia organization was manned and officered by French-speaking personnel. The organization was of limited military value, however, as the main defence of British North America rested on a large garrison of British troops and the militia organization was used mainly in the civilian administration of the newly acquired territories. The militia was first used in a military campaign by the British when a battalion of Canadian militia was mobilized for use in the war against Pontiac. The proclamation issued by General Murray in May, 1764, appointed J.B. des Bergères Sieur de Rigauville Commanding Officer of the French-speaking militia battalion. The other officers of the battalion were also Canadians who had experience in the Canadian militia or other colonial forces before 1763. Montreal and Quebec were to supply two companies each and Three Rivers was to supply one company, but recruiting was slow and General Murray finally had to threaten conscription, which at that time was part of the old militia system and not an innovation of the military government. The battalion was finally completed by 6 April 1764, and saw some service during the uprising. Its main advantage was perhaps more political than military since most of the fighting was done by British regular forces and American provincial troops.⁹ This force was supplemented by 400 boatmen also recruited for the campaign and the whole force served under General Bradscreet and was duly recognized for its services.¹⁰
2. During the American Revolt the participation of the Canadian militia was on a very small scale. The first action fought by a Canadian militia unit took place at St. Jean in June, 1775 when M.

9. Stanley, G.F.G., "The Canadian Militia During the Colonial Period", Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, Spring 1946, p. 30.

10. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, op. cit., p. 101.

de Belestre and 80 Canadians retook the fort from the Americans who had captured it earlier. This was the first action fought by Canadian troops unaided by British regular troops and the victory helped improve morale throughout the militia. The reverses suffered by Canadian and British troops later in the year severely affected the morale of the militia, however, and the next large battle in which militia personnel took part was the siege of Quebec during the winter of 1775-76. Generally, French participation was meager and Governor Carleton had to threaten and finally use compulsory service to raise militia troops during this period. Approximately 500 Canadians troops finally took part in helping repel the American invasion, but they did not form a large contingent of the British forces in the country and formed less than half the garrison at Quebec.¹¹ When the siege lifted and the invading American forces withdrew from Canada, participation by the Canadians virtually ceased. While willing to defend their own territory, the Canadians were unwilling to take part in the British offensive of 1777-78 and Sir Guy Carleton was able to supply only 105 Canadian troops for the campaign.¹²

3. The existing militia organization was not changed significantly in 1777 when the Council passed its first ordinance respecting the militia. The universal liability to service of all males of military age was retained and so were most of the duties and responsibilities imposed by the old French militia laws. The first major change in the militia organization of British North America did not occur until the passage of the Constitution Act in 1791 which created the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada. The militia laws of Upper Canada were based on the militia laws then prevailing in England including universal liability for service for those men of military age in the colony.¹³ In Lower Canada, the militia laws were still

11. Stanley, "The Canadian Militia", op. cit., p. 31

12. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, op. cit., p. 121.

13. Chambers, Capt. E.J., The Canadian Militia, Montreal, The Mortimer Press, n.d., p. 33.



based on the old French laws and differed from the English practice followed in Upper Canada in that the men of military age in the colony were also subject to compulsory service for civil projects, that is, the idea of the "Corvée" was still retained. Similarly, the militia officers retained many of their old civil duties and functions either formally (eg. they were also coroners) or as perquisites.¹⁴

4. During the Napoleonic Wars, many British regiments were withdrawn from the British North American colonies. To help fill the gap left by these withdrawals, fencible regiments were raised in the colonies for service in North America. The Royal Canadian Volunteer Regiment was raised in Lower Canada as a fencible regiment in 1793. The regiment consisted of two battalions, one composed of French-speaking personnel from the Quebec area and the other composed of English-speaking personnel from the Montreal area and Loyalists from Glengarry in Upper Canada.¹⁵ The French-speaking battalion was commanded by Lieutenant-colonel the Baron of Longueuil and all of his officers but three were French-speaking Canadians. The second battalion also had five French-speaking officers. The Regiment's main claim to usefulness seems to be that it proved to be a good school for many officers and NCOs who were destined to take part in the war of 1812.¹⁶ The regiment was disbanded in 1802 and was not re-raised because of an adverse report made upon it by General Hunter in 1799.¹⁷ These fencible regiments raised in the colonies were not part of the colonial militia but were part of the British army. They were carried on the rolls of the British army and served under British rules and regulations and under direct British command, but were eligible for service only in North America although the New Brunswick Regiment was made a regiment of the line in 1810 and thus eligible for service anywhere in the Empire.

14. Ibid., p. 33

15. Ibid., p. 36

16. Sulte, Benjamin, Histoire de la milice canadienne-française, Montreal Desbarats et Cie 1897, p. 19.

17. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, op. cit., p. 142



5. The militia staff of Lower Canada was almost wholly French speaking during this early period¹⁸ and remained so up until the war of 1812. The large influx of Loyalists following the American Revolt was to have an effect on the militias of both Upper and Lower Canada and as the war of 1812 approached, these men played an ever larger role in the militia organizations of the two colonies. Many of the Loyalists had had extensive experience in loyalist regiments during the American Revolt and were thus a ready source of experienced and willing officers and NCOs for the militias of Upper and Lower Canada. As the War of 1812 approached, five fencible regiments were raised in the British colonies, including the Canadian Fencible Infantry Regiment, recruited largely from the French-speaking population of Lower Canada, but officered by British regular soldiers.¹⁹ The Voltigeurs, raised and commanded by Lt. Col. de Salaberry - a Canadian who had served with some distinction in the British regular army - was a militia unit raised in Lower Canada as a sort of elite corps and was virtually on the same footing as the fencible regiments. The only major battle fought in Lower Canada during the war was the action fought at Chateauguay by de Salaberry and the Voltigeurs supported by other militia units. The militia units in this battle were almost all French speaking and the Voltigeurs were almost completely composed of French-speaking soldiers and officers.²⁰

6. Many militia units were raised in Lower Canada during the war²¹ but most of the fighting was done in Upper Canada and the Lower Canadian militia saw little active service. The bulk of the fighting was done by British troops and where the militia played a conspicuous part it was in the fencible regiments and long service militia units, not in ad hoc units formed of the sedentary militia. Nevertheless,

18. Sulte, op. cit., p. 26

19. Chambers, op. cit., p. 52

20. Sulte, op. cit., p. 32 - 33

21. Irving, L. Hamfray, Officers of the British Forces in Canada, Welland Tribune Print, 1908. Contains detailed lists of British and Canadian officers of regular, fencible and militia units which were used in the war.



the legend grew that the Canadian militia won the war of 1812 with a little help from the regular army. This is simply not correct and while recognizing that the militia did fill its role of supplying manpower and ad hoc formations to bolster British regiments, one must also recall that it was British policy to maintain a garrison of regular troops in Canada equal in size to the whole American regular forces.²² It was these regular troops who bore the brunt of the fighting and carried the war to the United States in 1814 and it was their officers who supplied the leadership and technical abilities needed to wage the war successfully.²³

7. After the War of 1812, the militia system in Canada remained unchanged - due mostly to the flattering picture it drew of itself and its role in the late war. It remained a useful source of manpower for ad hoc units that had to be formed from time to time. It played a small role in the rebellion in Lower Canada in 1837 and a larger role in the rebellion in Upper Canada, but these participants were not enrolled in militia units in the modern sense. The militia personnel who took part in the rebellion in Lower Canada were almost all English speaking and served only as a minor adjunct to the British troops which carried out the task of restoring order.²⁴

8. Even with the growth of limited self-government in the 1840s and 1850s the colonies were reluctant to change their militia organizations since any change that would make the colonial militias more efficient would also make them more expensive. In addition, a more efficient militia would also encourage the British government to give the colonies more responsibility for their own defence and would lead to withdrawal of British troops, again forcing the colonies to assume a larger expense in order to partially replace these troops. The only change of any significance during the period was the result of the Act of Union, 1840. The militia laws of the

22. Stanley, "The Canadian Militia", op. cit., p. 33.

23. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, op. cit., p. 178. See also Stacey, Military History, op. cit., p. 8; and Irving, op. cit., for a comparative list of British regular units and active Canadian militia corps.

24. Stanley, "The Canadian Militia", op. cit., p. 38



two old provinces of Upper and Lower Canada continued to exist until 1846 when they were superseded by a militia act patterned after the laws of Upper Canada, thus ending the distinctive civil responsibilities of the militia in Canada East.²⁵ This change did little to make the militia more efficient, since the basic principle remained the same. The militia was a sedentary militia which only existed on paper except for the annual muster parade. Control of the military forces in British North America thus remained in British hands not so much through the designs of the Colonial Office as through the unwillingness of the colonies to bear any large expenditures for their own military defence.²⁶ The few reasonably efficient volunteer militia units that did come into existence did so through the enthusiasm of their officers and men and were "tolerated rather than encouraged by the authorities".²⁷

Volunteer Active Militia, 1855-1902.

9. Apart from the few unappreciated and informal volunteer militia regiments, the ethnic structure of the militia remained proportionately balanced between English and French-speaking Canadians simply because, in theory, service was universal and compulsory. This balance existed only on paper, however, as did the militia itself. A paper organization also only needed a paper staff and so the only military organization of any real effectiveness was the large British garrison maintained in North America. The passage of the Militia Act of 1855, then, can be considered as the beginning of Canada's modern military system. The main defence of the country still rested on the British Army and the sedentary militia but the Act introduced a new factor into the military thinking of the country: there must be a small, partially trained body of militia available for immediate use in emergencies.

25. Chambers, op. cit., p. 63.

26. See Great Britain, House of Commons, "Report on Colonial Defence, 1859" and "Report of the House of Commons Committee, 1861". Contained in a volume entitled The Canadian Militia, n.p., n.d.

27. Chambers, op. cit., p. 64.



Service in this new "Active Militia" was to be voluntary (but the liability of any man of military age to compulsory service was in no way impaired by this new clause, at least in theory), and these volunteers would be uniformed, armed and trained even in peace.

The limit set on this volunteer force was 5,000. The volunteer militia created by the Act of 1855 also had an important side effect: it marked the decline of the Sedentary Militia system (the annual muster day was dropped in 1856) and with it the idea of universal military service.²⁸

10. The volunteer system became more and more popular in the country during the period of unrest following the "Trent Affair" and the start of the American Civil War. John A. Macdonald and George Etienne Cartier tried to have the limit of the volunteer Active Militia raised to 50,000. This move was vigourously opposed by the Liberals and with the aid of French-speaking government members, they were able to defeat the government. The proposed government bill was based on the report of a special commission to enquire into the militia and to prepare a bill thereon. The commission was composed of Cartier, Macdonald, Galt, MacNab, Taché, Lysons, Campbell and Cameron and although their recommendations covered many aspects of the militia and made several recommendations for its improvement, there is no mention in the report of the use of the French language or of the role and existence of French-speaking militia units.²⁹ In any case, neither the report nor the Bill based upon it were accepted by the House, but the following year, the new government saw fit to raise the strength of the Active Militia to 35,000 men and provided for the raising of "service battalions" by ballot, ie. by conscription. This latter proposal was never carried out.

28. Stacey, Military History, op. cit., p. 13.

29. See, Canada, House of Commons, Report of the Commissioners appointed to report a plan for the better organization of the Department of Adjutant General of Militia and the best means of Re-organizing the Militia of this Province and to prepare a Bill thereon, Quebec, Queen's Printer (Stewart Derbyshire & Geo. Desbarats), 1862.

11. The first militia act of the new Dominion government was passed in 1868 and was based on the 1855 Act and had the effect of extending the volunteer system to the Maritime provinces. The Dominion was divided into nine military districts (MD) each under the command of a Lieutenant Colonel who held his appointment on a full time basis. There were twenty-two brigade divisions and each of these in turn was divided into regimental divisions. It is interesting to note that the regimental divisions, with very few exceptions, corresponded to the federal electoral districts.³⁰ This organization has been attributed to George Cartier³¹ since he was the first Minister of Militia and Defence and he apparently specifically asked for that appointment.³² The appointment of Cartier to the militia portfolio, and Macdonald's tenure of the same portfolio in 1862 is a good indication of the importance attached to this department. It also ensured that a good proportion of the staff of the department would be French speaking. The first deputy minister was French speaking and this post continued to be held by French-speaking Canadians until the Second World War.

12. For some years the British government had been becoming more and more displeased with the large military expenditures it was making in the self-governing colonies of the Empire, and had been trying to persuade these colonies to undertake a greater share of their own defences. In 1869, Britain had 50,025 troops stationed in the colonies, 16,185 in Canada (including Newfoundland).³³ The settlement of the Alabama Claims finally produced the circumstances favourable to the withdrawal of these troops from Canada, and they were withdrawn in 1870-71 except for a garrison at Halifax. This was an important event in the development of

30. Chambers, op. cit., p. 89.

31. Sulte, op. cit., p. 65.

32. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, op. cit., p. 234.

33. Canada, House of Commons, "Letter from Mr. Secretary Cardwell to Earl Granville, The War Office, 25th January, 1869", in Returns to the Addresses of the Senate and House of Commons Relative to the Withdrawal of Troops from the Dominion, Ottawa, J.B. Taylor, 1871, p. 4.

the Canadian Army since it meant that Canada could no longer rely on the British garrisons for the country's immediate defence or for the training of the militia. Canada either had to make some other arrangements for the training of her militia or be content with a poorly trained and amateur military organization. To help fill the training requirement a battery of artillery was stationed at the Citadel in Quebec and another at Fort Henry in Kingston, in 1871. These batteries were established on a permanent basis and were to provide instruction and training for militia units. This small Permanent Force was increased in 1883 by the addition of one troop of cavalry, another artillery battery and three infantry companies for the same purposes of training and instructing the the militia. In 1885 a school for mounted infantry was opened at Winnipeg and the following year two more companies of infantry were added to the Permanent Force, raising the total strength for the force from 750 all ranks to 1,000 all ranks. In Quebec, the artillery continued to maintain one battery at Quebec City and the Cavalry School also was stationed there. One of the infantry companies was stationed at St. Jean, Quebec and was later joined by the Cavalry School when it moved from Quebec City. This, then was the organization of the Canadian military establishment between 1867 and 1902: a small permanent force used mainly for instruction; a volunteer active militia organized into military districts; and a reserve militia on paper which was the remnants of the old sedentary militia.

13. The military staff at Ottawa was ludicrously small throughout the period. It consisted of a General Officer Commanding who was a British regular officer loaned to Canada and who assumed the rank of a major general in the Canadian militia. He was assisted by an Adjutant General who was normally a Canadian militia officer, an Inspector General of Artillery and Warlike Stores and one aide de camp. Before 1874 the senior military officer in the Dominion had been the Adjutant General, also an English officer on loan to



the Dominion government. All non-operational military functions were under strict civilian control within the Department of Militia and Defence, including arms, equipment, stores, buildings and maintenance of military establishment while the GOC was responsible for the military command and discipline of the militia.

14. The growing Canadian Permanent Force was used in three major campaigns during this period. Two of these campaigns were on Canadian territory and met considerable support from French Canada. The third campaign was a foreign imperialist war and was roundly condemned in French-Canadian opinion. The first of the three campaigns was the Red River Expedition of 1870. This campaign was not a wholly Canadian one since British regular troops were used but the Canadian government did contribute one battalion of infantry from Ontario and one from Quebec. Enlistment officially started on 1 May 1870 and the Quebec battalion was placed under the command of Lt. Col. Casault who had served as an officer in the British army. The full force was composed of 28 officers and 409 men of the British Army and 56 officers and 700 men of the Canadian militia.³⁴ The militia battalions remained on garrison duty at Fort Garry during the winter of 1870-71 and gradually dwindled in strength as home leaves were granted and soldiers were granted permission to settle in the Red River area. The force finally returned to Eastern Canada in June, 1871, leaving behind 80 troops at Fort Garry under Lt. Col. Casault.

15. The second major campaign of the period was the first all-Canadian military expedition ever undertaken. There had been minor skirmishes with the Fenians during the 1860s which did not concern any Imperial troops but the campaign in the North West Territories in 1885 was the first major all-Canadian campaign and the first in which Canada's new Permanent Force units took part. The only

34. Sulte, op. cit., p. 74.

non-Canadian elements of the expedition were the GOC and a few staff officers. Militia units were mobilized from most of the Canadian provinces and both Quebec "city" battalions were accepted for service; the 9th Voltigeurs from Quebec and the Carabinières de Mont Royal from Montreal. Support for the enterprise was fairly strong from Quebec and it was not until the campaign ended and the two French-speaking commanding officers were left off the GOC's list of personnel recommended for decorations that antipathy was aroused. The Minister of Militia and Defence - a French Canadian - refused to forward the list unless these gentlemen were included and this in turn drew the wrath of English-speaking Canadians.³⁵

16. The third campaign of this period where Canadian troops were used in considerable numbers was the most controversial military campaign yet undertaken by Canada. For the first time a marked difference of opinion existed between French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians over military policy. The policy followed prior to this time had been very similar to the one outlined and followed by Macdonald in 1885. During the expedition to the Sudan, the Colonial Office had sounded Canadian opinion about sending Canadian troops for the campaign. Macdonald's reply was that the most favourable way of arranging this was for the War Office to authorize recruiting in Canada for service in the British Army as had been done in 1858 when the 100th Foot (Prince of Wales' Royal Canadian Regiment) had been raised in Canada. Macdonald did not think that conditions in the Sudan warranted calling out the Canadian Militia under clause 61 of the Militia Act.³⁶ Although the War Office did not avail itself of Macdonald's suggestion, the idea was simplicity

35. Morton, Capt. D.W., The Place of French-Canadians in the Canadian Militia, 1867-1914, a Submission to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, p. 12.

36. Stacey, CP., "John A. Macdonald on Raising Troops in Canada for Imperial Service", The Canadian Historical Review, December, 1957. Contains a letter from Macdonald to Lord Melgund, February, 1885, p. 39-40.

itself. Recruiting for British regiments in Canada would satisfy Canadian boosters of the Empire and at the same time give the anti-imperialists no reason to complain of outright Canadian participation in a foreign war. Furthermore, it would not cost Canada a penny.³⁷

17. The clamour for intervention in the Boer War from English Canadians finally forced Laurier to depart from this policy of no intervention to a limited extent. French Canadian opinion was almost universally hostile to this action and English Canadian opinion was as universally favourable. Canadian participation finally amounted to 2,500 men serving in Canadian units and a further 5,000 serving with British units. Quebec's participation in this war was limited to the provision of an infantry company from Montreal which was mainly English speaking and another infantry company from Quebec commanded by French-speaking officers. In the first contingent there were six French-speaking officers out of a total of 38. In the second contingent the commanding officer of the 1st Canadian Mounted Rifles was French-speaking and the 2nd Canadian Mounted Rifles had two French-speaking officers. Paradoxically, the battery of artillery recruited in Ontario had two French-speaking officers while the artillery battery recruited from the Quebec City area had no French-speaking officers.³⁸ While it was certainly not the only factor leading to withdrawal of French Canadian support of the Militia, even Laurier's qualified acceptance of the principle that Canadian troops could be used outside Canada for imperial purposes was not designed to increase French Canadian enthusiasm for, and willingness to participate in, the growth of a Canadian army.

18. The ethnic composition of the militia and the small permanent forces during the period showed considerable change as the nineteenth century progressed. The Act of 1855 provided for active militia

37. Ibid., p. 38.

38. Figures are compiled from the Supplementary Report of the Department of Militia and Defence, 1899-1900, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1901.

units of company size recruited on a local geographic basis. These units were small and the officers could have a close contact with, and knowledge of, their men. These independent companies formed the basis of the militia units that were authorized in 1859, some of which exist to this day. After the passage of the Militia Act of 1868, Ontario militia battalions were the first accepted in the new Dominion militia and in April, 1869, a dozen Quebec units were formed and accepted. In the militia organization of the Dominion, MD5 comprised the English-speaking units in the Montreal area, MD6 contained the French-speaking units of the Montreal area and MD7 contained all the units in the Quebec City area, most of which were French speaking. After 1874, militia appropriations began to drop and a distinction was made between rural and city units, with unfortunate effects on the former. City units could drill regularly and could attend summer camp once a year but the rural units could not meet as readily for training throughout the year and were limited to one concentrated training period every second year. This change was important for the Quebec French-speaking militia units since many of them were rural units, and their training and efficiency suffered heavily under the new restrictions. The Quebec French-speaking city units were as good as any in the Dominion but there were only two French-speaking city battalions.³⁹ A reorganization in 1892 further affected the French-speaking militia units in Quebec when MD5 and MD6 were reorganized on a geographical basis, thus transferring many French-speaking units to MD5 and some English-speaking units to MD6.

19. The establishment of two permanent force artillery batteries in 1870 was primarily to provide training facilities for the militia and this meant that they had to be able to give instruction in French. Both batteries were commanded by British officers on loan but "B"

39. Units were the 9th Voltigeurs (Quebec City) and the 65th Carabinières (Montreal).

Battery, located in Quebec, had a large proportion of French-speaking personnel. Two of its three officers were French speaking and 52 of its 138 men were French speaking.⁴⁰ A cavalry school was established in Quebec in 1883 but it was an English-speaking establishment in contrast to the infantry school established at St. Jean in the same year of which only one officer was not French speaking.⁴¹ All other permanent force units were entirely English speaking and were stationed outside Quebec. The exchange of artillery batteries between Quebec and Kingston in 1880 further weakened the ability of the Permanent Forces to give instruction in French to Quebec militia units. The new battery transferred from Kingston was entirely English speaking.

20. Officers at this period were appointed by the government, which helped to ensure a rough proportionate balance between French-speaking and English-speaking officers. Officers did not, however, receive substantive commissions until they had qualified at one of the schools of military instruction operated by the small permanent force and all but one of these schools gave instruction only in English. A further source of officers for the militia and the permanent force was the Royal Military College opened in 1876 at Kingston.

21. The first commandant of the RMC was an English officer as was the military staff of the college. All instruction was in English and entrance requirements strongly stressed mathematics and science. French was neither a requirement for entrance nor a seriously taught subject and, in the very first report of the college, the instructor of modern languages complained of the cadets' lack of proper school training in French.⁴²

40. Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1871, p. 93.

41. Morton, op. cit., p. 4

42. Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1876, p. 208.

22. In establishing the college at Kingston, the original intention was that each military district was to send two cadets per year to the college and that these cadets were then to be trained for civilian employment with enough military knowledge to be available for service in the militia in time of need. In 1880, the Canada Gazette announced that the first class of cadets were to receive commissions in the militia and that they would be regularly promoted as they became qualified by age, rank and seniority. In addition, these cadets were to be appointed to all permanent militia posts as they progressed in their careers.⁴³ The top prizes at the college, however, were four commissions in the British regular army and in 1885 this number was augmented by the offer of 24 additional commissions to graduates of RMC. Fourteen undergraduates also received commissions in the British army in the same year,⁴⁴ and so much of the value of the college as a training ground for young Canadians who would be useful in the military and civil development of the new Dominion was lost. Thus the combination of entrance examinations stressing mathematics and science, instruction given only in English, the highest award being a career in the British army, and lack of government support for the proposal that the top prizes should be civilian appointments in the Dominion government service,⁴⁵ all combined to make the RMC attractive to English-speaking Canadians but not to French-speaking Canadians. By 1900 only ten of 255 graduates of the RMC were French speaking and most of these came from prominent French Canadian families that had long been active in the militia.⁴⁶

23. The schools of military instruction - first started at the British garrisons in 1864 - also failed to provide enough qualified French-speaking officers for the militia or the permanent force. The capacity to instruct in French steadily declined as outlined

43. Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1880, p. 270.

44. Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1885, p. 190-191.

45. Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1880, p. 1.

46. Morton, op. cit., p. 5.



previously and after the change of artillery batteries in 1880 the only school giving instruction in French was the infantry school at St. Jean. The failure to provide for the professional instruction of French-speaking officers and NCOs was particularly depressing for the rural militia units in Quebec. Not only would the officers of these units have a greater problem attending the schools of instruction in the few large cities but there would also be a smaller number of bilingual officers in rural units than in the city units and thus a far smaller number of officers qualified at English-speaking schools of military instruction.⁴⁷ Up to 1870 there were more officers from Quebec with certificates of qualifications than there were from Ontario and the ratio of those holding first class certificates was two to one in favour of Quebec.⁴⁸ After 1870 as funds for the militia began to fall, Quebec lost its leading position. In 1874 the number of French-speaking candidates for commissions and certificates from the schools of military instruction in Quebec had been 59 of 102 applicants. In the same year, nine of the 41 candidates who received commissions or certificates from boards of examiners in Quebec were French speaking.⁴⁹ By 1890, the proportion of officers, NCOs and men with French names who received certificates of qualification from a school of military instruction in Quebec or from RMC had dropped to the following figures.⁵⁰

Cavalry School	2 of 37
Artillery School	4 of 53
Engineer School	0 of 8
Infantry School	29 of 266
RMC (MQ)	<u>1 of 6</u>
Total	36 of 370

24. Enlisted personnel for the active militia units were recruited on a local basis and on a strict voluntary basis. Response in the early years was enthusiastic and the problem was more to control

47. Ibid., p. 7-8.

48. Chambers, op. cit., p. 89.

49. Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1874, p. 304-305 and p. 313-314.

50. Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1890, p. 192-198.

the size of the Volunteer Active Militia rather than to recruit it up to strength. Units would often be formed and then disbanded after the first lot of recruits had finished its term of service but there was usually another unit formed immediately from a new group of enthusiasts. This policy was as true of Quebec militia units as for any in Ontario, but by the 1870s more peaceful and less tense conditions returned to North America and interest began to flag in the militia. By 1871 the Deputy Adjutants General of MD5 and MD6 recommended use of the ballot to fill the vacancies in the militia units while the Deputy Adjutant General of MD7 noted that the voluntary system was not supplying enough recruits.⁵¹ The following year he too recommended use of the ballot.⁵² The malaise was not universal, however, and at the summer training period for MD7, the 23rd (County Beauce) battalion was present to a man, all of them French-speaking Canadians.⁵³ In 1874, the Shefford Field Battery under the command of Major Amyrauld arrived at summer camp at full strength and with complete camp equipment after a march of 56 miles.⁵⁴ It was later shown that Major Amyrauld supplied the wagons at his own expense and also supplied the provisions for the march at his own expense.⁵⁵ No comparable enthusiasm was shown by any English-speaking regiment in Quebec at the time.

25. Personnel for the small permanent force units that started to develop in 1871 were men from the volunteer active militia who signed to serve for a definite period on a full time basis. Except for the Quebec artillery battery, already mentioned, no other permanent force unit was French speaking until the establishment of the infantry school at St. Jean in 1883. Except for artillery and

51. Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1871, p. 21, p. 27, p. 30.

52. Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1872, p. LXXII.

53. Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1871, p. 30.

54. Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1874, p. 25.

55. Ibid., p. 67.

infantry, all instruction at the military schools was done in English. The capacity of these military schools to instruct in French was further impaired when the artillery batteries at Quebec and Kingston changed places in 1880. The battery taking up residence at Quebec was then composed of English-speaking personnel and their value as instructors for the French-speaking militia units in Quebec was low. Also, the change of assignment of the two permanent force artillery batteries led to another effect that was to prove to be a continuing factor in the development of a Canadian army. Service in the Permanent Force meant that eventually personnel would move from Quebec and this meant breaking family ties and moving to an environment often very different from Quebec's. The move of the Quebec artillery battery to Kingston in 1880 was the first instance of this happening and it led to dissatisfaction on the part of the French-speaking personnel of the battery and their gradual withdrawal from service as their enlistments ended. The same became true for other permanent force units: service meant breaking Quebec ties at some time in the career of the soldier or else it meant limiting the career prospects of the soldier to what could be provided within Quebec. In the early years of the permanent force, this was not, perhaps, a serious limitation but as the Canadian army developed, service outside Quebec became more and more essential to the development of a successful career.

The Modern Army, 1902-1939

26. Following the Boer War a considerable reorganization of Canadian military forces took place. The war had shown that the Canadian militia had become seriously unbalanced, with too much weight given to the arms and very little thought given to the ancillary services necessary for a well-balanced and effective force. Accordingly, the Canadian Army Medical Corps was formed in 1904 (from the Militia Army Medical Services formed in 1899); a Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers was formed in 1903; the Army

Service Corps, the Canadian Ordnance Corps, the Canadian Corps of Guides and the Canadian Corps of Signals were formed in the same year; the Corps of military Staff Clerks was formed in 1905; and the Canadian Army Pay Corps in 1906. In 1906 the strength of the Permanent Force was raised to 5,000 all ranks. The permanent Force of the Dominion was growing and playing a more important role but the backbone of the Canadian military system still remained the Volunteer Active Militia. To facilitate its control and the control of the new permanent force establishment - which existed mainly as a training facility for the militia and to run the new headquarters organizations - a command structure was superimposed on the old system of military districts. This was only true of Eastern Canada, the western area of the country remained organized on the old system. The new army commands were Western Ontario, Eastern Ontario, Quebec and the Maritime Provinces. Ontario thus had a command organization equal to that of Quebec and the maritime provinces combined. Most of the new permanent force schools and bases were established in Ontario and the first major military camp in the Dominion was established at Petawawa in 1904.

27. The most important reorganization of the period was the abolition of the post of General Officer Commanding and the creation of the Militia Council by the Militia Act of 1904. The 1904 Act gave the Minister unquestioned control over the militia and the Defence Council - patterned after the British Army Council - was an advisory body for the Minister. The council consisted of the minister, the deputy minister, the civilian accountant of the department, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), the Adjutant General (AG), the Quartermaster General (QMG), and the Master General of Ordnance. The Act of 1904 also abolished the stipulation that the senior militia officer in the Dominion had to be a British officer not below the rank of colonel in the regular army. British officers of the same rank as Canadian officers but

junior in seniority were no longer to have precedence over their Canadian counterparts and the GOC of British troops at Halifax was to command all armed forces in Canada in time of war only if he was the senior officer in the Dominion.⁵⁶

28. In 1910 the militia was reorganized on a divisional basis to make any possible mobilization more efficient in case of war. When WWI did start, however, the new mobilization plans were not followed which meant that new units were formed for service with the Canadian Expeditionary Force and that existing militia regiments were not used. In addition, the camp at Petawawa was not used for mobilization and a completely new camp at Valcartier was created. There was thus no continuity of unit traditions and ties in the CEF and as a result no recognition of the use of French-speaking units, although militia units were called upon to provide recruits for CEF units being raised in their area. It was only after a special delegation of prominent men from Quebec (Rodolphe Lemieux, Senator Belcourt and Sir Wilfrid Laurier⁵⁷) had an interview with the Prime Minister that a French-speaking battalion was formed on September 15, 1914. This unit did not receive a place in the First Division and was placed into the Second Division where it was brought up to strength by drafting French-speaking recruits from other units that had been raised in Quebec. The Canadian Corps was formed in September 1915 and by the end of the war consisted of four divisions with supporting and ancillary troops as well as a large base organization in the United Kingdom. In all, 424,589 Canadians served overseas during the war but the 22nd Battalion was the only French-speaking regiment or unit in this large war machine. In 1917 another French-speaking battalion had been authorized but it was never completed.

29. Following the war Canada reverted to her post war military organization, relying on the volunteer active militia to provide the bulk of her fighting forces in time of need and maintaining a

56. Chambers, op. cit., p. 108.

57. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, op. cit., p. 337.

small permanent force to provide instruction for the militia and to act as a nucleus around which the militia could be mobilized. The strength of the permanent force was set at 10,000 (a figure never approached in practice) and the 22nd Battalion (later the Royal 22e Regiment) was one of the three infantry regiments chosen to form part of the Permanent Force. It was the only French-speaking unit in the Permanent Force. The militia continued to play an important role and militia units perpetuated CEF units or were continuations of pre war militia units. Following the war the reaction of French-speaking militia units to active support for summer training was slightly less favourable than Quebec English-speaking units by 1925,⁵⁸ but by 1930 this difference had lessened and by 1935 the main difference was between rural and city regiments and not between French-speaking and English-speaking regiments as such.⁵⁹

30. Personnel for the small permanent force prior to the Great War continued to come mainly from the militia for service on a full time basis, although some officers and NCOs who had been released from Imperial forces did join the Permanent Force.⁶⁰ Militia officers qualified for substantive rank by successfully attending a course at one of the military schools of instruction and they could then qualify for a commission in the Permanent Force. RMC began to supply Permanent Force officers in larger numbers at this period and in 1905 only three cadets accepted commissions in the Imperial Army and 17 accepted commissions in the Permanent Force. There was, however, a lack of qualified staff officers and most staff positions in the Permanent Force organization were held by British officers. To help meet this shortage of Canadian staff officers an arrangement was made whereby a limited number of Canadian officers could attend the staff course at Camberly in England but due to lack of preparation Canadian candidates had difficulty passing

58. Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report, 1925, p. 16.

59. Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report, 1935, p. 35-36.

60. Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1905, p. 20.

the entrance tests. A short course for these staff college candidates was arranged at RMC to prepare them for the college entrance examinations.

31. In 1911 a further source of potential officers for both the militia and the Permanent Force was opened when a course of instruction was started at McGill University to qualify successful students for commissions in the PF or the militia.⁶¹ No similar plan was initiated for any of the French-speaking universities in Quebec. Potential French-speaking officers were not only handicapped by the lack of training facilities in Quebec - only the infantry school at St. Jean gave its courses in French - but were also handicapped by the entrance examinations for RMC and the curriculum followed at that institution. The entrance examinations for RMC stressed only two major subjects: mathematics accounted for 3,000 marks and English accounted for 1,350 marks. These were the only two obligatory groups of subjects and a minimum pass was 33% of the aggregate marks allotted. Voluntary subjects could be included in this qualifying mark if these voluntary subjects were attempted and if the candidate gained at least 25% of the marks allotted. The voluntary subjects were latin, geometrical drawing and freehand drawing.⁶² If a French-speaking candidate passed these examinations (in English) and was accepted for entrance to RMC, he then followed a course taught completely in English. French was taught only as an academic subject which received slightly less emphasis than gymnastics and much less emphasis than horse-back riding.⁶³

32. The following table gives the number of British, English-speaking and French-speaking officers in the Permanent Force in 1912.⁶⁴

61. Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1911, p. 80.

62. Ibid., p. 62.

63. Ibid., p. 62-63.

64. Morton, op. cit., p. 18

Rank	British Officers			Eng.-Speak. Officers			Fr.-Speak. Officers		
	1886	1899	1912	1886	1899	1912	1886	1899	1912
Major-General	1	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-
Brigadier General	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	1
Colonel	-	1	2	1	1	9	-	-	3
Lt.Col.	2	2	3	15	14	27	5	4	3
Major	3	-	9	8	11	52	3	3	5
Captain	1	-	2	4	13	68	1	4	12
Lieut.	3	-	-	18	12	67	6	1	3
Total	10	4	17	46	51	227	15	12	27

This table shows quite clearly the drop in proportionate representation of French-speaking officers during the period. In 1886 French-speaking officers comprised 30% of all the ranks held by Canadian officers. By 1899 the proportion had not changed seriously except for the very junior officers, indicating that the method of training and selection of junior officers did not meet the demands of French-speaking Canadians. By 1912 there is a serious imbalance between English-speaking and French-speaking officers except in the more senior ranks.

33. At the outbreak of war in 1914 the first draft of officers were militia officers who had qualified for their commissions at various schools of military instruction, Permanent Force officers, ex-cadets of RMC and officers of the British Army who were allowed to join the CEF. An additional source of officers was the Canadian Officers Training Corps which was established in 1913 and which included contingents at McGill and Laval universities. Early in the war, however, no difficulty was found in supplying officers for the CEF and five university companies from McGill were sent to France as general reinforcements for the PPCLI rather than converted to officer training companies as was suggested by the War Office in



London.⁶⁵ In May, 1915, a few commissions were awarded to soldiers and NCOs who had distinguished themselves in battle and in the same month the first group of soldiers and NCOs were sent to officer training camps in the UK and France to receive their officer qualifications.⁶⁶ Military schools continued to function in Canada to provide qualified junior officers and a shortened and modified course was held at RMC. The flow of junior officers was thus adequate throughout the war but no provision was made to train French-speaking officers in their own language. Those French-speaking officers who qualified for commissions did so through the same process as English-speaking officers.

34. The supply of qualified senior officers and staff officers during the war was not as large as the supply of junior and field officers and it was not until 1917 that the Canadian Corps was commanded by a Canadian and that virtually all large units and formations were commanded by Canadian personnel. Throughout the war, however, almost all first grade staff officers in the Canadian corps were British officers on loan to the Canadian forces.⁶⁷ The highest ranking French-speaking Canadian officer in the war was Major General Panet, Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence. Out of the other general officers in the Canadian forces overseas, there were only four French-speaking brigadier generals and none of these officers commanded a major formation, or held a top post in the General Staff organization.⁶⁸

35. After the war, the source of officers for the PAM (Permanent Active Militia) and the NPAM (Non Permanent Active Militia) reverted to the pre-war practices. Militia officers continued to be trained

65. Nicholson, GWL, Col., The Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1962, p. 228.

66. Duguid, Col. A. Fortescue, L'armée canadienne dans la grande guerre, 1914-1919, vol. 1, Ottawa, Imprimeur du Roi, 1947, p. 505.

67. Stacey, Military History, op. cit., p. 27.

68. Nicholson, op. cit., Appendix A, p. 539-543. The following senior posts were held by French Canadians: Deputy Minister of the Department of Militia and Defence, (Maj. Gen.), Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster General, Canadian Corps (Brig. Gen.), General Officer Commanding Canadian Machine Gun Corps (Brig. Gen.), one brigade commander of 2nd Div. (Brig. Gen.), General Officer Commanding 2nd Div. Artillery, (Brig. Gen.).



and qualified for substantive commissions by the schools of military instruction operated by the PAM. The only course run in Quebec where French-speaking militia officers could receive instruction in French was at the Infantry School at St. Jean and its branches at Quebec and Levis. The Cavalry school was also at St. Jean but instruction was in English by English-speaking personnel. NPAM officers could qualify for commissions in the PAM by taking the "long course" at RMC which lasted for three months. A further source of militia officers was the COTC (begun in 1913) where acquisition of an "A" certificate qualified the candidate for a commission in the NPAM and a "B" certificate qualified a candidate for a commission as a captain in the NPAM and exempted him from having to write the entrance examination for the "long course" at the RMC if he wished to enter the PAM. The two main French speaking COTC contingents by 1930 were the ones at Laval university (136 members) and at the University of Montreal (106 members).⁶⁹

36. Permanent Force officers either qualified for commissions through the "long course" mentioned above or came from RMC. Vacancies at RMC were allotted pro rata to provincial population but some provinces were still not represented fully, notably Quebec. The distribution of cadets by provinces for the 1929-30 academic term was as follows:⁷⁰

Ontario	100	Manitoba	4
Quebec	50	Saskatchewan	5
B.C.	16	Alberta	7
N.B.	8	Abroad	3
N.S.	7		

The curriculum followed at RMC still heavily stressed the natural sciences and mathematics although the "Report of the Board of Visitors" for 1930 did recommend that French should be included as a subject for the entrance examination.⁷¹

37. The Permanent Force was becoming more and more self sufficient in staff officers and senior officers during the inter-war period but

69. Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report, 1930, p. 97.

70. Ibid., p. 53.

71. Ibid., p. 77.



the training of these senior officers was still done in Britain. The most important courses were the ones conducted at the Imperial Defence College, the Staff College at Camberly and the Gunnery Staff Course. The proportion of French-speaking Canadian officers attending these courses was very small and the percentage declined as the Second World War drew nearer.

Canadian Officers Attending UK Staff Courses⁷²

	<u>English</u>	<u>French</u>
1925	21	2
1930	23	1
1935	24	0
1940	31	0

The percentage of French-speaking officers holding foreign postings during the same period is a little better, but not all of these foreign postings are of a training nature and include service as exchange officers with affiliated British regiments.

Canadian Officers Serving Abroad⁷³

	<u>English</u>	<u>French</u>
1930	11	0
1935	8	2
1940	4	1

Throughout the inter-war period, the percentage of French-speaking officers in the PAM was far smaller than the proportion of the French-speaking population in Canada would warrant and is probably an accurate reflection of the fact that commissions in the PAM went more and more to those who were professionally qualified and this meant qualifying in courses taught only in English.

72. Figures include all courses run in the UK, including the three major ones mentioned. Figures compiled from the Annual Reports of the DND for 1925, 1930, 1935, and 1940.

73. Includes officers serving at the War Office and various other staffs and appointments and exchange officers serving with affiliated British regiments. Figures compiled from the Annual Reports of the DND for 1930, 1935 and 1940.



Rank	Ethnic Origin of PAM Officers ⁷⁴					
	1925		1930		1935	
	French	English	French	English	French	English
General	-	1	-	-	-	-
Lt. Gen.	-	2	-	-	-	-
Maj. Gen.	1	6	-	3	-	7
Colonel	3	11	5	36	2	19
Lt. Col.	5	14	8	55	7	53
Major	-	12	7	82	9	84
Captain	4	14	13	71	7	69
Lieut.	4	9	7	45	15	129
2 Lieut.	-	-	-	-	5	14
Total	17	69	40	292	45	375

38. Soldiers and NCOs for the pre-World War I militia were recruited on a local geographical basis. The number of militiamen taking summer training with their units and formations varied from about 36,000 to 50,000 between 1904 and 1913, and French-speaking units in Quebec responded, on the whole, as readily as their English-speaking counterparts to the demands made on them for annual training. The militia was also the major source of personnel for the permanent force units but, except for the Infantry School at St. Jean, there were no French speaking permanent force units and this despite the fact that, next to Halifax, Quebec City had the largest permanent force garrison.⁷⁵

39. When the Great War started in 1914 Canadian opinion in favour of intervention in the war could be divided into high, medium or low, depending upon whether they were: British subjects living in Canada but born in Britain; Canadians of British origin; Canadians of non-British origin. In this order they enlisted or were expected to enlist.⁷⁶ The strength of the first contingent recruited reflected the above divisions quite accurately since of the 24,500 men recruited in the early part of the war, fully 65% were born in other parts of the Empire, mainly Britain, and less

74. Figures only include Permanent Active Militia officers and for 1925 excludes some miscellaneous officers, eg. veterinarians. Compiled from the Militia List, Sept. 1925; List of Officers, Defence Forces of Canada, April, 1931; and Defence Forces List of Canada, November, 1939.

75. Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1911, p. 13.

76. Hopkins, CJ and Renison, RJ, Canada At War, Toronto, Canadian Annual Review Limited, 1919, p. 268.



than 30% were Canadian born,⁷⁷ a complete reversal of the origin of officers for the CEF. Service was not restricted to members of the militia or the Permanent Force and recruiting was started at all unit headquarters, usually at the local drill hall. By August 18, 1914, 26,250 men had been enrolled in the expeditionary force.

Recruiting was distributed as follows:

Recruiting by Divisional Districts, August 18, 1914.⁷⁸

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Men</u>
1st divisional zone, Western Ontario, HQ London	78	1,696
2nd divisional zone, Central Ontario, HQ Toronto	281	5,618
3rd divisional zone, Eastern Ontario, HQ Kingston	120	1,850
4th divisional zone, Western Quebec, HQ Montreal	153	3,290
5th divisional zone, Eastern Quebec, HQ Quebec	31	537
6th divisional zone, Maritime Provinces, HQ Halifax	107	1,448
MD 10, Manitoba and Saskatchewan, HQ Winnipeg	254	5,332
MD 11, British Columbia and Yukon, HQ Victoria	284	3,033
MD 13, Alberta, HQ Calgary	127	1,960
Other detachments		55
Total	1,435	24,819

40. The original strength of the CEF had been set at 25,000. This was the figure that the mobilization plans were based upon, but the mobilization plan was not followed and the figure of 25,000 was soon exceeded, and in fact it was decided to send 31,200 men to the UK in the first contingent.⁷⁹ In November, after a second contingent had been decided upon, a further 30,000 men were retained under arms in Canada. By July, 1915, the strength of the Canadian

77. Duguid, op. cit., p. 59.

78. Ibid., p. 59.

79. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 29.



force was set at 150,000 and in October of the same year the authorized strength was increased to 250,000. After the original enthusiasm for the war had passed and the British-born manpower of the country used up, recruiting slowed down but a steady stream of recruits throughout 1915 promised to provide the quarter of a million men authorized for the Canadian Army. Medical requirements were lowered and active steps were taken to stimulate recruiting, including the establishment of special recruiting offices in major cities and towns.⁸⁰ Recruiting was done on a territorial basis in divisional or military districts. The Minister tried to widen this basis in 1915 by freeing recruiting officers from the restrictions imposed by the territorial division of recruiting areas but the encroachments of battalion officers on the territories of other units caused some ill feeling and after a rather heated dispute between the Officer Commanding 4th Division (Montreal) and 5th Division (Quebec), the Minister was persuaded to cancel his new instructions.⁸¹

41. On New Year's day, 1916, the Prime Minister made the announcement that the effective strength of the Canadian Army was to be raised to half a million men. Doubts were expressed in many quarters that this was a realistic figure and that it was either incapable of being filled at all or at least was incapable of being filled on a voluntary basis. The decision to raise an army of 500,000 seemed to be the Prime Minister's alone and was made by him without any prolonged or detailed consultation with either his cabinet colleagues or his military officials. Neither was the decision made as a result of British requests for more troops. In any event, the call for 500,000 men became a symbol and was regarded in some cases as a pledge.⁸² The announcement spurred recruiting during the winter months of 1916 but enlistment began to fall in June and July and the effects of large numbers of men being withdrawn from the labour force for military service, combined with the fall in recruiting, brought

80. Ibid., p. 213-214.

81. Ibid., p. 214.

82. Ibid., p. 215-218

the idea of voluntary enlistment under criticism. Accordingly, the National Service Board was formed in August 1916 to study plans for the most economical use of Canada's manpower, and a manpower inventory was undertaken by the board.

42. It could not reasonably be expected that the French-speaking population of Quebec would show the same enthusiasm for the war as would English-speaking Canadians who were connected with Britain either through family ties or sentimental ties. The nationalist press in Quebec and the leading nationalist spokesmen in Quebec continually opposed Canada's part in the war and the lack of rebuttal from prominent French-speaking Canadians in public life and the clumsy recruiting methods used by the federal government in Quebec did not lessen the effect of the nationalist's influence on the Quebec population. French-speaking Canadians in Quebec were not enlisting in great numbers and indeed there was no incentive for them to do so. There was only one unit in the entire Canadian army where they could speak their own language and there was no particular effort made to inform them of Canada's war effort nor to make them more welcome in the army. A prominent French-speaking officer was brought back from France to help stimulate recruiting in the province but his influence was negligible and the appointment of an English-speaking protestant clergyman as Director of Recruiting in Montreal surely had a negative effect on recruiting.⁸³ If French-speaking Canadians were not enlisting in great numbers neither were English-speaking Canadians by 1917 and it became more and more apparent that voluntary enlistment was not going to be sufficient to maintain the large army that Canada had provided for overseas service.

43. The conscription crisis of 1917 is an important event in the political life of Canada and has been dealt with extensively in other and far more detailed works. The effects of the conscription

83. See Ibid., where Nicholson says that this gentleman was only appointed after the failure to find a French-speaking priest to fill the post, p. 221.

crisis on the development of the Canadian army are what interests this study and these effects of conscription on the army were negligible. By 1917 the Canadian army had already developed as an English-speaking organization and the use of conscription to fill its ranks was going to make little immediate difference to that organization. The Military Service Act was meant to supply reinforcements for the existing CEF and not to increase or alter that force. Conscription did have a long term effect on the composition of the Army in that it reinforced the French-Canadian attitude towards the Army already apparent in the Boer War: dislike of the use of Canadian troops overseas was turned into open hostility to military service. This attitude persisted, of course, long after the conscription crisis of 1917 had passed but conscription and its after-math did not change the nature and composition of the Canadian Army. What it did do was make it extremely difficult for the Army to change if, in fact, it - or the government - had wanted to institute a change in its nature and composition following the war. There were no further French-speaking regiments formed (the 258th was to have been a French-speaking battalion but it sailed for England in October 1917 with only 15 officers and 221 other ranks) and no special arrangements were made to train French-speaking personnel in their own language.

44. Reinforcements were provided by territorial regiments formed for each province in March, 1917. There were two Quebec Regiments, one centred in Montreal (MD4) and the other in Quebec (MD5). The 1st Quebec Regiment (Montreal) had one depot battalion in Canada and two reserve battalions in England. This organization provided the reinforcements for the English-speaking units from Quebec. The 2nd Quebec Regiment had a depot battalion in Quebec and also one in Montreal which handled French-speaking reinforcements from that area. There was one reserve battalion in England which supplied reinforcements for the single French-speaking unit in France, the

22nd Battalion. In March of 1918 the two organizations were amalgamated into one Quebec Regiment, although the French-speaking reserve battalion in England retained its identity and continued to handle reinforcements for the 22nd Battalion. The two regiment organization was retained in Canada, the 2nd Regiment handling French-speaking personnel. In all, 129,569 men (approximately 46,000 from Quebec) reported for service under the terms of the Military Service Act, of whom 121,124 eventually served in the CEF.⁸⁴ Of the total number of men conscripted, 47,509 finally went overseas and 24,132 went to France.⁸⁵ In February, 1919, the percentages of defaulters reported by the Military Districts showed that, with the exception of Montreal, Quebec had no worse a record than the other provinces and in fact had a better record than many of the Military Districts in the other parts of Canada.⁸⁶

45. Following the war, the strength of the permanent force was set at 10,000 all ranks but this number was never approached during the inter-war years and by 1939 the strength of the Permanent Force was approximately 4,500. The authorized strength of the three infantry units in the PF during the inter-war years was 34 officers and 739 other ranks per unit, but the actual strengths of the units never approached this figure.

Strength of Permanent Force Infantry Units⁸⁷

Unit	1930		1939	
	Officer	OR	Officer	OR
RCR	24	336	24	390
PPCLI	17	191	20	301
R22eR	14	139	14	161

46. The Militia hardly fared better than the permanent force and the French-speaking units in Quebec showed a slightly lower interest in annual training than their English-speaking counterparts

84. *Ibid.*, Appendix E, p. 551. Department of Militia and Defence Figures differ from the figures of the Department of Justice given here and show 124,588 conscripts taken on strength the CEF.

85. *Ibid.*, p. 551.

86. Hopkins and Renison, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

87. Figures compiled from the Annual Reports of the DND for 1930 and 1939.

during the 1920s but this interest increased during the 1930s, as mentioned above, until the real difference between the strength of militia units was based on the rural-urban division rather than on an English-French division. There was, however, a disproportion between the number of French-speaking militia units and the population of Quebec during the inter-war period and the majority of militia units and personnel in Quebec were English speaking. For example, in 1930, there were 14 French-speaking units in Quebec with a total trained strength of 2,292 officers and men out of a total of 75 units in the same province with a strength of 82,938.⁸⁸ Thus there was not a proper territorial representation maintained in either the PAM or the NPAM. There was no particular attempt to recruit for either the militia or the permanent force and the only French language training available was that supplied by the R22eR at its schools in Quebec.

The Present Army, 1939-1952

47. On the eve of war in 1939 there was little thought on the part of either the British or Canadian governments of a large Canadian Expeditionary Force. The role of the Canadian Army was considered as essentially a home defence task. To fulfill this role, a Canadian Active Service Force (CASF) of two divisions was authorized on September 1, 1939, but on September 16 an offer of a CEF of one division was made to the British government. Unlike the process followed in the Great War, the mobilization of the home defence force and the CEF was based on the mobilization of existing militia units. The one division CEF sailed for England in December, 1939 and in January, 1940, the Prime Minister announced that a second division would be sent to join the first. The 2nd Division was in England by October 1940 and a Canadian Corps was formed in December. The Canadian Corps was increased by the addition of the

88. Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report, 1930, p. 11. Figures for French-speaking units are only for those with French names; therefore do not include French-speaking personnel in English-speaking regiments or regiments with English names.

3rd Division and the 5th Armoured Division in 1941, and in April, 1942 the First Canadian Army was formed under the command of General MacNaughton. Britain supplied 9,000 line of communication troops per division for this organization but Canada supplied all the Corps troops for the Army.

48. In April, 1943 it was decided to split the Canadian Army and send one division to the Mediterranean. The 1st Division was later joined there by the 2nd Corps HQ and the 5th Armoured Division and the 1st Canadian Corps was formed in Italy in January, 1944. The Canadian forces in Italy had also been increased by the addition of 1 Army Group RCA and the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade. The Canadian Corps and the 1st Armoured Brigade joined the rest of the Canadian Army which had taken part in the invasion of Normandy and by April, 1945 the 1st Canadian Army was recreated as a single organization. By May 5, 1945 Canadian participation in the military forces of the allies had grown to an army composed of an army headquarters and army troops, two corps with the necessary headquarters and corps troops, three infantry divisions, two armoured divisions, two armoured brigades plus two units serving with British forces. This was a considerable departure from the modest participation originally planned. In addition there were as many as three divisions retained in Canada plus garrisons in Newfoundland, the Caribbean, sensitive coastal areas in Canada, and forces retained in each military district for the large training and administrative establishments.

49. The concept governing the mobilization of the CASF was that all regions and sections of Canada were to be represented in proportion to their population but in the case of Quebec this was not entirely possible. Quebec French-speaking militia units were not representative of the French-speaking population of the province and fewer still were active during the inter-war years.⁸⁹

⁸⁹. Canada, Army, GS Historical Section, Report No. 63, Manpower Problems of the Canadian Army in the Second War, vol. 1, Army Headquarters, August, 1951, p. 5.

In the 1st Division, one brigade represented the west, one Ontario and one Quebec and the Maritimes. The same was to be true of the 2nd Division.⁹⁰ It was intended that the Quebec brigade of the 2nd Division was to be composed of entirely French-speaking infantry units but this plan was never fully implemented.⁹¹ The R22eR, originally allotted to the 5th Brigade, was placed in the 1st Division so that the first contingent overseas would have some French-Canadian representation. In place of the R22eR, an English-speaking unit was placed in the 5th Brigade. In 1940 a French-speaking officer was appointed to command the brigade but before the brigade could proceed overseas, the Fusiliers de Mont Royal were posted to Iceland and replaced with an English-speaking unit.⁹² The formation of a French-speaking brigade was also affected at this time by a lack of qualified French-speaking officers and Brigadier Leclerc finally recommended that the project be dropped. General MacNaughton agreed and a mixed brigade was decided upon, the reason given being that a mixed formation would give a closer rapport between English-speaking and French-speaking soldiers.⁹³ The 3rd Division was also based on regional representation but the hastiness of mobilization meant that there was a certain relaxation of the principle of regional representation and this was made at the expense of French-speaking units. The principle of regional representation was again violated in the formation of the 4th Division and the 5th Armoured Division. It was decided that the Sherbrooke Fusiliers would be placed in the 4th Armoured Division (new name of the 4th Division) and that Les Voltigeurs de Québec would go to the 4th Army Tank Brigade.⁹⁴ The result was that no French-speaking brigade was ever organized and that the largest French-speaking formations were limited to battalion (unit) size.

90. Stacey, Col. CP, Six années de guerre, vol. I, de l'histoire officielle de la participation de l'armée Canadienne à la seconde guerre mondiale, Ottawa, Imprimeur de la Reine, 1957, p. 42-43.

91. Ibid., p. 43.

92. Ibid., p. 44

93. Ibid., p. 44-45

94. Canada, Army, GS Historical Section, Report No. 63, op. cit., p. 33

French-speaking technical units were non existent and French-speaking units were for the most part limited to the artillery, infantry and administrative and service units. The following is a list of French-speaking units - or those believed to have been French-speaking - which served in Canada and overseas during the war.

List of French-speaking Units as at March 1, 1944.

CANADA

12 AA Battery	RCA
17 AA "	
41 AA "	
52 AA "	
60 AA "	
61 AA "	
63 AA "	
HQ 24 AA Regiment	
HQ 26 AA "	
4 AA Gun Operational Room	
3 AA " " "	
29 AA Troop Line Signals	
59 Coast Battery	
20 Field Regiment	
15 Field Company	RCE
22 General Pioneer Company	
Fusiliers de Sherbrooke	CIC
Fusiliers de St. Laurent	
Régiment de Hull	
Régiment de Joliette	
Régiment de Montmagny	
Régiment de Québec	
Régiment de St. Hyacinthe	
Régiment de Châteauguay	
B Company, St. John Fusiliers. (MG)	
1 Bakery Section (Mech)	RCASC
5 Company RCASC	
19 Field Ambulance	RCAMC
5 Company RCAMC	
36 Provost Company	C Pro C
46 " "	
16 Company (75% French)	VG of C
12, 13, 14, and 15 Companies (50% French)	
No. 5 District Depot	Misc
25 Company Canadian Dental Corps	
5 Ordnance Depot	
105 Company CWAC	
8 Special Employment Company	
Quebec Arsenal Protection Company	
5 District Recruiting Company	
66 Military Detention Barracks	
Quebec Military Hospital	
Valcartier Military Hospital	

OVERSEAS

57 Light AA Battery	RCA
62 Anti-tank "	
4 Medium Regiment	
3 Battalion RCE	RCE
4 Medium Regiment Signal Section	RCCS
Fusiliers Mont Royal	CIC
Régiment de Maisonneuve	
R22eR	
Régiment de la Chaudière	
4 Company	RCASC
Medium Regiment Platoon	
1 Convalescent Depot	RCAMC
6 Field Dressing Station	
18 Field Ambulance	
5 Field Hygiene Section	
17 General Hospital	
104 Light Aid Detachment	RCOC
9 Provost Company	C Pro C

"Note (a) All the units were formed in Canada and sent overseas as French-speaking units. They are believed to be still composed predominantly of French-speaking personnel. However, it is not known whether, with the exception of the 4 Inf. Bns. they are still French-speaking units."

50. At the start of the war the sources of officers for the CASF were the Permanent Force, militia officers, cadets and ex-cadets of the RMC, COTC candidates who had received a diploma of qualification and in some cases promoted soldiers and NCOs. As mentioned in the previous section, none of the programmes to provide officers for the Permanent Force and the militia were especially suited to the needs and requirements of French-speaking officers. The lack of French-speaking officers was underlined by the abandonment of the attempt to form a French-speaking brigade in the 2nd Division.

95. Ibid., vol. 2, Appendix I.

51. In March of 1941 it was decided to adopt a plan of selecting officers from the ranks by selection committees based on the British practice. The plan was changed late in 1942 and instead of interviewing candidates who had requested officer training, a committee was formed which searched the personnel documents of selected soldiers. Likely officer candidates were then sent to selection centres established at Three Rivers and Chilliwack in the summer of 1943. The selection centre at Three Rivers processed both English and French speaking potential candidates, while the centre at Chilliwack handled all potential candidates from western Canada. Recruits who made high scores on their entrance examinations were also sent to these selection centres, but they both existed only for a short time. The one at Chilliwack was closed in September 1943 and the one at Three Rivers was moved to the officer training school at Brockville. There were also a large number of officers who received their commissions directly without going through this selection process, most coming from the categories listed in the preceding paragraph.

52. The actual instruction of officer candidates took place at Gordon Head, B.C. and Brockville, Ont. where schools were formed in 1941. A temporary school was opened at Three Rivers in 1942 but an excess of officers led to its closure in September, 1943 and all officer training was then done at Brockville. For French-speaking officer candidates there was a school opened at St. Jerome in 1942 which gave a preliminary training course. When they had finished this preliminary course, French-speaking officer candidates then went to the school at Brockville where there was a special French section. These officers were meant to serve in French-speaking units or for units with a large proportion of French-speaking personnel; French-speaking units in the process of being mobilized or English-speaking coastal batteries being converted to French-speaking units; and finally for use at French-speaking training

centres near and in Quebec.⁹⁶ By this arrangement it was hoped that fully 30% of the output from the Brockville school would be French speaking. During this period, Mr. Lapointe had pressed for a self-contained French-speaking officer training school to train these officers but the CGS and the ACGS wanted a mixed school and their views prevailed.⁹⁷

53. In Contrast to WWI, the mobilization plan prepared before WW II was followed and whole militia units were activated on a regional basis. Recruiting was done by the units to bring them up to the required strength. Recruitment was generally strong but lagged in two parts of the country - Quebec and Saskatchewan. The first Quebec French-speaking regiments to be mobilized - the R22eR, the Régiment de la Chaudière and Les Fusiliers de Mont Royal - all lacked large numbers of men and it was only when the R22eR's recruiting area was enlarged to include all of Quebec that enough men were acquired.⁹⁸ However, some English-speaking regiments were also short large numbers of men and the lack of recruits was by no means limited to French speaking parts of the country.

54. The National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA) was passed in June, 1940 to register Canadian manpower and provide for its more efficient use in the war effort. Canadian males of military age were subject to compulsory military service but only for home defence. Men called up under the terms of the NRMA were given a four month training course and then posted to the reserve army and were free to resume their civilian job. It was intended that additional French-speaking units would be formed from these "R" men after they had received their initial training.⁹⁹ In April, 1941 it was decided that a certain number of NRMA men would be

96. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 44-45.

97. Ibid., p. 45n.

98. Ibid., p. 11, and Stacey, Six années de guerre, op. cit., p. 53.

99. Canada, Army, GS Historical Section, Report No. 63, op. cit., p. 33

retained in the army indefinitely so that a corresponding number of volunteer soldiers could be released for overseas service. Authority also began to be issued for the use of NRMA personnel for duty outside of Canada and by 1943 NRMA men were eligible for service in virtually all of the western hemisphere. Earlier, the conscription plebiscite held in 1942 had released the government from its pledge not to use NRMA men for service overseas and in August the bill modifying the NRMA was given royal assent but no immediate action was taken to implement conscription for overseas service. Quebec supplied 39% of all NRMA men¹⁰⁰ - a manpower survey in 1941 had shown that Quebec had the largest number of eligible men of military age - and there was thus little problem finding enough men to fill French-speaking home defence units as 30% of NRMA personnel spoke that language.¹⁰¹ The vast majority of the men in the French-speaking units serving in Canada were conscripted under the terms of the NRMA.

55. Service for overseas duty was voluntary in the early years of the war, but in 1941 voluntary enlistment began to fall off. Originally, recruiting had been done on a unit basis as units were mobilized for active service but in 1941 a civilian recruiting directorate was formed which operated within the Adjutant General's Branch. A French-speaking associate director was appointed, principally to direct recruiting in Quebec, and each military district had its own recruiting officer and a civilian recruiting committee. In 1942 district recruiting companies were formed which worked from a central office with branch offices and mobile recruiting teams, and by this time the emphasis had shifted from raising units for the Canadian army to supplying reinforcements to the troops overseas. French-speaking units in Italy and the

100. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, op. cit., p. 304.

101. Canada, Army, GS Historical Section, Report No. 63, op. cit., p. 48.

UK were among those most in need of men but French-speaking men were not enlisting in sufficient numbers to keep them fully supplied. The common reasons given for the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the French-speaking Canadians were the lack of French-speaking militia units prior to the war, the lack of French speaking technical units, service in technical units being barred except to bilingual French-Canadians and the feeling that French-speaking personnel would only be used in the infantry.¹⁰² A glance at the list of French-speaking units in the army during the Second World War will show that these reasons were not without basis. However, by 1944 the lack of infantry reinforcements had become general and forced a readjustment in the whole Canadian manpower policy.

56. Discussions of the reinforcement problem in the spring of 1944 recommended that NRMA personnel be used but that they proceed overseas as part of a unit rather than as individual reinforcements. It was thought that this method would lead to an increase in the number of NRMA men who would volunteer for active service, especially those serving in French-speaking units.¹⁰³ It might prove impossible to keep the units together once in Europe but at least an attempt would be made and a special attempt would be made to keep sub-units together. This plan was tried on the brigade which returned from the Kiska expedition and considerable pressure was put on units to get their NRMA men to volunteer for active service in Europe as part of the unit. Response of English-speaking units in the brigade was bad and the response of the Régiment de Hull was no better. Similar appeals were made in Eastern Canada but the response was no better in either English-speaking or French-speaking units.

57. In contrast to the Great War, there were now several French-speaking units in Europe and it was decided that these units should keep their identity but it was becoming more and more difficult to

102. Ibid., p. 44.

103. Ibid., p. 132.

find reinforcements for them. Several expedients were tried but the number of French-speaking general service men found was insufficient and by September, 1944, most of the French-speaking units overseas were under strength and the stream of reinforcements from Canada was drying up. The following month a survey of NRMA men in Canada showed that 42,000 were eligible for immediate use as infantry reinforcements, 37% being French speaking.¹⁰⁴

58. On November 23, 1944, the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence decided that the voluntary system was not going to supply the necessary infantry reinforcements and that a limited use would have to be made of conscripted personnel. The figure decided on was 16,000 infantry reinforcements. Demonstrations then broke out in Ottawa, Hull and Montreal and there were demonstrations by NRMA men in many parts of British Columbia, including a serious incident in Terrace, B.C. led by the Fusiliers de St. Laurent. The government persisted in its decision and the resulting reinforcement flights of NRMA men to Europe were for the most part disorganized, disorderly and marked by large numbers of absentees and deserters. Three English-speaking and four French-speaking units were included in the drafts and all except one unit were badly under strength when they sailed.¹⁰⁵ When those reinforcements reached North West Europe, all marks denoting that they were NRMA men were removed and they were given no other distinguishing marks. In all, 12,908 NRMA men were sent overseas and of this number, only 2,463 saw service with the Canadian Army in North West Europe.¹⁰⁶

59. The most serious consequences of conscription were political and do not need to be considered in this paper apart from the effect conscription had on the development of the Canadian Army. In this respect, conscription did not affect the nature of that army since, as in the First War, the nature of the army had already been

104. Ibid., p. 222.

105. Ibid., p. 250.

106. Ibid., p. 262.

determined by the time conscription for overseas service had been introduced. In the Second War, however, conscription was, at least in part, used to maintain French-speaking units and thus keep French Canadian representation in the army at a certain level, rather than have it all off as the war progressed. A definite attempt was made to have an army based on the territorial distribution of population, and conscription for overseas service was one of the ultimate means used to maintain this end. It was, of course, not used solely for this purpose but the fact remains that the position of the French-speaking units in the Canadian Army did have a considerable influence on all the considerations leading up to the decision taken in November, 1944. French-speaking soldiers were used, as far as possible, in French-speaking units commanded by French-speaking officers and this alone marked a considerable change from the practices of the First War.

60. In all, French-speaking personnel provided 19% of the manpower of the Canadian Army during the war, compared with 12.6% of the manpower for the Army in the First War.¹⁰⁷ For the whole of Canada, the Second World War was much more of a Canadian war since 618,354 of the men and women who served in the Canadian army were Canadian born and only 71,276 were born in other parts of the Commonwealth. In the First World War, there were only 318,728 Canadian born soldiers in an army of 619,636.¹⁰⁸

Post-War

61. At the end of the war, the army reverted to a peace-time strength of 25,000 officers and men for all arms. The reserve forces of the country were organized on a divisional basis and the geographical command system was re-established consisting of Western, Prairie, Central, Quebec and Eastern Commands. The post war

107. Canada, Army, File No. 1435-2, Appendix A to Memorandum by Brig. Bernatchez, 3 August, 1950.

108. Canada, Army, GS Historical Section, Report No. 63, op. cit., vol. 2, Annex B, p. 299-300.

reorganization of the Canadian Army (Reserve) - as the militia was renamed - tried to provide a proper proportion of French-speaking reserve units for mobilization purposes^{*} but apparently no such thought was given to a similar balance in the regular forces until late in 1946.¹⁰⁹ At the time, the R22eR was the only French-speaking unit retained in the regular force. After some consideration, it was decided that the proportion of French-speaking personnel in the regular army was to be 30% for the infantry and 15% for other corps.¹¹⁰ To meet this plan, a tentative arrangement was made to station one field battery of artillery, two armoured squadrons, one engineer sub-unit and one signals sub-unit in Quebec. The intention was that the units considered as French speaking must not be mixed units since experience in the war had shown that mixed units became unbalanced and that eventually almost all the officers tended to be English speaking.¹¹¹ Progress was slow and this plan was never fully carried out. In 1950 a "Committee for the Study of Bilingual Problems" was formed under the chairmanship of Brigadier JPE Bernatchez to study this problem and to find means by which a more balanced representation of French-speaking personnel could be gained in arms and services other than infantry. The Vice Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the General staff opposed the decentralization of regular force units as outlined above.¹¹² Nevertheless this was one of the conclusions of the committee,¹¹³ but not one of its direct recommendations.

*See Appendix A, Tables 2 and 3.

109. Canada, Army, GS Historical Section, Report No. 81, French-Canadian Representation in the Canadian Army, Army Headquarters, February, 1959, p. 1.

110. Ibid., p. 2.

111. Canada, Army, File No. 1435-2, see foot note 107.

112. Ibid., Memorandum from Brig. Bernatchez, 15 Dec., 1950, to members of the Committee for the Study of Bilingual Problems, Appendix E of attached background information.

113. Ibid., "Committee for the Study of Bilingual Problems, Conclusions and Recommendations", "Conclusions", February, 1951.

62. During the Korean war, the R22eR had three battalions on active service and other French-speaking units placed on active service were one troop from Le Régiment de Hull, one troop from the Three Rivers Regiment, one battery from the 79th Field Regiment, 205th Independant Field Battery and one company of the Canadian Infantry Battalion. After the war, all these units except the R22eR were taken off active service but the Canadian Infantry Battalion became the 3rd Canadian Guards and remained part of the regular force. It was not until 1958 that "A" Squadron of the 1/8 Canadian Hussars moved to Valcartier as a French-speaking sub-unit composed of soldiers transferred from the then disbanded 3rd Canadian Guards. In the same year "X" Battery of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery was turned into a French-speaking unit and moved to Valcartier. By 1959 the plan proposed a decade earlier had been finally put into practice. The camp at Valcartier consisted of the above units or sub-units and an engineer works company, a signals detachment, the R22eR Depot, a field ambulance and station hospital, an ordnance railhead, a field workshop and a light aid detachment.

63. The officers for the post war regular army were largely wartime officers. By 1950, the only apparent way to gain a commission in the army was either to graduate from one of the service colleges or to have a university degree, that is, enter through the COTC programme. As early as 1947 General Foulkes had proposed that a French speaking wing of the service colleges be opened but this proposal was countered by a proposal of the minister that a military academy wing be formed at Laval University. Neither plan was finally accepted and the VCGS in particular was not prepared to give special treatment to French-speaking officer candidates in this respect.¹¹⁴ RMC was re-opened as a tri-service college in 1948 and

114. Canada, Army, GS Historical Section, Report No. 81, op. cit., p. 18.

the Naval College at Royal Roads was changed into a tri-service officers' training school. No real attempt was made to attract French-speaking officer candidates to either of these colleges and the course of studies at both colleges was taught entirely in English. By 1950 the number of French-speaking cadets at these institutions was very small as the following table for enrolment at Royal Roads shows.

Schedule A to letter from Commandment, Royal Roads,
to Adjutant General, Sept. 8, 1950.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Intake</u>		<u>1st yr. failures</u>		<u>2nd yr. failures</u>	
	<u>Total</u>	<u>French</u>	<u>Fr.</u>	<u>Eng.</u>	<u>Fr.</u>	<u>Eng.</u>
1947	60	3	0	4	0	1
1948	86	10	3	15	0	1
1949	79	2	1	4	-	
1950	79	5	-	-	-	

64. In 1951 a special committee began to study the proposal of Laval University that it establish a department of military science to qualify French-speaking students for commissions in the regular forces. The proposal was also considered by the Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee in July, 1951 and no serious objection was voiced by the naval and air force representatives. The VCGS, however, did object to the plan and contended that more effort should be spent on raising potential French-speaking officer candidates to the established academic levels for English-speaking candidates rather than provide special provisions for them.¹¹⁵ The Laval proposal was then referred to the Chiefs of Staff Committee which made no decision on the matter. The question was then referred to an ad hoc committee under the chairmanship of the Chairman of the Defence Research Board. At this stage, the Director General of Military Training opposed the plan along with the VCGS. The former preferred that the service colleges teach both French and English to the level that cadets would be bilingual by the time

115. Canada, Army, File No. 1435-2, "Extracts from the Minutes of the 17th, Meeting of the Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee, 16 July 51", comment by Vice Chief of the General Staff.

that they graduated.¹¹⁶ The problem next went to the Defence Council which noted that the services were generally opposed to the plan and that the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the CGS were particularly strong in their opposition. They also noted that this was the first instance of an important Quebec institution ever making a proposal to increase French-speaking representation in the services. Still, no decision was made and the whole problem was shunted back to the Chiefs of Staff Committee.¹¹⁷ By now the lack of French-speaking officers was becoming more noticeable and the Adjutant General had been forced to send 13 junior English-speaking officers to the R22eR in Korea to make up shortages in that regiment.¹¹⁸

65. The Laval plan was never accepted but the idea of the Armed Forces operating a preparatory course for French-speaking cadets in Quebec was accepted by the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in 1952 and subsequently by the Minister and the Cabinet.¹¹⁹ The idea of creating a full two year course similar to that used at Royal Roads was considered and this plan was actually accepted before the College Militaire Royal de St. Jean was opened in 1952. French-speaking cadets for each of the three services could now enter a service college and follow a course in their own language for two or three years before going to RMC for their final two years of training. Of the first class of 125 cadets, 78 were French speaking, a significant departure from prior service college enrolment figures.¹²⁰ In addition, French-speaking candidates could gain a commission through the COTC and these cadets could take their service training at the various corps schools, some of which had the capacity to carry out training in

116. Ibid., Memorandum to the VCGS from DGMT, 4 July, 1951.

117. Ibid., "Extract from the Minutes of the 55th Meeting of the Defence Council, 14 Sept. 51."

118. Ibid., Letter to the Minister from the AG, 12 January, 1952.

119. Canada, Army, GS Historical Section, Report No. 81, op. cit., p. 22.

120. Canada, Department of National Defence, Canada's Defence Programme, 1953/54, Ottawa, Queen's Printer 1952, p. 17.

the French language. Similarly, French-speaking candidates for short service commissions could take their training at the same corps schools where they could often get at least some of their training in French.¹²¹

66. To aid in forming French-speaking units and to get and maintain the French-speaking quotas agreed upon, the Canadian Army Training School (CATS) was established in 1946. The purpose of this school was to give basic training and to give some specialized corps training for French-speaking recruits for all corps and to give these recruits a basic knowledge of English.¹²² The original intention had been to establish the school at Camp Valcartier but a reduction in the manpower of the army in 1947 meant that no immediate action was taken on this proposal and the school went to the R22eR Camp at St. Jean. While able to handle the task of giving basic training to French-speaking recruits, the task of teaching English was more than the St. Jean camp could handle at the time, and it was not until the staff was increased in 1949 and 1950 that the school began to give an adequate English course. In 1952 CATS moved to Camp Valcartier and received a new role. From that date it was to give basic training for all French-speaking recruits for all corps and then was to give French-speaking infantry recruits their advanced training. No English language instruction was to be given in this basic training period. In addition, the school was to teach English-speaking officers and NCOs French and was to give French-speaking potential NCOs an eight week junior leaders course followed by a twenty week English language course.¹²³ The establishment of CATS was intended to aid in increasing the proportion of French-speaking personnel in the

121. Canada, Army, File No. 1435-2, "Survey of Corps School Bilingual Instructors as of Jan. 50".

122. Canada, Army, GS Historical Section, Report No. 81, op. cit., p. 5-6.

123. Ibid., p. 14.

army in corps other than infantry. In April, 1946, when the CATS was formed, French-speaking representation in the infantry was 23.5% and in other corps was only 7.5%.¹²⁴

67. The establishment of the CATS was significant for another reason because it was also the first attempt made by any of the three Armed Forces to teach English-speaking personnel French so that they could help in training French-speaking personnel in that language. This new policy came from acceptance of some of the recommendations of the Committee for the Study of Bilingual Problems and the decision that the minimum percentages of bilingual instructors at corps schools was to be 30% for the infantry corps school and 15% for other corps schools.¹²⁵ The army, alone of the three services, began to regard English as essential only for NCOs and some trades specialists and believed that soldiers in non-technical jobs need not learn English other than a few technical terms that they would learn in their job training.¹²⁶ Since training French-speaking recruits in their own language would require bilingual instructors, and since there was a shortage of such instructors, it was considered that the most practicable course open was to teach English speaking instructors French.¹²⁷

68 In the actual training of recruits at the corps schools, the new policy recommended was that if there were enough French-speaking recruits at the school to warrant it, classes should be given in French. If there were not enough French-speaking recruits to warrant using separate classes then French-speaking recruits were to receive special coaching in their own language. But, if French-speaking recruits were able to absorb instruction in English then they should be urged to do so.¹²⁸ This was to apply to all corps except the

124. Canada, Army, File No. 1435-2, see foot note 112.

125. Ibid., Memorandum, 17 September, 1951, outlining recommendations of Committee for the Study of Bilingual Problems which have been accepted.

126. Ibid., Draft report, "Training of French Speaking Recruits", n.d., p. 4-5 and p. 7-8.

127. Ibid., Memorandum to VCGS from AG, 10 February, 1951 and Memorandum to AG from VAG, 11 April, 1951.

128. Ibid., see foot note 113, "Recommendations".

signals corps in which it had been decided that all French-speaking signallers must be bilingual.¹²⁹ Policies and intentions are not always carried out, however, and by 1962 no trades training was being done in French. The capability existed at the infantry school, the ordnance corps school and the signals corps school but there was apparently no call for such services.¹³⁰ All corps schools did, however, have at least a tutorial bilingual capacity.¹³¹

69. The percentage of French-speaking personnel in the army had changed slightly by 1950 and the following chart gives the ethnic breakdown of the Canadian Army (Active Force) in 1950.

Summary of French Canadian Manpower in the¹³²
Canadian Army (1950)

Corps	Percentage Officers	French Or	Canadian All	Bilingual Instructors Corps Schools %	RMC % French	Royal Roads % French
RCAC	4.8	6.4	6.1	6.3		
RCA	7.7	6.6	6.8	11.1		
RCE	5.1	10.5	9.4	11.6		
RC Sigs	6.7	8.8	8.6	3.4		
RCIC	26.1	20.2	21.1	25.0		
RCASC	9.7	13.2	12.9	6.8		
RCAMC	11.4	11.9	11.8	3.4		
RCDC	8.7	10.5	9.9	23.1		
RCOC	15.1	15.7	15.6	15.6		
RCEME	2.5	10.3	9.6	4.2		
RCAPC	17.2	14.9	15.5	-		
C Pro C	13.0	8.1	8.5	-		
C Int C	13.1	12.9	13.0	-		
RCACHC	31.4		31.4	-		
Gen List	13.5		13.5	-		
Average Percentage	12.2	12.3	12.3	15.5	10.8	5.3

The above table can be used as a base against which the effectiveness of the practices and policies adopted in the early 1950s can be measured. Further detailed analytical and statistical studies will provide the new data for the past decade but an improvement in French Canadian representation in the Army is shown for the

129. Ibid., see foot note 112, Appendix C.

130. Canada, National Defence Headquarters, File No. 1001-3, Memorandum to VCGS from DGMT, 9 February, 1962, Annex C

131. Ibid., Annex C.

132. Canada, Army, File No. 1432-5, Memorandum of 15 Dec. 1950, op. cit., Appendix A.

percentages of French-speaking officers in 1958. While there is not a close correlation of the percentage of French-speaking officers to the population, the figures for 1958 show an increase in the percentage of young French-speaking officers in the army but a steady decrease in French Canadian representation as rank increases.* The same is true of French-speaking enlisted personnel but it is not clear whether this high wastage rate was due to French-speaking personnel leaving the army because of lack of advancement or there was a lack of advancement because they did not stay in the army long enough to become qualified.¹³³

* See appendix B.

133. Canadian Army Operational Research Establishment, Memorandum No. 58/12, The Proportion of French Canadian Soldiers in the Canadian Army, by Dr. Marcel Chaput, Ottawa, 1958, p. 20.

LANGUAGE USE

Sedentary Militia, 1763-1855

1. In its early years, the sedentary militia was little more than a paper organization and therefore there was little in the way of administration or training and thus there is little to be said about language use in this organization. The militia was controlled by the various provinces and the administrative language of the province would predominate. Units raised as fencibles were part of the British army and commanded by British officers and subject to the rules, regulations and training practices of the British army, including the use of English for all formal purposes. In the few limited operations in which the militia engaged, service was normally as an adjunct to regular British forces and the normal language for operations would be English although the internal control of the militia units - where distinct militia units were formed - would be the language of the district from which they were recruited. Operations in Canada were undertaken under British commanders and staff organizations and the normal language for the use of the commander and his staff would be English. Even in a battle fought by largely French-speaking militia units and under the command of a French-speaking Canadian officer, the language of staff orders and instructions seemed to be English. After the Battle of Chateauguay, Colonel de Salaberry issued an order which outlined the policy to be observed by the Indians in relation to any prisoners that they might take and which also thanked the troops - almost entirely French-speaking - for their gallant action against the Americans. The order was issued in English.¹³⁴

Volunteer Active Militia, 1855-1902

2. The beginning of the volunteer militia system meant that a small permanent staff to care for the administration and day to day requirements of the volunteer force had to be formed.

134. Sulte, op. cit., p. 120-121

The military districts of Montreal and Quebec, which included a high percentage of French-speaking units, were commanded by French-speaking officers. In the early years they had no staff except during the summer training periods when they would call on the services of various officers within their districts. Most of the training and organization work was done on a local basis except for courses operated by the British garrisons in Canada. These British forces gave courses of advanced instruction for officers and NCOs of the militia and instruction was in the English language. After the withdrawal of British forces in 1870/71 "B" Battery was formed at the Citadel in Quebec City and given the task of training the militia units of Quebec. Fifty-two of the men in this battery were French-speaking¹³⁵ and instruction was done in both languages.¹³⁶ The switch of the Kingston and Quebec batteries in 1880 seriously affected the opportunities of the Quebec militia units to receive instruction in French, since the battery from Kingston was staffed completely by English-speaking soldiers.

3. RMC was started in 1876 at Kingston with a class of 18 gentlemen cadets and a staff composed of British regular officers. All instruction at the college was in English and French-speaking candidates were not favoured by the entrance examinations to the college. The English-speaking cadets at the college did not receive adequate instructions in French and that subject received less emphasis in the academic timetable than horse back riding as mentioned above. An investigation of the teaching of French in 1896 found the professor hopelessly incompetent and the level of French among the students deplorable.¹³⁷ The failure of the college to either attract a representative

135. Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1871, p. 93.

136. Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1873/74, p. 54.

137. Morton, op. cit., p. 6.

proportion of French-speaking cadets or to give adequate French instruction to English cadets meant that the militia and the Permanent Force were not being supplied with adequate French-speaking officers.

4. During the late nineteenth century the small militia organization began to grow and a permanent force and staff organization began to develop. The only French language training establishment was the infantry school at St. Jean and virtually all other military qualifications for officers and NCOs were taken in English. In addition, the GOC and many of the senior staff officers were English career officers of the Imperial forces. Increasingly, the militia organization became more and more an English-speaking institution although one GOC - General Hutton - did consider that bilingual officers - especially staff officers - were essential for the development of an efficient militia system. He issued an order to this effect but difficulties with the government led to his resignation before he could implement many of his planned reforms.

The Modern Army, 1902-1939

5. The reorganization and development of the Canadian militia following the Boer War led to increasing English unilingualism in the militia services. The infantry school at St. Jean remained the only school giving instruction in the French language. The staff organization became more and more English-speaking as British officers were borrowed to fill vacancies and as Canadian officers were sent to Camberly for the staff course run there by the British army. Apart from the two vacancies allotted to Canadian officers at Camberly in 1905, there was also a staff course for militia officers given at Kingston, but only in English. As the permanent force grew in size and importance so did the influence of French-speaking Canadians decline and by the time World War One started the Canadian army was virtually an English-speaking organization. This situation was maintained during the war, formal

French-speaking participation in the war being limited to the R22eR. This was the single French language unit in the entire Canadian army apart from the reinforcement element and recruiting offices in Quebec. In short, there was an almost complete rejection of the use of French in the Canadian Army during the Great War.

6. The status of the French language was hardly enhanced following the Great War. Formal acceptance of French was limited to publishing King's Regulations, Pay and Allowance Regulations, Cadet Services Regulations and Dress Regulations in French. All General Orders were published in French but only because they appeared in the Canada Gazette which had both English and French versions.¹³⁸ Orders, decorations and regimental names were not translated although lapses in this respect occurred.¹³⁹ In general, Army policy followed the judgement given by the Judge Advocate General in 1934. He noted that section 133 of the BNA Act required that all laws and acts of Parliament be published in both languages but not, apparently, rules and regulations made thereunder. There was no other statutory provision in this respect and the JAG recommended that the circumstances and exigencies of the service should determine the use of French in army publications and not bare legal necessity.¹⁴⁰ The circumstances and exigencies of the services did not, apparently, favour a wider use of French in the army. All professional publications continued to be produced only in English and though the use of French translations had been recommended from time to time no action was taken because it was not considered that translations could be done economically.¹⁴¹

7. The R22eR was retained as one of the three regular army infantry battalions but its establishment was small and its function and capabilities limited. It acted as a training nucleus for the

¹³⁸. Canada, Army, File No. 4521-2-1, Memorandum, n.p., n.d., containing General Order for 28 September, 1921 attached as Appendix C.

¹³⁹. Ibid., Memorandum to DMT from D Org and Pers Services, 27 March, 1934.

¹⁴⁰. Ibid., Letter to D Org and Pers Services from Chairman Orders Committee, 6 November, 1934.

¹⁴¹. Ibid., Memorandum to D Inf from Chairman Army Language Bureau, 31 March, 1946.

Quebec militia and was the only military establishment having the capability to instruct in French. Officers and NCOs had to take their qualification courses in English either at Canadian or British institutions. All staff work was in English and it was only on a unit or sub-unit basis within the militia that French was used. There was no professional course given in the French language and there was no language instruction given in either English or French other than what was taught at RMC. In addition to the rejection of the use of French within the army organization, most major army installations were established outside of Quebec and this placed a further handicap on the French-speaking soldier since he had to spend a large part of his career away from a French-speaking environment. The start of the Second World War thus saw an English-speaking army faced with the necessity of mobilizing a large force of which a big proportion would be French-speaking. The solution used in the mobilization plan was the mobilizing of complete militia units - including French-speaking units - so that a French-speaking soldier could be trained and serve in a French-speaking environment, at least to a limited extent. This was in direct contrast to the policy followed by the other two services which gave English language training to their French-speaking recruits so that they could be assimilated into an English-speaking service.

8. Another recognition given to the use of French during this period was that officers were allowed to write interpreters' examinations in that language. The examinations were set and held under the regulations of the British Civil Service Commissioners and the results were announced in the annual reports of the Department of National Defence under the heading "Foreign Languages".¹⁴² German was added to the examinations by 1935 and by 1940 Russian had received the same status.

142. Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report, 1925, p. 24.

The Present Army

9. Prior to the war, mobilization plans called for a mobile force which could be used as an expeditionary force if necessary. The force was to be representative of the various sections of Canada and this plan was, in fact, followed during the early stages of mobilization. The main problem faced by the army in its attempt to mobilize and maintain a sectionally balanced force was that the French-speaking militia units in Quebec were overwhelmingly infantry. Other arms and services, and particularly the technical corps, were not representative of the population distribution in Quebec. The result was that there was a shortage of officers and instructors who spoke French in non-infantry corps.¹⁴³ Service for unilingual French-speaking personnel then meant service in an infantry unit, although the field was broadened slightly during the war as the list of French-speaking units in the previous section shows.

10. English remained the operational language of the army although French could be used within units for local administration and tactical control. French-speaking non-bilingual personnel were barred from the technical corps¹⁴⁴ and for the signal corps this was particularly true. In all units signallers had to be bilingual and for all corps except the infantry the officers had to understand English.¹⁴⁵ Nevertheless, there was a place in the Army for a French-speaking unilingual person and contrary to the assimilation practices of the other services, the Army went to considerable trouble to keep French-speaking units intact and were only forced to use English-speaking personnel in these units towards the end of the war. Private soldiers, NCOs and officers could take their training in French and then serve in French-speaking units, but the career prospects for a unilingual French-speaking officer or NCO were quite limited as the operational

143. Canada, Army, File No. 1435-2, see foot note 112, Appendix E of attached background information.

144. Canada, Army, GS Historical Section, Report No. 63, op. cit., p. 44

145. Canada, Army, File No. 1435-2, see foot note 112, Appendix C of attached background information.

language of the army remained English. This policy was supported - as it was for the other services - on the plea of efficiency.

11. The use of French in some training establishment and operational units e.g. the Junior Leader School at Megantic and the French section of the Officer Training School at Brockville - did lead to an increase of French-speaking officers on various staffs. In addition the existence of French-speaking units and training establishments was supported by a large translation service which produced over 500 manuals and documents in French.¹⁴⁶ In July, 1941 a Bureau of Translations was formed in the army to produce the documents and publications needed to support the large training programme. The bureau was put under the Director of Military Training (DMT). New King's Regulations were published in French as was the Manual of Military Law and Financial Regulations and Instructions. Routine orders and General Orders continued to be published in both languages by the Translation Bureau in the Secretary of State's office until responsibility was transferred to the army's translation bureau in February, 1942. The responsibility of publishing these orders was promptly passed back to the Secretary of State's office in April and in October that office announced that the maximum delay between the English and French versions would be only 24 hours at the very most and that in many cases they would be published simultaneously.¹⁴⁷ In all, the small army translation bureau did yeoman service during the war, translating over 500 manuals into French and also finding time to translate volume one of the army's official history of the Great War.¹⁴⁸ The bureau was officially called the Bureau of Bilingual Publications until 1945 when, because of

146. Canada, National Defence Headquarters, File No. 4521-2-1 vol. 4, Brief by DMT, "French Language Editions, Training Publications," September, 1962, Annex A.

147. Ibid., Memorandum to DMT from Head of Translation Services (Secretary of States' Office), 11 September, 1942.

148. Ibid., Memorandum to DMT from MT 5, 1 April, 1944.

its capacity to handle translations in 17 languages, it was renamed the Army Language Bureau.¹⁴⁹ It must not be assumed however, that the Canadian Army was in the process of becoming a bilingual organization: it was an English-speaking organization with some French-speaking elements.

12. The reorganization of the army following the war was based again on sectional representation and this meant that the place of French in the Army had to be studied in more depth than it had been in previous reorganizations. For the purposes of this reorganization all units in Quebec except English-speaking infantry regiments were considered to be bilingual.¹⁵⁰ Experience during the war had shown that bilingual units were not entirely satisfactory since they tended to become unilingual English-speaking units in time. Instead, proposals were made that French-speaking units and sub-units be posted to Quebec,¹⁵¹ but these proposals were not implemented until the late 1950s. During the same period that CATS was being formed and the language training programme was being developed, a proposal was made that Laval University should be asked to study the language problems of the Army. It was anticipated that such a study would lead to the affirmation of two basic principles: that English would remain as the only operational language of the Army; and that English technical terms would be used in French language training manuals without being translated and would thus provide uniformity throughout the Army.¹⁵² This proposal seems not to have been seriously entertained but it does indicate at least one of the basic principles of the post-war army: English must remain the operational language of the Army. This proposition is reaffirmed time and again in all discussion and correspondence on the

149. Ibid., Annual Report of MT5, 9 May, 1945.

150. Canada, Army, GS Historical Section, Report No. 81, op. cit., p. 2

151. Canada, Army, File No. 1435-2, Memorandum to D Arty from Brig. Bernatchez, 31 July, 1950 and Memorandum to D Armd from Brig. Bernatchez, 31 July, 1950.

152. Ibid., Memorandum to DMT from DCGS, 17 June, 1950.

subject of language training and the use of French. This was, in fact, one of the conclusions reached by the "Committee for the Study of Bilingual Problems". French could be used on a unit level, it could be used for basic training and even for trades and specialist training if necessary, but all officers and all signals personnel were to be English-speaking or bilingual.¹⁵³ The latter provision was considered necessary because the Army was to use English as its operational language and therefore officers and signallers of French-speaking units had to be able to converse with and understand English. Army training became centred on this principle.

13. As a start on the post-war intention to provide a reasonable linguistic balance in the army, CATS was opened in 1946 to give basic training to all French-speaking recruits of all arms. It also taught a basic English language course. A survey was made of all the corps schools to see what capacity they had to instruct in the French language and programmes were instituted to increase the number of French-speaking instructors in the Army. The number of instructors able to instruct in French could be increased by two methods: train French-speaking soldiers the required skills and also teach them English or teach English-speaking instructors French. The first course was being followed at CATS but the latter course was not followed in any of the services. By 1950 suggestions began to be made by senior officers inside Army Headquarters that English-speaking instructors should be taught French.¹⁵⁴ At the same time it was tacitly agreed that the army was mainly interested in teaching English only to potential NCOs and instructors and senior trades specialists.¹⁵⁵ Non-technical or even technical jobs at a low level could be done by unilingual

153. Ibid., see foot note 113.

154. Ibid., Memorandum to VCGS from Acting AG, 25 July, 1950.

155. Ibid., see foot note 126.

French-speaking personnel. In 1952 CATS was moved to Valcartier and its task changed to accord with these suggestions. French-speaking recruits from all corps were to receive their basic training there, all French-speaking infantry recruits were to be trained there and potential French-speaking NCOs and instructors were to take a junior leaders course followed by an English language course at CATS. In addition, selected English-speaking officers and NCOs were to receive French language training at the school.¹⁵⁶ This latter provision was a major innovation that had not been followed by the Army before 1952 and which was not followed by either of the other services. It was the first indication in the armed forces that all language instruction was not to be confined to one linguistic group.

14. The training at CATS was the first attempt to run a full-time French language course for English-speaking personnel but it was not the first attempt at a French language training programme in the army. In November, 1947 the CGS approved a plan to teach French to Army Headquarters Personnel.¹⁵⁷ The first course started early in 1948 and was held after normal working hours on a voluntary basis. The plan was extended to include Command Area and large camp headquarters - except for Quebec Command and Eastern Quebec Area headquarters. The GOC of Quebec Command complained of the exclusion, pointing out that there were many officers employed at these headquarters who could not speak French.¹⁵⁸ These two establishments were then included in the plan which was approved by the Defence Council in January, 1948. Funds were made available to hire suitable French teachers and by March there were 700 officers taking French courses in 21 centres.¹⁵⁹

156. Canada, Army GS Historical Section, Report No. 81, op. cit., p. 14.

157. Canada, Army, File No. 3505-3, Memorandum to D Pers from DMT, 27 November, 1947.

158. Ibid., Letter to AHQ from GOC Quebec Command, 12 December, 1947.

159. Ibid., Letter to the Minister from CGS, 15 March, 1948.

The purpose of this training was to get two classes of officers:
a) those who could hold command appointments in either language
and b) those officers who were proficient enough to handle day to
day liaison in either language.¹⁶⁰ These courses have continued,
although they have had to be suspended from time to time for lack
of funds. The plan was also broadened to allow officers to take a
French course at a university or an approved language school at
public expense.¹⁶¹ The courses have not been entirely satisfactory,
due mainly to the lack of opportunity for the officers to live and
work in a French-speaking atmosphere or to serve with French-
speaking units. The language programme at the CATS has become the
main method of teaching selected officers and NCOs French and
the infantry personnel so trained then have the opportunity to
serve with the R22eR for a short time.

15. The Collège Militaire Royal was opened at St. Jean in 1952
and provided a two to three year course for officer candidates
of all three services. Courses were taught in both English and
French and the aim of the college was to create bilingual officers
for Canada's three armed forces. French was placed on an equal
basis with English at the college not only for instructional
purposes but also for normal administrative and training tasks.
This bilingual institution was indirectly the result of proposal
made by Laval University. Laval University had proposed to the
Department of National Defence that a course in military studies
should be started at Laval which would qualify a student for a
commission in one of the armed forces. The plan was to be
subsidized by the government and was intended to increase the
number of French-speaking officers in the armed forces. The
plan was resisted by some of the service heads on the ground that
it would lead to linguistic segregation within the armed forces
and that it would be hard to confine subsidies to Laval University.

160. Ibid., Memorandum to DMT from DMI, 19 May, 1948.

161. Ibid., Letter to Registrar, Carleton College from CGS,
28 September, 1953.

The preference of the service chiefs was for a preparatory course to be run at Laval and other French-speaking universities which would give French-speaking students the training required for them to compete successfully with English-speaking students on the entrance examinations to the services colleges.¹⁶² The idea of a preparatory course became more acceptable to the service chiefs and to the Minister when it was decided that such a course should be run by the services themselves. The result was the establishment of CMR and before the opening in 1952, the intended one year preparatory course was extended to a course similar to that followed at Royal Roads. Following the course at CMR, however, cadets then go to the RMC where all instruction is done in English.

16. The intention to the Army to increase French-Canadian representation in non-infantry corps caused the greatest problems. There was a lack of trained bilingual personnel and a lack of French language training pamphlets and manuals. The first problem was met in part by sending French-speaking recruits to the Three Rivers Technical School where they received technical training in some trades and where they also were given an English course. Personnel from several corps took their training here starting in 1949. The technical aspects of the course were well taught and there was no serious complaint on this score, but the language training was not very effective. Few recruits graduating from the course at Three Rivers were able to take an advanced course at a corps school which was taught in English.¹⁶³ The effectiveness of the courses was further damaged when English-speaking personnel began to be sent to the Three Rivers Technical School where they received their training in English but blocked vacancies for French-speaking personnel. In 1950 the CGS ordered that the course was to be reserved for French-speaking personnel if enough were available to make the courses worthwhile.¹⁶⁴ The

162. Canada, Army, File No. 1435-2, Memorandum to VCGS from DGMT, 4 July, 1951 and reply, 6 July, 1951.

163. Canada, Army, File No. 3686-2, Letter to DMT from A/Dir of Training, Department of Labour, 18 August, 1950.

164. Ibid., Letter to HQ Quebec Command, from CGS, 3 November, 1950.

plan was finally allowed to lapse because not enough French-speaking personnel were available to make continuation of the course economical. Training of French-speaking tradesmen in French at the corps schools fared no better and by 1962 there was no trades training being done in French at any of the corps schools,¹⁶⁵ although the teaching of trades courses in French had been authorized in some cases.¹⁶⁶

17. The problem of providing French language manuals and pamphlets was met by closing the Army Translation Bureau in 1952, against the recommendations of the head of the bureau and despite his dire predictions.¹⁶⁷ All translation work then became the duty of the National Defence Division of the Bureau of Translations. The large number of manuals and pamphlets translated during the war soon became obsolete and even by 1950, out of the 180 French pamphlets available, only 60 were considered to be modern enough for use.¹⁶⁸ The translation bureau was too small to keep up with the demand and it was decided that only basic pamphlets should be selected for translation. By 1962, only 28 French language pamphlets were in use,¹⁶⁹ and eight were in the process of being translated. The policy followed by the army in producing French translations was that all material needed for depot, recruit and new soldier training should receive priority and that for the long term, all pamphlets required by soldiers and officers for their professional advancement - up to and including the rank of captain - should be translated.¹⁷⁰ In 1962 the VCGS established four priorities for translation,

165. Canada, National Defence Headquarters, File No. 1001-3, Memorandum to VCGS from DGMT, 9 February, 1962, Annex C.

166. Canada, Army, File No. 3505-3, Letter to CO, RCOC School from DOS, 24 September, 1953.

167. Canada, Army, File No. 4521-2-1, vol. 4, brief by DMT, "French Language Editions, Training Publications", September, 1962, Annex A.

168. Canada, Army, File No. 1435-2, see foot note 112, Appendix D of attached background information.

169. Canada, Army, File No. 4521-2-1, vol. 4, see foot notes 146 and 167.

170. Ibid., Memorandum to DMT from D Inf, 28 June, 1954.

clarifying this policy.¹⁷¹ All important orders and regulations have been available in both languages throughout the post-war period and by 1962 most of the army personnel documents were also available in English and French.¹⁷²

18. French has not been accepted as an operational language in the Army but the Army has gone farther than either of the other services in providing French-speaking personnel the opportunity to serve in French-speaking units, take at least some of their training in French, study for professional examinations with French language manuals and write the examinations in French - including officers' promotional examinations - and read orders and regulations in their own language. The career of a unilingual French-speaking soldier is limited and the career of a French-speaking officer without a working command of English is limited not only in employment opportunities but also in the professional courses he can take since all senior staff and technical courses taught in Canada are taught only in English and other advanced courses are taught either in England or the US. Staff work is all in English but the Army is also subject to the same regulations regarding correspondence in French to the Quebec government, French-speaking individuals, replies to letters received in French, and bilingual signs and notices as the other two services. In the Army, as in the other services, the policy is that all correspondence is drafted in English and sent to the translation bureau for translation into French.¹⁷³ Similarly, any correspondence received in French is sent to the bureau for translation and both the original and the English copy are placed on file. The Army has gone much further than either the Air Force or the Navy in recognizing and using the French language but French is not given full parity with English.

171. Ibid., Memorandum from DMT, 3 May, 1962.

172. Canada, National Defence Headquarters, File No. 1001-3, Annex E to Memorandum to VCGS from DGMT, 9 February, 1962.

173. Canada, National Defence Headquarters, File No. 1001-3, Memorandum to DVD from Assistant Deputy Minister, 17 July, 1956.

CULTURAL MILIEU

Sedentary Militia, 1763-1855

1. Following the British conquest of Canada, the nature and role of the militia changed little. The old militia organization was maintained and militia captains retained much of their prestige and most of their military and civil functions. The main responsibility for the defence of British North America belonged to the British regular forces and the military functions of the Canadian militia were limited. It was not until 1777 that the Council passed an ordinance respecting the militia, the first of the British regime. Up till that time the old French rules and regulations had prevailed. Although the French regulations had been used and the old militia organization inherited from the French regime had been retained, continuity of units and traditions had been disrupted and gradually new traditions of British origin began to grow.

2. Following the American Revolt, the defence of Canada depended on large garrisons of British troops supported by the sedentary militia. The militia was, however, little more than a paper organization and what Canadian participation in the defence of British North America there was, was confined largely to enlistment in fencible regiments. The personnel of the fencible regiments were Canadians and so were many of the officers. One battalion of the Royal Canadian Volunteer Regiment was composed of French-speaking Canadians and officered by French-speaking Canadians but in all other respects, the regiments were British.

3. During the war of 1812/14 most of the fighting was done by British regular units and despite Canadian legends to the contrary it was the professional soldier who did most of the fighting and provided most of the leadership.¹⁷⁴ The most effective units were those closely associated with the regulars, including five fencible regiments and the Voltigeurs, a long service regiment

174. Stacey, An Introduction to Military History, op. cit., p. 8



which was virtually on the same footing as a fencible regiment. These units were carried on the rolls of the British army and did not belong to the Canadian militia - except for the Voltigeurs. They were British in every respect, even to the use of British pattern uniforms, decided upon as early as 1814 in Upper Canada.¹⁷⁵ The militia seldom fought as distinct militia units but were absorbed into the long service battalions and the fencible regiments. It remained a source of manpower to the regular regiments and the long service and fencible regiments and thus did not develop a distinctive Canadian regimental tradition. This system was followed after the war and the defence of Canada continued to rest with the large British garrison stationed here. The militia could always be used for emergency services and could always be called out to provide the personnel for ad hoc units or volunteer units raised from time to time but there was little permanent organization and active service was almost always in conjunction with the British regiments.

4. A curious arrangement during this period was the distinction made between militia organizations in Quebec City. It was the practice to distinguish "British" militia from "Canadian" militia in the Quebec City area. This distinction corresponded to English-speaking and French-speaking units respectively until 1828 when the system was abolished by the Lieutenant Governor. The distinction was renewed in 1847¹⁷⁶ but since there were no militia units in active existence, the distinction was of doubtful practical significance and the Militia Act of 1855 placed all the new Active Militia formations in the Quebec City area under one military district.

Volunteer Active Militia, 1855-1902

5. The Militia Act of 1855 forms the beginning of the modern Canadian Army. Volunteer militia units were formed which were

175. Chambers, op. cit., p. 40.

176. Ibid., p. 56

uniformed, armed, trained and paid. Five artillery, three armoured and four infantry units or parts of units can trace their ancestry back to this act.¹⁷⁷ This was not the start of a distinctive Canadian army, however. Uniforms were of British pattern so that any enemy could not tell militia from regular troops (despite the fact that the Canadian militia had some kilted "highland" regiments while no such regiments of the British army were stationed here during the period). Arms and equipment were British as were the organization and tactics used and training was given by the British garrisons stationed in Canada. Even the rules and regulations were British: Queen's Regulations, the Mutiny Act and the Articles of War applied to the Canadian Militia when placed on active service, the only modifications being some restrictions placed on the use of corporal and capital punishment.¹⁷⁸

6. Even after Confederation the senior militia officer was British and later the commanding officers of the two Canadian artillery batteries were British as was the commandment and military staff of RMC. Militia units were often named after Canadian towns and localities but the formal unit designations often carried the prefix "Royal" and in other respects were very British sounding indeed.

7. Part of the explanation for this development can be found in the strange divisions of responsibilities between the Minister and the senior militia officer. The senior officer was British throughout the period and supposedly free from Canadian political ties and sympathies. He was responsible for the military efficiency of the militia and the small permanent force that began to develop after the withdrawal of British troops from Canada. The minister and his civilian officials in the Department of Militia and Defence were responsible for the provision of arms and equipment, military

177. Ibid., p. 12.

178. Scoble, Maj. TC, The Canadian Volunteer's Handbook for Field Service, Toronto, Henry Rowsell, 1868, p. 76.

stores and the provision and maintenance of all military buildings. The senior officer commanding the militia had the task of making the militia as efficient as possible and for a British career officer this usually meant making it as British as possible. This development did not seem to create undue worry for the civilian head of the department and the most serious conflicts between the senior militia officer and the Minister occurred when the demands for efficiency and reform happened to be contrary to the realities of Canadian politics. The form the militia regiments took was of little bother to the government as long as the important function of dispensing the public money to the most deserving quarters was unimpaired by overzealous attempts at efficiency. A proposal to raise a French-speaking militia unit and dress them in Zouave uniforms could be denied as a result of objections of military people in Canada and Britain,¹⁷⁹ but the GOC's attempt to make the purchase of horses for the South African contingent the responsibility of an impartial commission could not be tolerated.¹⁸⁰

8. Apart from the North West Rebellion, the only other large scale military action taken by the Canadian army at this time was its participation in the South African war. Loud and vociferous English Canadian demands for participation in this war finally made the government of the day agree to participate in a limited manner. Britain preferred that Canada supply independent companies that could be used as reinforcements for British units but the government stipulated that the Canadian contribution remain together as a contingent and not be broken up as reinforcements.¹⁸¹ This was the first instance of what was to become a persistent Canadian demand: Canadian troops serving abroad were to remain as a distinctive Canadian contingent under Canadian control as much as was practicable. In all, 2500 men served in the Canadian

179. Morton, op. cit., p. 8-9

180. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, op. cit., p. 293.

181. Ibid., p. 280.



contingent and another 5000 served in units raised for the British Army at British expense.¹⁸² This was the first Canadian participation in a British war outside of North America and while the Canadian contingent remained a separate entity, the Canadian troops were legally on the same basis as other Imperial troops and formed only a small part of a British imperial army.

The Modern Army, 1902-1939

9. After the Boer War and with the modest growth of the small permanent force, British ties became closer. The idea of a truly imperial force composed of contingents from all parts of the Empire was proposed by Britain at the Colonial Conference in 1902 but the idea was rejected by Canada and Australia. The concept of an Imperial army was not abandoned and if there could not be agreement on a single Imperial force under British control, then the next logical step was that all the various armies in the Empire should be standardized. The Colonial Conference of 1907 discussed this problem and met a generally favourable response from the self-governing colonies and the Dominions. At the same time it was agreed that an Imperial General Staff would be organized which would give advice but which would have no powers to command and control the various armies of the Empire. The principles of standardization were further discussed and elaborated at the Imperial Conference of 1909 and 1911 and the details were worked out. There was to be uniformity in arms, equipment, uniforms, training, organization and doctrine. The Imperial General Staff was to have Canadian and Australian sections and Canadian and Australian staff officers were to be trained at the British Army Staff College in Camberly. It was also during this same period that the practice of having Canadian army units affiliated with British units was begun, the first such affiliation being the one between the 78th Highlanders of Toronto and the Gordon Highlanders.

182. Stacey, An Introduction to the Study of Military History, op. cit., p. 20.

10. The Militia Act of 1904 abolished the post of GOC but the ties between the British army and the Canadian Army grew steadily stronger. The Militia Council formed by the Militia Act, 1904, was composed of military advisers to the Minister but most of these advisers were British professional soldiers and it was not until 1908 that a Canadian became the senior military officer in the Dominion. True, the old division of responsibilities had been ended and with it the division in loyalties of the senior officer of the militia but as the army developed more and more British practices were adopted and more and more British staff officers were borrowed to staff the growing organization. The first Canadian CGS was appointed in 1908 and though the difficulties between the Minister and his senior officer became less frequent and of more limited scope, it is also true that the military men had more of their own way in professional matters¹⁸³ - and that way was the way of British trained officers. There can be little argument that the army became more efficient and professional in the process but at the cost of losing - or failing to develop - a true Canadian identity.¹⁸⁴ The primary role of the Canadian Army was recognized as home defence but, in the words of a British General, Canada must "think of the thousands from overseas who fight...in her behalf... and prepare herself ... to do as much for them in return."¹⁸⁵ The only significant departure from British practice in this period was the adoption by the Canadian Army of the Ross rifle and as events later showed, this was not one of the most inspired moves that the Department of Militia and Defence ever made.

11. The expansion of the Army during the Great War placed a considerable strain on its resources, both in men and material. The CEF was equipped and clothed on the British pattern and it was trained and organized in the same manner and in the spirit

183. Ibid., p. 23.

184. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, op. cit., p. 304.

185. Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Report on The Military Institutions of Canada by Gen. Sir Ian Hamilton 1913, Ottawa, Government Printing Bureau, 1913, p. 13.

of the standardization agreements made before the war. Canada was able to supply the majority of junior officers but during the early stages of the war most senior officers and staff officers were British. The Canadian Corps was formed in September of 1915 but not commanded by a Canadian until June, 1917. Canadian control of her forces in Britain and France was complete except for ultimate operational command of her field forces. Control of all non-operational aspects of the CEF was exercised by the Minister and various military appointments made by him in the UK. In March, 1916, the post of "Minister of Overseas Military Forces from Canada in the United Kingdom" was formed over the objections of the Minister of Militia and Defence and this disagreement ultimately led to the Minister's resignation - at the Prime Minister's insistence - in November, 1916. The Overseas Minister then became responsible for liaison with British headquarters in France for all matters of organization and administration of the Canadian field forces and he could communicate directly with the Commander of the Canadian Corps in this respect.¹⁸⁶ Non-operational control of the CEF thus remained in Canadian hands throughout the war and this control was justified mainly by the legal opinion given by the Deputy Minister of Justice: Canadian troops serving abroad were in no respect Imperial troops (and therefore subject to unqualified Imperial Control) but they were Canadian Militiamen on active service defending their country abroad, and therefore were subject to Canadian rules and regulations.¹⁸⁷ By the end of the war all major formations of the CEF were commanded by Canadian officers and many of the Staff officers were Canadian but the overall atmosphere of the Army was overwhelmingly British.

12. The image of the army did not change after the war since the CEF units and their traditions were continued in the post-war

186. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 212.

187. Stanley, op. cit., p. 314-15.

army and the training, equipment, organization and uniforms remained patterned on the British example. The staff became all Canadian but it was trained on British lines and staff officers were trained at Camberly. Regimental affiliations were continued and extended in many cases. For example, the Régiment de Québec was affiliated with the East Yorkshire Regiment in 1921 and the Régiment de Chateauguay was affiliated with the North Staffordshire Regiment in 1930. The R22eR was made part of the regular army following the war but it wore British uniforms, used British arms and equipment, was organized on British lines and trained and operated on the British pattern. It was also affiliated with a British Guards regiment. The inter-war years mark the emergence of Canada as a nation but they also mark one of the most British oriented periods in the history of the Canadian Army. Even at Canada's own military college - RMC - Canadian traditions and symbols were lacking. In his report for 1920, The Commandant of RMC remarked on this lack of any distinguishing Canadian mark. To remedy this situation and to create a "Canadian" atmosphere at the college he proposed that pictures of prominent military men such as Wolfe and Brock be acquired and that the main hall should have in gilt the names of all the regiments who fought to gain and hold Canada for the British Empire.¹⁸⁸

13. Following the war control of the Army reverted to pre-war patterns until 1922 when the Department of National Defence was created. The following year the Militia Council was abolished and replaced by the Defence Council. The CGS became Chief of Staff of the Department of National Defence and Inspector General of the Militia, Naval and Air Forces but this appointment was opposed by the Director of Naval Services and the appointment was discontinued in 1927, returning each service to its own military chief. The next organizational change was made in 1936 when the

188. Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1920, p. 73.

Chiefs of Staff Committee was formed with General MacNaughton as its Chairman. In August of the same year a Cabinet Defence Committee was formed composed of the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Finance, Justice, and Defence with the three service chiefs providing professional advice. A modest rearmament policy was started after 1936 with the emphasis on rearmament being placed on the Air Force, the Navy and only lastly the Army. The official policy of the government was to avoid any military commitment and the lowly place the Army occupied in rearmament plans tends to support the assumption that the army's role in any future war was to be confined mainly to "home defence".¹⁸⁹

The Present Army

14. The Canadian Army in World War Two was a self-contained army in many respects. All the senior commanders were Canadian and all the staff officers were Canadian. Canadian control of the force overseas was complete up to Army Headquarters level and this control extended over all matters except ultimate operational command in Europe. Uniforms, equipment, training and organization remained the same - or similar to - that used by the British Army. The laws governing the discipline of the Canadian Army were also British in many cases since the military enactments of Canada incorporated by reference the existing military law of England.¹⁹⁰ There were Canadian modifications of those laws but under section 69 (1) of the Militia Act, the Army Act, King's Regulations, Rules of Procedure and Customs of the Service were incorporated into Canadian military law insofar as they were not inconsistent with the Militia Act or regulations made under it.¹⁹¹ By 1943 the British establishments for units and formations were fully adopted to permit more efficient integration with senior British

189. Stacey, Military History, op. cit., p. 33.

190. Singer, Burrell M. and Langford, Lt. Col. RJS, Handbook of Canadian Military Law, Toronto, Copp Clark Co. Ltd., 1941, p. 8.

191. Ibid., p. 11

formations in future operations on the continent. Both the personnel and outlook of the Army were perhaps more distinctly Canadian than previously but it was, nevertheless an English-Canadian organization with a few French-speaking units attached to it.

15. The Army did not change drastically following the war and continued very much in its old pattern although more attention was paid to French-Canadian representation in the Army. The greatest change in policy was the acceptance by the government of international commitments for its armed forces, but the Army changed very slowly and retained its old traditions and ties to a large extent. New units and regiments were added to the regular force but they were mostly English-speaking units with British sounding names: the Regiment of Canadian Guards, the Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, the Royal Highland Regiment (Black Watch of Canada), 1/8 Canadian Hussars, Fort Garry Horse. British traditions and regimental affiliations remained and Canadian troops in NATO formed part of the British Army of the Rhine but direct British influence has decreased. Canadian army training facilities following the war became well developed and capable of training officers and men at all ranks without extensive resort to external resources. The Canadian Army Staff College, formed during the Second War, and the National Defence College provided most of the training of Canadian staff officers. RMC has been supplemented by Royal Roads, CMR and the ROTP as a source of career officers and the various corps schools and training establishments provided specialized training for officers and men. Training in British schools became very limited and usually restricted to specialist courses. In 1950 a National Defence Act was introduced in Parliament which not only was intended to unite the three services under one civilian minister but which was also intended to consolidate the various

legislative enactments affecting the Armed Forces into a single statute, including military discipline.¹⁹² Reference to British law was thus ended. The Army also changed its equipment policy and either developed its own equipment or adopted American equipment. Organization and training methods changed and many British methods and practices were replaced but these changes did not necessarily lead to stronger Canadian identity in the Army but rather to stronger military ties with the US, making the Army less British perhaps, but still an English-speaking organization.

192. Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Defence, Report of Proceedings and Evidence, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1950, p. 11.



APPENDIX A

TABLE 1

Survey of Corps Schools - Bilingual Instructors, January, 1950¹⁹³
By 1 Sept 50

<u>School</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>NCOs</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>NCOs</u>
RCAC	0	1	1	0
RCSA	1	6	1	6
RCSA (AA)	3	1	3	1
RCSA (C&AA)	2	0	2	0
RCSME	1	3	2	2
RCSofS	0	0	0	0
RCSofI	30	0	10	12
RCASC	2	0	2	0
RCAMC	0	1	1	1
RCDC	0	3	2	0
RCOC	1	0	0	2
RCEME	0	2	0	3
CProC	0	1	0	1
CJATC	5	13	5	13
CATS	4	12	-	-

193. Canada, Army, File No. 1435-2, see foot note 121.



TABLE 2

194

Percentage of RCAC, RCA and RCIC Units in Quebec Command, 1950

<u>Mobilization Plans</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>Quebec Units</u>	<u>Percentages</u>
RCAC	19	5	28%
RCA	50	10	20%
RCIC	40	12	30%
<u>Reserve Force</u>			
RCAC	23	6	26%
RCA	71	14	20%
RCIC	66	8	27%
<u>Active Force</u>			
RCAC	2	-	-
RCA	4	-	-
RCIC	9	3	33%

TABLE 3

195

French speaking Reserve Units, 1952

RCAC	Régiment de Hull Three Rivers Regiment
RCA	46th Anti-tank Regiment 27th Field Regiment 2nd Medium Regiment 51st Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment 38th Light Anti-aircraft Regiment 62nd Light Anti-aircraft Regiment 6th Field Regiment 35th Anti-tank Regiment
RCIC	Fusiliers de Mont-Royal Régiment de Chateauguay Régiment de Maisonneuve Régiment de Joliette Régiment de St. Hyacinthe Fusiliers de Sherbrooke Régiment de Saguenay Régiment de Lévis Régiment de Montmagny Régiment de la Chaudière Fusiliers de St. Laurent Régiment de Quebec (MG) Voltigeurs (motorized)
Mixed Units	Canadian Infantry Battalion 258th Battery of 79th Field Regiment

194. Ibid., see foot note 112, Appendix G of attached background information.

195. Ibid., Memorandum to the Defence Secretary from AG, 12 January, 1952.



APPENDIX B

TABLE 1

196

Percentage of French Canadian Personnel by Rank, February, 1958

Officers	Percentage French Canadian	Other Ranks	Percentage French Canadian
Colonel & above	8	WO I	8
Lt. Col.	9	WO II	10
Major	12	Staff Sgt.	11
Captain	12	Sergeant	15
Lieutenant	15	Corporal	20
2nd Lt.	21	Private	26
Officer Cadet	21	Apprentice	16
All Officers	14%	All ORs	21%

TABLE 2

197

French Canadian Other Ranks Among Non-Tradesmen, February, 1958

Corps	Non-tradesmen % French	Other Ranks % French
RCAC	45	21
RCA	14	16
RCE	15	14
RC Sigs.	15	12
RCIC	37	30
RCASC	31	23
RCOC	25	21
RCEME	19	15
C Pro C	26	17
CPC	40	27
RCDC	8	14
RCAMC	22	20
C Int C	0	18
RCAPC	50	24

196. Chaput, op. cit., p. 7

197. Ibid., p. 31

TABLE 3

				198
<u>Officers with Staff Training, February, 1958</u>				
Category	Staff Trained	Non-Staff Trained	Total	Percentage Staff Trained
French Canadian	74	751	825	9
Non-French Canadian	867	4250	5117	17
Total	941	5001	5942	26

Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism

ARMED FORCES HISTORICAL
STUDY

Part 3

The
Royal Canadian Air Force

Errata

1. Page 3, paragraph 1: This was not the first flight of a heavier-than-air-machine within The British Empire. It was the first of its kind carried out by a British subject within The British Empire.
2. Page 6, paragraph 7: R.C.A.F. historians say Landry did not join the French air force but returned to Canada before the outbreak of war.
3. Page 10, paragraph 14: In 1923 both Ontario and Quebec took over the forestry work being done within their boundaries. B.C. had no company able to assume such a task and the natural resources of Alberta and Saskatchewan were still in federal ^hlands. The C.A.F. used Roberval until the province assumed operation of the forestry service.
4. Page 19, paragraph 28: Enlistment was in the R.C.A.F., not the B.C.A.T.P. which was the training organization.
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 - St.-Eugène
 - Windsor Mills
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Mont Joli

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Manning Depot, Quebec City

Initial (basic) training school at Victoriaville

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General Comments

1. The basic comment made on this paper is that no attempt has been made to justify or explain the unilingual English-speaking policy of the R.C.A.F. eg. need for efficient communication; the close co-operation necessary with the R.A.F. and U.S.A.F. etc.
2. A second comment made refers to the lack of technically qualified applicants from Quebec during the inter-war years. This comment is not documented but based on general reflections on the Quebec educational system at that period.

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PREFACE

1. This short paper on Canada's junior service is intended to serve as a general introduction to the study of the Air Force being done by the Commission. Its purpose is to provide some background information and to identify and trace the trends affecting French-Canadian representation in the RCAF. Two major trends are apparent in the short history of the RCAF. The first corresponds to the pre-World War Two period and is marked by a complete indifference to the ethnic structure of the RCAF. The pre-war RCAF was small, ill equipped, and concerned far more with civil responsibilities than with any military role. Within the severe financial restrictions placed upon it, the RCAF developed as an English-speaking organization patterned as closely as possible on the RAF. Only with the beginning of the Second War and the need of the RCAF to expand rapidly was any attention given to the place of French-speaking personnel within its structure. Even during this period of vast expansion progress was slow in either recognizing or affecting the changes needed to increase French-Canadian representation in the RCAF or in developing independantly of the RAF. It is only with the growth of the RCAF as the largest of Canada's three armed forces following the war that the second major trend in its development became apparent. In the post-war period the RCAF had the facilities and the time to begin a serious study of its ethnic composition and policies and practices began to be instituted to increase the number of French-Canadians in the RCAF. This development was limited, however, by the basic assumption that the RCAF must remain a unilingual, English-speaking organization. The RCAF did at least become aware of the lack of French-Canadian representation within its structure and this alone marks a departure from its old pre-war indifference to this matter.

2. The paper is split into three major functional sections: ethnic representation, language use and cultural milieu. Each section is sub-divided into chronological divisions corresponding to the various periods of the RCAF's development. The section on the ethnic representation within the Air Force includes general information on its organization and characteristics as well as material on its ethnic composition and the practices and policies affecting that composition. The other two sections are restricted to their specific topic and in many cases are little more than comments on the general survey made in the first part of the paper. All three sections deal only with events up to the early years of the past decade. Policies and practices instituted during the Korean War period have generally remained in use and their effects will form the basis for the detailed study of the modern RCAF which is to follow.

THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

A - INTRODUCTION

1. The Royal Canadian Air Force is the junior of Canada's three armed forces but its youth has not prevented it from experiencing frustrations in common with its two sister services. The RCAF suffered four false starts before it assumed its present form. While the RCAF escaped much of the political bickering that marked the development of the other two services, it was also subject to the overriding defence policy of Canada in the period following the Great War: economy. The result has been that during the periods of economic restrictions the RCAF was left little room to develop and received little attention from either the English or French communities in Canada. In periods of stress the RCAF has had to develop rapidly and has had neither the time nor the qualified personnel to adequately reflect the ethnic composition of Canada in its ranks and procedures. Only with the development of a relatively large peace-time establishment has the RCAF - in common with the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Navy - had the time to study and work upon its ethnic composition, and the recruiting and training policies that basically affect that composition.
2. The short history of the RCAF contemplated in this paper can best be divided into four portions: World War One to the formation of the RCAF; the inter-war years; World War Two; and the post-war period up until the early 1950s. The reason for ending the historical sketch at this period is the same as for the other two services - the last major reorganization of the Armed Forces occurred in 1951 and the last major introduction of new policies affecting the ethnic composition of the armed forces occurred shortly after this reorganization. The purpose of this short paper is to serve as a general introduction to the detailed analysis of the three services which will follow. Further

background information to the statistical analysis will have to come from detailed study of specific topics. This historical sketch will only give a general review of the development of the RCAF and the major policies and trends affecting that development.

B - ETHNIC COMPOSITION

World War I to the Formation of the RCAF: 1914-1922

1. Military aviation in Canada developed very slowly, even under the impetus of the Great War. The first flight of a heavier than air machine was made by JAD McDurdy at Baddeck Bay, Nova Scotia, on February 23, 1909. This flight was also the first by such a machine anywhere within the British Empire. The Militia Council foresaw the military possibilities of aviation and arranged for a demonstration of the new aircraft at Camp Petawawa.

Unfortunately, the "Silver Dart" and its sister aircraft, the "Baddeck I" both crashed before a large audience of civil and military observers.

2. The enthusiasm of the Militia Department was not entirely destroyed by this unfortunate demonstration and in 1910 the Militia Council asked the Treasury Board for \$10,000.00 to aid McCurdy and Baldwin with their experiments and to train several army officers as pilots. This request was refused by the Treasury Board and the Militia Council itself refused a similar proposal the following year.¹ The next year the Minister refused to entertain any military participation in aviation since "no funds were available".² Surprisingly, the Minister - Sam Hughes - was the first to recommend that Canada supply a flying detachment with the CEF when war started in August of 1914. His original intention was to supply six flyers to accompany the Canadian Expeditionary Force but only two presented themselves in time to proceed overseas in October, 1914. These two young flyers and their American made airplane were the "nucleus" of the Canadian Aviation Corps. Unfortunately, they proved not only to be the original, but the only, members of the Canadian Aviation Corps. One of the flyers returned to Canada shortly after his arrival in England and the other was killed in a flying accident in February, 1915.³

1. Nicholson, Col. GWL, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1962, p. 503.

2. Ibid., p. 503

3. Hitchins, W/S FH, "Evolution of the Royal Canadian Air Force", paper prepared for the Canadian Historical Association, 1946, and bound separately by the Library of the Department of National

3. Compared with the demands made by the Canadian government for the preservation of the national identity of the CEF and for the control of all non-operational aspects of the CEF, the Canadian attitude to participation in military aviation was surprising. The Army Council in 1915 had suggested that the Dominions form their own squadrons within the Royal Flying Corps. Australia took advantage of this offer but Canada did not.⁴ No further action to form a Canadian element in the RFC was taken by Canada for three years. In May, 1918 Sir Edward Kemp suggested that the RAF give more publicity to the work of Canadians in the RAF; that Canada might form its own small Canadian Flying Corps; and that a special Canadian section be formed with its own distinctive badges.⁵ British opinion had shifted since 1915, however, and these proposals did not meet with great enthusiasm. The publicity requested was not forthcoming since it was Air Force policy not to mention individuals by name. The idea of forming a Canadian section was accepted in principle but no concrete action was taken at the time. And finally, the idea of a separate Canadian air force - while accepted as an inevitable development - was rejected as not being opportune.⁶ In August, 1918, the Air Ministry did, however, issue orders to form two squadrons manned by Canadians but the squadrons themselves were not formed until after the Armistice. Early in 1919, Number One Canadian Wing was formed to administer the two squadrons, the intention being that this organization would return to Canada as the nucleus of a Canadian air force.⁷

4. Meanwhile in Canada, another air force organization was being introduced. Under prodding from the Admiralty, Canada had agreed to form a Royal Canadian Naval Air Service and the necessary orders were issued in 1918. However, the war ended before the RCNAS became fully operational and it was disbanded by Order-in-Council on 5 December, 1918.⁸

4. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 504.

5. Hitchins, op. cit., p. 93.

6. Ibid., p. 94.

7. Ibid., p. 94.

8. Ibid., p. 95.

5. The lack of a Canadian air force did not impede young Canadians from enlisting in the air services of the Empire. In 1914 there were two ways of becoming a war pilot; by joining the CEF and hoping for a transfer to the Royal Flying Corps on arrival in Europe; or by travelling to England or France at private expense and then trying to enlist in the air services of the country in the normal manner.⁹ Early in 1915 a new avenue of entry was opened when a few officers were sent to Canada to recruit for the RFC and the RNAS. In the same year the Army Council - through the Colonial Office - appealed for recruits and made the suggestion that the Dominions could create their own squadrons within the RFC. No firm decision was made by Canada on military aviation policy until 1917 when an arrangement was made with Britain for the recruiting and training of pilots and groundcrew personnel in Canada. The first RFC recruiting group arrived in Canada in January, 1917 to establish Headquarters in Toronto and to establish recruiting offices in the major Canadian cities and at selected points in the U.S.¹⁰ The same month work began on airfields and facilities at Camp Borden, Long Branch, Armour Heights, Rathburn, Mohawk and Beamsville which became RFC training bases.

6. In April, 1918 the RFC and the RNAS were amalgamated to form the RAF, and it was in this force and its predecessors that Canadian airmen served. The single distinguishing mark of Canadians serving in the RFC was that they drew Canadian rates of pay.¹¹ Altogether, 22,802 Canadians were known to have joined the RAF and its predecessors. These are only the figures from lists of Canadians in the CEF who were seconded to the RAF; who were discharged from the CEF to enroll in the RAF; or who were enrolled in the RAF in Canada.¹² There must have been many more Canadians who found their way into the RAF by other means because at the end of the war - in

9. Ellis, Frank H, Canada's Flying Heritage, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1954, p. 109.

10. Ibid., p. 120.

11. Ibid., p. 126.

12. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 504

spite of high casualty rates - 24% of the officers and 8% of the airmen in the RAF were Canadians.¹³ During the short time that the RAF operated recruiting and training facilities in Canada, it recruited 16,663 cadets and air mechanics, graduated 3,135 pilots (2,539 were sent overseas) and 137 observers (85 sent overseas).¹⁴

7. No records exist of the number of French Canadians who served in the British air forces but the conditions of service were hardly congenial to large participation by French speaking Canadians. Service was in an imperial force having no Canadian traditions; all training and operations were carried on in the English language; and finally all training was done in Ontario - whether privately at the Curtis flying school in Toronto (a prerequisite for enrollment in the RFC early in the war was that the candidate had to have a civil pilot's licence) or at one of the RAF training bases established in that province in 1917 and 1918. Similarly there are no figures to show how many french Canadians followed the example of Jean-Marie Landry who paid his own way to the Blériot school in France and then joined the French air force.^{14a}

Formative Period of the RCAF, 1919-1924:

8. When the Great War ended, Canada had two embryonic air forces. One - the RCNAS - was disbanded in December of 1918 but the government remained undecided over the fate of the two squadrons formed by Canadians serving in the RAF. The indecision proved fatal for the small CAF and the strength of the two squadrons gradually faded until in January and February, 1920, the squadrons and wing headquarters were formally disbanded.¹⁵

9. As an interim measure an Air Board was formed in June, 1919, which was to control aviation throughout the Dominion, both civil

13. Ibid., p. 507, Actual figures were 6,623 officers and 15,679 airmen.

14. Canada, RCAF Historical Section, RCAF Logbook, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1949, p. 8.

14a. Ellis, op. cit., p. 96.

15. Hitchins, op. cit., p. 96.

and military. No decision was made on the use and role of military aviation in Canada, although the facilities of the RAF at Camp Borden were available and largely intact. Canada was also spared a large expenditure on military aviation by the offer of the British government to provide the Dominions with large quantities of surplus airplanes and equipment. Canada's share of this programme was approximately five million dollars worth of airplanes, flying boats, motor transport, cameras, and other stores. The selection of equipment finally made by Canada was, however, more adaptable to civil use than to military use.¹⁶

10. The Air Board was mainly concerned with the control of civil aviation and they were given the power and authority to carry out this task, including the exclusive right to licence pilots, establish air routes and make rules governing aviation throughout Canada. While emphasis was placed on civil aviation, military aviation was not completely ignored in the formation of the Air Board. One member of the five to seven man board was to represent the Department of Naval Services and one member was to represent the Department of Militia and Defence. In February, 1920 the Air Board submitted a report to the Privy Council on military aviation, recommending the formation of a non-permanent military air force to give refresher training to ex-RAF Pilots for a maximum of five weeks every two years. It also recommended that this organization be administered by provincial air force associations.¹⁷ These recommendations met with the approval of the government and in April a small number of officers and airmen were employed to complete the organization of the provincial air force associations and to draft the necessary rules, regulations and establishments. The renewed concern with military aviation was also reflected in the new

16. Ibid., p. 97

17. Canada, RCAF, Air Board, CAF and RCAF, 1919-1939, Typewritten MS, 2 vols., n.d., n.p., p. 13.

composition of the Air Board. The Minister of Militia and Defence became Chairman of the Air Board, Sir Willoughby Gwatkin (a retired British general and ex-Chief of the Canadian General Staff) became the first Inspector General of the CAF with the rank of Air Vice Marshal, and the Director of the RCN also became a member of the seven man board.

11. The weakness of the system recommended is readily apparent: there would be no new blood infused into the Canadian Air Force. The CAF was a non-professional, non-permanent service concerned only with giving refresher training to ex-RAF pilots. This policy effectively closed the door to any greater French Canadian participation in the CAF since the number of French speaking Canadians who served with the RAF was in all probability very small.¹⁸ There was no French Canadian representation on the Air Board and French Canadian representation in the provincial air force associations was non-existent - the executive committee of the Quebec Air Force Association, appointed in June, 1920, had one French Canadian member out of seven and he also served on the succeeding committee in 1921 as the sole French Canadian member. In fact, he is the only French Canadian who served on any of the provincial executive committees, during this early period.¹⁹

12. This makeshift arrangement for an air force was ultimately due to collapse and it came to an end in 1922. In that year the National Defence Act was passed which created one Department of National Defence, containing the Militia, the Naval Services and the Air Board. At the same time the civil and military branches of the Air Board were amalgamated under a Director of the CAF who became directly responsible to the CGS.²⁰ The powers formerly

18. Michel, Pierre, Une Epopée de l'air et Romeo Vachon, Editions Beauchemin, Montreal, 1959, p. 19.

19. Air Board, op. cit., p. 39, Appendix A to Chapter 2.

20. Ibid., p. 118.

vested in the Air Board were transferred to the Minister of National Defence, and the non-permanent CAF thus came to an end.

13. Temporary strength for the new CAF was set at 69 officers and 238 airmen and refresher training of ex-RAF pilots was stopped. A special course for Air Force officers was arranged at RMC and arrangements were made with the RAF for CAF officers to attend the RAF Staff College after a three month preparatory course at RMC. The most important innovation, however, was the introduction of a pilot training plan designed to bring new young pilots into the CAF. To qualify for flying training, the cadet had to be a member of an existing COTC unit at a Canadian university; he had to be a student in a course leading to a degree in applied science, single, medically fit and under 21. He also had to be recommended by the military council of his university. After a training period spread over three summers, the young officer was then eligible for appointment to the CAF, the non-permanent Air Force or the Reserve of Officers. Such a plan formed the basis of all the Air Force officer recruiting and training plans throughout the inter-war period and while admirably suited to producing a class of well educated officers such a scheme - with its emphasis on training in the applied sciences - was not well suited to attracting French Canadian youths from Quebec. On the official birthday of the RCAF - 1 April 1924 - only two officers and ten airmen were French-Canadians.

Inter-war Period, 1924-1939

14. The RCAF was officially born on 1 April, 1924 when King's Regulations and Orders for the Royal Canadian Air Force were promulgated. Although the prefix "Royal" had been granted to the CAF in February, 1923 this was the first instance of its being

21. Ibid., p. 110.

22. Ibid., p. 126-127. See also Report of the Department of National Defence, 1923, p. 38-39.

used. With the promulgation of these orders, the RCAF became a permanent body but not an independent organization like the Army since the RCAF was under the control of the "Director, RCAF" who was responsible, not to the Minister of National Defence, but to the CGS. In addition, the work of the RCAF at this period was almost exclusively concerned with civil tasks for other government departments and military aviation played a very small role. To carry out its tasks, the RCAF had stations at Vancouver, High River, Alberta, Winnipeg, Camp Borden, Ottawa and Dartmouth,²⁴ but none in Quebec. In 1927 the RCAF was reorganized and civil operations were made the responsibility of the Deputy Minister of the Department of National Defence and the RCAF itself was left with service flying. This division of functions was more apparent than real, however, because the pilots and ground crews for the planes engaged on civil government operations came from the RCAF.

15. In 1921/22 the RCN had suffered from the economy efforts of the government of the day and ten years later it was the turn of the young RCAF to fall under the influence of a government economy drive. Civil and military operations were again consolidated under the Senior Air Officer and drastic reductions were made in both service and civilian personnel. Only one portion of the RCAF did develop during this lean period, and that was the reserve. The regulations promulgated for the RCAF in 1924 had authorized the formation of Non Permanent Active Air Force units but the only use made of this provision was that personnel on full time duty with the RCAF but not part of the regular establishment of the RCAF were posted to the NPAAF. There were no reserve units formed and there was no reserve training carried out. New regulations issued in 1932 corrected this former policy and the formation of three reserve

24. Canada, Department of National Defence, Report, 1926, p. 49-52.

squadrons and a wing headquarters was authorized. The wing headquarters was not actually formed but reserve squadrons were formed at Vancouver, Winnipeg and Toronto and they began to take shape in 1933 and actually began training in 1934.²⁵ There were no reserve squadrons in Quebec at this time and the lack of Air Force facilities in that province was complete until 1935 when two reserve squadrons began to form in Montreal.²⁶ No further reserve units were formed in Quebec before the start of the second World War although a squadron had been authorized for Quebec City in 1937 but had not completed its organization by the time the war started in September, 1939.

16. November 19, 1938 marks the RCAF's independence as a separate service within the Department of National Defence. On that date the RCAF became directly responsible to the Minister through the Senior Air Officer who became the Chief of the Air Staff on 15 December, 1938. An Air Council was formed consisting of the SAO(CAS), Air Staff Officer, Air Personnel Staff Officer, Chief Aeronautical Engineer and a Secretary.²⁷ During the same year, air stations throughout the country ceased to come under the control of the Army District Officers Commanding and came under the control of three new Air Commands; Western Command (1 March, 1938), Air Training Command (15 September, 1938), and Eastern Command (15 September, 1938).²⁸ The new status also affected the reserve Air Force and it became the Auxiliary Active Air Force on 1 April, 1938. Air Force representation in Quebec was augmented slightly under this new organization when a Wing headquarters for the AAAF was formed in Montreal and when two permanent force detachments were formed in Montreal. These latter

25. Air Board, op. cit., p. 349.

26. Canada, Department of National Defence, Report, 1935, p. 67.

27. Air Board, op. cit., p. 463.

28. Ibid., p. 463-464.

formations were the permanent force detachments of the two Auxiliary Squadrons in Montreal and had previously been included as an integral part of the Auxiliary Squadrons.²⁹

17. On 1 April, 1924 - the formal birthdate of the RCAF - its officer strength was 66 permanent officers and three non-permanent officers. Only two had French names.³⁰ Of these two officers, one died in 1932 and one retired in 1946 with the rank of Air Vice Marshal.³¹ The method of recruiting and training officers for the RCAF was the same as that introduced for the CAF in 1923. That is, officers came from Canadian universities where they had to be enrolled in a course of applied science and be a member of the COTC unit of the university. In 1924, this limited recruiting field was widened to include cadets of RMC and in the course for future pilots started in 1924 10 out of 20 candidates were from RMC.³² Neither source favoured recruiting of French speaking Canadians and there were no other avenues open for young men wishing to make the RCAF a career. In addition, all pilot training was done in Ontario at Camp Borden, exclusively in English and with no English language training for French speaking candidates. Once commissioned into the RCAF, officers then took professional courses at RMC, the RAF Staff College in Andover, England, and in 1924 arrangements were made for RCAF officers to attend specialist courses at RAF training establishments in the UK.³³ These latter developments were, from a practical viewpoint, inevitable because a small and newly developing force could not provide its own senior training establishments and had to make use of these facilities which were available. By 1930, these recruiting and training procedures had produced the following rank structure in the RCAF.

29. Canada, Department of National Defence, Report, 1939, p. 104.

30. Air Board, op. cit., "Nominal Roll of Officers Appointed to the RCAF on 1 April, 1924", following p. 160.

31. Ibid., following p. 160.

32. Ibid., p. 51.

33. Canada, Department of National Defence, Report, 1924, p. 50.

RCAF Rank Structure, February, 1930.³⁴

A - Flying List

<u>Rank</u>	<u>English</u>	<u>French</u>
Group Captain	2	-
Wing Commander	4	-
Squadron Leader	11	-
Flight Lieutenant	27	2
Flying Officer	24	0
Pilot Officer	10	1

B - Non-Flying List

<u>Rank</u>	<u>English</u>	<u>French</u>
Squadron Leader	1	-
Flight Lieutenant	5	-
Flying Officer	5	-

18. Government economies in 1931 forced the RCAF to cancel its pilot training plan but in late 1932 a new plan was introduced. The new training plan replaced the old summer training scheme which spread over three years with a concentrated eight-month course (later lengthened to one year) for young men who had finished their academic training at a university or RMC. The original provisions respecting academic qualifications remained, however, and Camp Borden still remained the main training station of the RCAF although training on a unit basis was conducted at all RCAF stations. Professional qualifications were tightened by the introduction of promotion examinations and entrance examinations for the RAF Staff College. Two other innovations affecting recruiting and training during the period immediately preceding the start of W.W. II were

34. Figures compiled from the Defence Forces List, February 1930, Part I, p. 495-496. Figures include only permanent force officers and not non-permanent force officers on full time duty. Note - there were 53 NPAAF officers on full-time flying duty and only two were French. None of the 7 non-flying officers were French. The sample is based on the names of the officers as listed in the seniority roll.

the opening of RCAF Station Trenton which became the main training station in the RCAF, and in 1938, the change in the pilot training scheme which allowed greater co-operation with the RAF.

19. Recruiting during the period of depression between the wars had been severely limited and the RCAF managed to supply all the officers it needed through its plan of training university students as pilots. By 1935, interest in the Air Force had begun to quicken in Canada and approximately 4,000 enquiries were received at Air Force Headquarters that year. These enquiries concerned both officer appointments to the RCAF and the RAF and enquiries about an apprentice training plan for young men. Recruiting was still strictly limited, however, and only 12 officers were enrolled in the RCAF during the year while eight Canadians were given commissions in the RAF.³⁵ The number of enquiries continued to increase during the next year and in 1936 a trend was begun that was to continue until the outbreak of war in 1939: more Canadians were commissioned in the RAF than in the RCAF.

<u>Number of Canadians Commissioned in the RAF and RCAF³⁶</u>					
	1936	1937	1938	1939	Total
RCAF	29	9	36	83	157
RAF	37	39	40	133	247
Total	66	48	76	216	404

20. The new training plan for flying personnel introduced in 1938 divided flying training into three distinct phases: elementary, intermediate and advanced. Intermediate and advanced training were done at Camp Borden and Trenton respectively and the elementary phase of training was done at eight civil flying schools, including

35. Canada, Department of National Defence, Report, 1935, p. 72

36. Figures are compiled from the Annual Reports of the Department of National Defence for the years 1936 to 1939 inclusive. All figures include both permanent and short service commissions. RAF figures for 1938 and 1939 also include officers commissioned directly into the RAF and trained in the UK and also the small number of Canadian RAF officers trained in Canada (15 each year).

one in Montreal. The third part of this plan was never fully implemented since the war started before the plan could begin to function and elementary training was then moved to Camp Borden. The aim of this three stage training plan was to produce yearly 75 trained pilots for the RCAF and 50 pilots for the RAF.³⁷ At this time, the RCAF was also training 15 pilots for the RAF under a previous arrangement, and was selecting, interviewing, and examining yearly 120 applicants for short service commissions in the RAF.³⁸

21. The RCAF changed its officer policy with the adoption of the new three phase training plan and brought it more in accord with RAF practices. Formerly, all flying officer personnel came from Canadian universities or the RMC but in 1939 a short service commission scheme on the British pattern was introduced. There were two main reasons for this change in policy and perhaps the most pressing was the need for a rapid increase in strength as war drew nearer. The second reason was the wish to keep a reasonable career open for permanent force officers which would obviously be difficult if all officers had the same qualifications. As a result of these policy decisions, it was planned to have at least half of the RCAF officer strength composed of short service personnel.³⁹ Academic qualifications were lowered to junior matriculation standards and the period of service was set at four years in the permanent air force and an additional six years in the reserves. A limited number of permanent commissions were given to short service officers and some short service officers were given a five year extension as "medium service" officers.⁴⁰ Short service officers came from three categories of recruits, were trained at RCAF stations in Ontario and took all instruction in English. The three categories were (a) those recruits with no previous flying experience; (b) qualified auxiliary pilots; and (c) commercial pilots.⁴¹

37. Canada, Department of National Defence, Report, 1939, p. 110.

38. Air Board, op. cit., p. 485n.

39. Ibid., p. 487.

40. Ibid., p. 487.

41. Ibid., p. 487.

22. Facilities continued to increase in the period immediately before the start of war in 1939 and RCAF Station Trenton gradually began to replace Camp Borden as the major training station for RCAF personnel, although airmen training was done on all RCAF stations. These various stations were all, however, outside of Quebec. On the 1st of September, 1939, the only permanent force units in Quebec were No. 11 Technical Detachment at Montreal, No. 115 and No. 118 PF Detachments at Montreal and No. 121 PF Detachment at Quebec. None of these were operational or training units but were PF detachments at reserve units, except for the technical detachment which was located at an aircraft plant in Montreal. A French speaking recruit thus had to leave Quebec for his training and then had very little prospect of being employed at a unit in Quebec following his training. No figures are available for the number of French speaking airmen in the Air Force at this period but it seems reasonable to assume that the representation would not have been significant, particularly as all training was done in English and no English language course was run for the benefit of French speaking recruits.

23. In the early years of the RCAF there were no training establishments for airmen. Airmen were recruited from the civilian population and then given training at their unit rather than at a central recruit training centre. Some basic training was done at Camp Borden but technical and service training was done in the various units. For technical personnel, especially mechanics, the RCAF had to depend on recruiting trained mechanics directly from civil occupations.⁴² Training facilities at Camp Borden gradually improved during the first decade and that camp became the major training centre for enlisted as well as flying personnel, although the RCAF still had to rely on outside resources for the training of its technical ground crew tradesmen. One innovation during the period was the establishment of a boys' training scheme, approved in 1928. Under this plan boys were trained at Camp Borden

42. Canada, Department of National Defence, Report, 1924, p. 52.

during the school vacation period in the summer.

World War II

24. Prior to 1939 the government had established a definite priority for the development of Canada's armed forces in reaction to the growing threat of war. The RCAF received first priority among the three services, but even so the RCAF was far from being on a war footing in September, 1939. At that time it was believed - and intended - that the best contribution that the RCAF could make to the air war was to concentrate on the training function and to limit its overseas commitment to an army co-operation force with the necessary administrative and reserve units.⁴³ To meet its commitments the RCAF was placed on active service on 1 September, 1939. This mobilization applied to the auxiliary forces and a new Special Reserve was also formed and placed on active service. The authorized war strength of this force was 3,500 officers and 41,000 airmen,⁴⁴ but this strength was vastly increased during the war, reaching a peak strength of 209,803 in 1943/44.

25. One of the most significant Canadian contributions to the air war was the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. Discussions had started on this matter before the war and by the fall of 1939 plans were well advanced for the establishment of this vast training apparatus in Canada. The intention of the BCATP was to train pilots and air crew for the Commonwealth air forces but the plan came perilously close to foundering over the use to be made of these flyers after their training was completed. The British assumed that the pilots and air crews would form part of the RAF so that the air war would be fought by one single cohesive force. The Canadian government, on the other hand, wished to reach an understanding that Canada, after consultation with the British government, would be allowed to establish units overseas as part of the RCAF. The British demurred at this proposal but

43. Canada, Department of National Defence, Report, 1940, p. 85.

44. Ibid., p. 95.

the Canadian view won the day.⁴⁵ This agreement was extended in 1941 by the Ralston-Sinclair Agreement which allowed Canada to form a further 25 squadrons of the RCAF overseas in addition to the three RCAF squadrons already in existence in England. The expenses for these squadrons continued to be assumed by the British government and it was not until January, 1943 that Canada assumed financial responsibility for the RCAF squadrons serving overseas.⁴⁶ Canada's main contribution to that date had been the assumption of the burden of operating the BCATP. The BCATP graduated 131,553 officers and airmen during the course of the war, 72,805 of these Canadians,⁴⁷ but in most cases those Canadian graduates of the BCATP who served overseas served with RAF units, and not with Canadian formations.⁴⁸ In all, about 65% of RCAF aircrew personnel who served overseas served in RAF squadrons.⁴⁹

26. The highest formation of the RCAF overseas was No. 6 (Bomber) Group and this formation was in turn directly controlled by the RAF and not the RCAF or the Canadian government. Beginning in 1941 Canadian fighter and coastal patrol squadrons and wings began to be established and by the end of the war the RCAF had 48 squadrons overseas in Europe, Italy and Burma.⁵⁰ These squadrons formed an integral part of the RAF and not a distinct Canadian air force. Canada had full operational control of the RCAF home defence squadrons based in Canada but the RCAF overseas did not operate as a distinct allied air force.

27. Among the 48 squadrons overseas and the 37 in Canada, only one had a distinctive French Canadian atmosphere - the 425 (Alouette) Squadron. This squadron came into existence on 25 June, 1942 and formed part of No. 4 Group (RAF), but was not completely manned

45. Roberts, Leslie, *There shall be Wings*, Toronto, Clarke Irwin and Company Limited, 1959, p. 122-123.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 155.

47. Canada, Department of National Defence, *Report, 1946*, p. 47.

48. Canada, Department of National Defence, *Report, 1942*, p. 16.

49. Canada, RCAF, *The Roundel*, vol. 16. No. 8, October, 1964, p. 32. Reply of the Editor in the "Letters to the Editor" column under title "Forgotten Men".

50. Canada, Department of National Defence, *Report, 1946*, p. 41.

by French speaking personnel at any time during the course of the war, even after becoming part of No. 6 Group (RCAF). No. 425 Squadron was not a French Canadian unit in the same sense that a unit in the Canadian Army is a French Canadian unit. It was a unit composed predominantly of French speaking Canadians but many of its members were English speaking and all of its operational functions were in English. It is not fair to assume that this the single "French Canadian" squadron in the RCAF was the only unit containing French speaking personnel because they served in many RAF squadrons and throughout the RCAF but since there are no figures readily available no accurate estimate can be made of their contribution during the early years of the war.

28. To meet the increased need for officers and airmen the RCAF opened its first recruiting offices in 1940. Of the 20 recruiting offices opened in that year, three were in Quebec (Montreal, Three Rivers and Quebec), nine were in Ontario and each of the other provinces had one except for P.E.I. During the following two years the number of recruiting offices was reduced to 16 and greater emphasis was placed on the use of mobile recruiting units. All candidates for aircrew training had to enlist in the BCATP as airmen and enlistment was generally into the Special Reserve of the RCAF and not into the permanent force or the Auxiliary. As a result, the short service commission plan introduced just before the war was put into abeyance.⁵¹ The University Air Training Plan was started in May, 1942 as a further source of officers and in the same year arrangements were made with all provinces to train potential aircrew candidates to the necessary academic standards.

29. Once enlisted and selected for officer training as a pilot or other member of an aircrew, the candidates then took their training at BCATP training stations. While St. Hubert in Quebec became a major training school for aircrew personnel (of

51. Canada, Department of National Defence, Report, 1940, p. 88-89.

the 73 BCATP schools), French speaking Canadians still had to take all their training in English and for the most part at stations outside of Quebec. No figures are readily available for the number of French speaking Canadians who entered the RCAF or the RAF under this training programme but it would be reasonable to assume that most of the French speaking aircrew recruits from Quebec would receive their training at St. Hubert. A special report for a twelve month training period gives the following figures:

"Graduates of No. 13 Service Flying Training School, St. Hubert Quebec. 31 August 1942 - 30 September 1943 inclusive".⁵²

	RCAF	French Canadian	RAF	RAAF	RZNAF
Total	437	123 (22% of Cdns.)	101	15	15

30. The first mention of English language training given to French speaking airmen is made in the Annual Report of the Department of National Defence for 1944. In 1944 a complaint came from the RCAF Overseas that they were receiving trained aircrew personnel who could not speak English adequately.⁵³ Some research was made into this problem and French speaking airmen were carefully screened at manning depots and those found deficient in English were sent to the new English language school. Apparently even this did not alleviate the problem because the following year another complaint was made from the RCAF Overseas.⁵⁴ Sporadic attention continued to be given to the problem of training French speaking Air Force personnel but the conclusion of the war the following year brought a slow-down in all RCAF personnel policies. BCATP units were disbanded, recruiting stations closed and recruiting stopped from all sources in 1945, pending reorganization on a peace-time basis.

52. Canada, RCAF, File No. 407-1, vol. 2, np., nd.

53. Canada, RCAF File No. 407-1, Letter to the Secretary, Department of National Defence, from the AOC-in-C, RCAF Overseas, 5 October, 1943.

54. Canada, RCAF, File No. 013-102, Letter to the Secretary, Department of National Defence, from the AOC-in-C, RCAF Overseas, 20 June, 1944.

31. Training of enlisted personnel was similar in many respects to officer training. All air crew applicants entered the Special Reserve of the RCAF as airmen and took their training at BCATP training schools, and as air crew trades included both commissioned and non-commissioned categories the training plan for airmen remained parallel with that of officers. For airmen employed in ground crew trades, training was at RCAF training stations and once again most of these training bases were outside Quebec. The same conditions of service applied for airmen as it did for officers: service might be with an RCAF unit overseas but the majority were employed with RAF units. In addition, there was still only the single RCAF squadron with any claim to being French Canadian in character. Again, no figures are available on the number of French Canadian airmen who served in the RCAF in the last war as the RCAF did not keep records according to the ethnic origin of its personnel.⁵⁵ In a report made by the RCAF Overseas to AFHQ in the spring of 1944, a tentative breakdown of RCAF overseas personnel is made but the list is only compiled on the basis of name, language spoken and birthplace of parents and is only applicable to the RCAF personnel serving overseas.

French Canadians Overseas with the RCAF, 1944.⁵⁶

Officers	Air Crew	Ground Crew	Total
425 Sqn	21	3	24
Other RCAF	159	31	190
RAF	240	17	257
	<u>421</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>471</u>
<u>Airmen</u>			
425 Sqn	50	165	215
9425 Serving Echelon	-	70	70
Other RCAF	307	2349	2656
RAF	<u>437</u>	<u>245</u>	<u>682</u>
	794	2829	3623

55. Ibid., Letter to the Secretary of the Department of National Defence, from the AOC-in-C, RCAF Overseas, 9 June, 1944.

56. Ibid., same letter.

WDs	Air Crew	Ground Crew	Total
RCAF	1	19	20
RAF	1	-	1
	<hr/> 2	<hr/> 19	<hr/> 21

The total strength of the RCAF on 31 March, 1944 was 31,091 officers and 173,913 airmen. Although no comparable figures for French speaking officers and airmen serving in Canada are available for comparison, a comparison can be made with RCAF strength overseas. The strength of the RCAF overseas in 1944 was 11,403 officers (plus 35 WD officers) and 32,904 airmen (plus 646 WDs) of whom, according to the above report, only 471 officers and 3623 airmen were French Canadians, exclusive of female personnel. Of these figures, 257 French Canadian RCAF officers were serving with RAF units and only 214 were serving with RCAF units. The most significant figures are the ones for No. 425 Squadron - the RCAF's only "French Canadian" squadron. Only 24 officers and 215 airmen of this unit were French Canadians compared with a total operational strength of 36 officers (including one RAF officer) and 414 airmen (including 11 RAF airmen).* It should be remembered that in 1944, the RCAF was at the peak of its wartime strength.

Post-war RCAF

32. Peace-time reorganization plans for the RCAF envisaged a regular force of 16,100 officers and men, an auxiliary force of 4,500 all ranks and a reserve of 10,500. The original plans for the Auxiliary Air Force envisaged fifteen Auxiliary squadrons throughout Canada but only ten were established, including in this number two squadrons at Montreal. The bulk of the RCAF's training and operational bases continued to be in Ontario and to facilitate the command and control of the RCAF facilities, two geographic commands were established: Central Command, with headquarters at Trenton; and North West Command, with headquarters

*Figures supplied by RCAF Historical Section and are for December, 1943.

at Edmonton. In addition, Maintenance command was formed with headquarters at Ottawa and Air Transport Command had its headquarters at Rockcliffe. In 1950 the RCAF organization shifted from a geographic to a functional basis which has lasted until the present. Once again the main bases were outside of Quebec: Training Command (Trenton); Air Material Command (Ottawa); Air Transport Command (Rockcliffe); Maritime Group (later a command - at Halifax); Tactical Group (later a command - at Winnipeg); and only Air Defence Group (later a command) was formed with headquarters and bases in Quebec when it moved to St. Hubert in November, 1949. There were no specifically French Canadian units in the post-war Air Force until 1954 when No. 425 Squadron was reformed at St. Hubert as a fighter squadron. The squadron was again briefly disbanded in April, 1961 but was reformed in September with new aircraft and based at Namao in Alberta before its return to a new base at Bagotville, Quebec in 1962.⁵⁷

33. Recruiting started again in 1946 after being suspended in 1945. Use was made of specially trained recruiting officers but the following year the use of special recruiting units was stopped and the task was assumed by all regular force detachments and units. Extensive use was made of radio advertising in both English and French by the service and in 1949 the recruiting officers started moving from the RCAF stations back into the cities. Use was again made of Canadian universities as sources of officer candidates when the University Summer Training Scheme was started in 1947. The RCAF also made arrangements with the RCN to train potential career officers at the Naval College at Royal Roads and the following year the RCAF became part of the tri-service training plan conducted at Royal Roads and the newly re-opened RMC at Kingston. In addition to the use of the Services Colleges and the University Flights, the Air Force also sent selected airmen to universities and the Service

57. Canada, RCAF, Press Release, "No. 425 Squadron", August, 1962.

Colleges. Quebec representation in these plans was not heavy, however, and it was not until 1950 that the University of Montreal became one of the nine universities having a Reserve University Flight. The Air Force also had students at several Canadian universities taking undergraduate courses but by 1950 none of these future officers were at either the University of Montreal or Laval. The following year the RCAF had two officer candidates taking courses at the University of Montreal and five at Laval and with the inclusion of Laval in the Reserve University Flights programme in 1952 these universities have been represented ever since. The comparative figures for that year are 56 and 29 cadets in the Reserve University Flights at Montreal and Laval respectively out of a total registration in the Reserve Flights at all universities of 930 cadets.

34. The cadets enrolled in the CSC, RUF and the undergraduate training programme were intended to provide the Air Force with permanent force officers who would make the RCAF a career. There was also a Short Service Commission Plan for candidates with junior matriculation started in 1952. These plans for the production of RCAF officers have remained in operation throughout the post-war period although the names may have changed. The only two significant changes have been to broaden the basis of the recruitment of potential officers by opening a services college in St. Jean in 1952 mainly to attract French speaking youths and the introduction of the Regular Officer Training Plan in the same year to provide subsidization for candidates at the Services Colleges and civilian universities.

35. Recruiting for airmen followed essentially the same pattern as that outlined for the officers. They were recruited at special recruiting units opened in 1947 and then at RCAF units and detachments. An Inter-Service Recruiting Committee was formed

in 1951 which became responsible for all advertising and publicity and co-ordinated the manning policies for all three services. In that year, the RCAF also operated 19 separate recruiting establishments as well as conducting recruiting at units and detachments of both the permanent and reserve components of the service. By 1955 the number of recruiting units had increased to 22 in Canada and one in England. After initial recruiting at a unit or recruiting office, the airman recruit then went to No. 2 Manning Depot at RCAF Station Aylmer for the necessary selection and screening process before taking any formal training. In 1952 this Manning Depot was moved to RCAF Station St. Jean, where it has remained.

36. Actual service training for officers took place at bases outside of Quebec. The main training stations were located at Centralia, Moose Jaw, Claresholm, Penhold, Saskatoon, Portage La Prairie, Gimli, MacDonald (Alberta), Trenton, and Chatham.⁵⁹ Not only were all the training schools located outside Quebec but most of them were not even near Quebec. In addition, French speaking officer candidates who did not have an adequate command of English had to take an English course at Aylmer before proceeding to flight or technical training. These training factors - combined with the limited use of French speaking universities and the unfavourable conditions for French speaking cadets at the Services Colleges⁶⁰ - produced the following rank structure by 1951.⁶¹

59. Canada, Department of National Defence, Report, 1955, p. 56.

60. Canada, RCAF, File No. 013-102, Memorandum to the CAS from PC 5-1, 21 November, 1951.

"French Speaking RCAF Cadets at RMC and Royal Roads"

Year	Number French Canadian	Percentage French Canadian
1948	4	8
1949	13	10
1950	7	6
1951	13	8

61. Ibid., same folio.

- a. Number of French Canadians above the rank of Squadron Leader; 10. Percentage of total strength of officers above rank of Squadron Leader; 2.6.
- b. French Canadians below the rank of Wing Commander:

<u>Rank</u>	<u>S/L</u>	<u>F/L</u>	<u>F/O</u>	<u>P/O</u>	<u>F/C</u>	<u>Total</u>
Number of Fr. Cdns	14	43	106	16	58	223
Percentage of officers in rank	2.52	4.26	4.36	5.15	7.38	4.31

37. It was quite obvious that some action had to be taken to correct this imbalance in the RCAF rank structure. As a result, the RCAF took an active interest in the Laval proposals for establishing a department of Military Science at that university for the benefit of French speaking students who wished to make the services a career. The discussions on this topic lead indirectly to the formation of the Collège Militaire Royal at St. Jean in 1952. After the establishment of this college, French speaking Air Force officer candidates could follow a two or three year course in French before passing on to their final two years at the RMC. Use was also made of the University of Laval and the University of Montreal for training future Air Force officers under the new ROTP plan. For short service officers who did not have an adequate command of English to permit them to take their formal training in that language, a new English language school was opened at the RCAF Station St. Jean for both officers and airmen. A slight change was made in this arrangement when the English language school for officer candidates was moved to London, Ontario, where it has remained.

38. A great deal of thought and work has been put into improving the training system for French speaking personnel and in recruiting French speaking candidates (Laval had the highest enrollment in

Canada in 1958).⁶² However, while the enlistment rate rose to approximately 17%⁶³, the wastage rate for French speaking personnel remained higher, especially in the technical trades, than the rate for English speaking personnel. This can best be shown by an example taken from a survey made of a group of French speaking aircrew trainees. A survey was made of one French speaking intake of 191 men and the following pattern was revealed.⁶⁴

1. Intake - 191
2. Reported to Personnel Selection Unit from School of English - 166
3. Rejected by the PSU - 53

(Loss to date is approximately 40% and compares favourably with the rejection rate of English speaking candidates at the PSU.)

4. Number of pilots entering pre-flight school - 69
5. Number graduating from advanced flight school - 14 (20.3%)
6. Number of observers entering pre-flight school - 44
7. Number graduating from advanced flight school - 8 (18.2%)

(The wastage rates at this stage of training are well above the 50% level which is common for English speaking personnel. Following successful completion of training, voluntary wastage was found to be no higher than for English speaking personnel).

39. The high wastage for French speaking officers in the training stream has been related to the language problem and has received intensive prolonged study. Any detailed comment on this aspect of Air Force training during the past decade will have to come from a specific study of training procedures and problems but a set of figures can be given here to act as a basis of comparison for later studies.

62. Canada, RCAF, File No. 482-103-3, Memorandum to the Minister from the CAS, 26 May, 1958.

63. Canada, RCAF, File No. 350-108, Report prepared by AMP for the CAS, 27 December, 1960.

64. Canada, RCAF, File No. 482-103-3, Memorandum to DPM from PSAB, 30 August, 1957.

Number of RCAF Officers of French Canadian Origin, 31 Jan 58⁶⁵

Rank	Total Male Officers	French Canadian Officers	Percentage French Canadian Officers
Air Marshal	2	-	-
Air Vice Marshal	9	-	-
Air Commodore	32	1	3.1
Group Captain	135	4	2.96
Wing Commander	418	8	1.9
Squadron Leader	1085	39	3.6
Flight Lieutenant	2451	105	4.3
Flying Officer	4230	208	4.9
Pilot Officer	43	8	18.6
Flight Cadet	736	44	5.97
Sub Total	9141	417	4.56
ROTP	728	90	12.5
Total	9869	507	5.13

Two points should be noted in studying this chart. The first is that the lack of French Canadian officers in the higher ranks can be traced to the lack of French speaking officers in the RCAF prior to the war and the small representation of French speaking officers who remained in the service after the war ended.⁶⁶ The second point is the rise of French Canadian representation in the category from which future regular force officers are drawn - the ROTP.

40. No figures comparable to those used for the officers are available for airmen but a rough survey can be made of the training procedures followed. After his initial recruitment an airman proceeded to No. 2 Manning Depot located at Aylmer for processing and trade selection. For French speaking airmen

65. Canada, RCAF, File No. 013-102, attachment to memorandum to CAS from CPers/RO, 17 February, 1958.

66. Canada, RCAF, File No. 350-108, Report prepared by AMP for the CAS, 27 December, 1960.

who did not speak English well enough to immediately take basic and trade training, an English school was operated in conjunction with the Academic Training School at Aylmer. In 1950 the English school was moved to Weston, a suburb of Toronto and continued to operate in that location until it joined No. 2 Manning Depot which had moved to RCAF Station St. Jean, in 1951. French speaking recruits took the language course at the school of English before proceeding with either basic or trade training. The School of English also served as a language school for students in the NATO Air Training Plan until they were accommodated at the language school for officers formed at London, Ontario in 1954/55. As for officers, it was found that the graduates of the School of English at St. Jean had a higher wastage rate in their later training phases than did their English speaking contemporaries. Where an English recruit had to make the adjustment from a civilian society to a military society, the French recruit had to make not only this fundamental adjustment but he had also to adjust to a predominantly English environment. Even after making these two adjustments, the French speaking recruit then faced three more difficulties in his later specialized trades training: the linguistic problem; complexities in assessment due to the language handicap (i.e. writing examinations in English); and motivation (he spent much more time in the training stream because of the period spent at the language school).

41. An example of the wastage rate for French speaking airmen is given in the following chart.

67. Canada, Defence Research Medical Laboratories, Project No. 152, Interim Report on Survey of RCAF Procedures for Training French-Speaking Recruits, by EJ Brazeau, and DN Solomon, DRB, DND, Canada, September, 1955, p. 16.

Wastage Rate for Graduates of the School of English Between 68
January 1953 and September 1954

1953							1954					
	S of Engl			Other			S of Engl			Other		
Trade	Pass	Fail	%F	Pass	Fail	%F	Pass	Fail	%F	Pass	Fail	%F
Admin- istra- tion. (Aylmer)	143	85	37	1348	366	21	136	73	35	1138	249	18
Electro- nics. (Clinton)	149	115	44	1961	501	20	49	20	29	799	156	16
Techni- cal. (Borden)	137	182	57	2526	492	16	143	170	54	1918	185	9
Total	429	382	47	5835	1359	19	328	263	45	3855	590	13

The result of these findings was the same as for the officers: methods were sought to reduce the wastage rate of French speaking airmen and the search has been continuous during the last decade. Minor adjustments have been made in the training structure but the policies have remained fairly constant and the basic training pattern has remained much as it was in 1952: English language training at St. Jean followed by familiarization training and then trades training. The overall policy throughout has been to integrate French speaking Canadians into the RCAF which is primarily an English speaking organization.

LANGUAGE USE

WW I to WW II

1. In its early years, the RCAF had no need, and did not practice in any way, bilingualism. Its evolution from a part of the RAF and the heavy preponderance of English speaking veterans in the force following the Great War produced no incentive in the RCAF to study the use of French and in this respect it was no different from any of the other two services. It was an implicit assumption throughout the inter-war period that English was the language of the armed forces. It is true that some of the orders for the Army were promulgated in both languages through the means of the Canada Gazette and the RCAF, having no fully independent status in the early 1930s, benefited from this arrangement to some extent since it depended on the Army for the publication and dissemination of its orders. When the Air Force adopted a new method of issuing orders in 1934 even this limited use of French came to an end.⁶⁹

2. It almost goes without saying that no French was used in any operational or training context at all during this period. English was unequivocally the formal language of the RCAF and any departure from this rule and any departure from this practice - the use of French in No. 118 Auxiliary Squadron for their own internal affairs - was certainly the rare and informal exception. There was no language training in either English or French, and indeed, the problem of language seems to have been accorded no attention whatsoever.⁷⁰

World War II

3. The RCAF entered the Second World War as an English speaking organization and it remained so throughout the period.

69. Canada, Department of National Defence, Report, 1934, p. 75.

70. The only mention of language found in any documents for this period is the contention of the SAO - never formally pronounced - that since "RAF" was not translated neither should "RCAF" be translated. Air Board, op. cit., p. 126n.

It is true that No. 425 Squadron was meant to be a French-Canadian squadron but that did not mean that French was to be the language of operational use within the unit. In fact, this was not the case and English was generally used within the unit for formal communication.⁷¹ Training in the Air Force was done entirely in English and when the RCAF asked the Army Translation Bureau to undertake the translation of its publications into French,⁷² it turned out that the only pamphlets in need of translation was one manual regarding the Air Cadets and the University Flights.⁷³ All other training material in the RCAF was needed only in English. For a French speaking recruit who did not have a workable command of English this policy posed a serious problem and block to recruitment and training. Accordingly, an English language school was formed as mentioned earlier in the paper. The purpose of language training was to teach the French speaking recruit enough English so that he could be trained in that language and then be employed in an entirely English speaking organization.

4. It is a mistake to believe that there was no attention paid to the French language, however, since there was at least some attempt to operate French courses within the Air Force. In the spring of 1942 a suggestion was made that a French course for AFHQ officers be started on a voluntary basis,⁷⁴ and such a course was in fact started in the fall of that year. There was also a compulsory French course started the following year for Air Force Police. In August, 1943, an order was issued that all Air Force Police were to take compulsory French classes and every effort was to be made to ensure that Air Police should at least converse in French.⁷⁵ With the end of the war these measures came to an end and the RCAF continued on its unilingual basis.

71. Canada, RCAF, File No. 013-102, Letter to the CAS from the AOC-in-C, RCAF Overseas, 20 June, 1944.

72. Canada, Army, File No. 4521-2-1, Letter to the DM from the Air Secretary, 12 December, 1942.

73. Ibid., Letter to the DM from the Air Secretary, 20 January, 1943.

74. Canada, RCAF, File No. 482-4, Memorandum to the Minister (Through the CAS) from the AMP, 12 May, 1942.

75. Ibid., Memorandum to AOSC from the CAS, 31 August, 1943.

Post-War Period.

5. The RCAF continued in its policy of using English exclusively as the operational language of the service and has stipulated that all personnel must be able to speak English.⁷⁶ There have been minor adjustments in policy and more particularly in training practices, but the Air Force has remained an exclusively English speaking organization for all practical purposes. English language training for French speaking recruits was continued but all other training was done in English and English was the only language used for examinations, for both officers and airmen. Virtually all documents and communications were in English and it was not until 1950, in compliance with the wishes of the Minister, that the Air Force issued orders stipulating that letters to the Quebec government, French speaking municipal governments and French speaking individuals would be in French and that Commanding Officers, where they considered it necessary, should have station signs, notices, etc. in both languages.⁷⁷ The following year the Air Force was also subject to the order of the Defence Council that stated that Kings Regulations and Air Force Orders would be published in both languages.⁷⁸ This has been the limit of the formal use of French in the service, although some basic training and initial indoctrination is done in French by bilingual instructors at RCAF Station St. Jean.⁷⁹ There is no comparable programme to that used by the Army to allow French speaking personnel to study from French language pamphlets and to write their professional examinations in French.⁸⁰ Even a suggestion that some form of supplemental examination for French speaking failures be introduced was turned down by the Committee considering the "Interim Report on survey of RCAF Training Procedures for Training French Speaking Recruits."⁸¹ By 1959 aircrew candidates could write

76. Canada, RCAF, File No. 350-108, "Supporting Data for Air Council", Special Air Council Meeting, 23 September, 1963.

77. Canada, RCAF, File No. 013-2, Air Force Routine Order, No. 250, dated 2 January, 1950.

78. *Ibid.*, Extract from Defence Council, Meeting No. 54, held 31 May, 1951.

79. DRML Project No. 152, *op. cit.*, p. 2

80. Canada, RCAF, File No. 350-108, see footnote 77. a/m.

81. DRML Project No. 152, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

aircrew selection tests in French⁸² but after this pre-training phase, instruction and professional examinations remained in English only.

6. The policy of English unilingualism extended to the Auxiliaries as well and as many as 80% of French speaking applicants for the Auxiliary were rejected because they were not bilingual.⁸³ Training at these units was in English and virtually all the officers and NCOs were English. A suggestion was made that English language training be given Auxiliary personnel or that at least some training could be done in French, but this suggestion was not recommended.⁸⁴ In some cases French was used in the training of Air Cadets but the ultimate aim was to be able to give all instruction in English to these people.⁸⁵

7. The teaching of French in the Air Force in the post-war period has hardly been spectacular. In 1948 when the Army was given authority to go ahead with its French language programme, the RCN and RCAF were instructed to consider starting similar training.⁸⁶ The topic was deferred until September 1948 when the first organization meeting was held. It was decided that classes were to be voluntary and a course did actually start early the following year but died a lingering death. Only 5 of the original 25 officers taking the course came even close to finishing it and the course was not recommended again.⁸⁷ When the RCAF accepted responsibility for providing an Air Division for NATO, the question of language training again arose. A plan for training personnel of squadrons about to proceed overseas was instituted in 1951 and tried out on three bases in Canada⁸⁸ and

82. Canada, RCAF, File No. 482-103-3, "A Report on the Selection and Training for French-Speaking Aircrew Trainees", 1959-1961, by TCHQ, 28 September, 1962.

83. Canada, RCAF, File No. 482-4, Memorandum to DAPC from DPM, 11 June, 1956.

84. Ibid., Minute sheet to DGT from DGT/GT2-3, 29 June, 56 and minuted by DGT, A/DPM.

85. Canada, RCAF, File No. 013-2, Letter to the CCOS from the CAS, 7 December, 1956.

86. Canada, RCAF, File No. 482-4, Extract from Minute of Defence Council Meeting No. 24, held 23 June, 1948.

87. Ibid., Memorandum to D/AMP from Acting/DPA, n.d., Minuted by AMP, 16 August, 1951.

88. Ibid., Memorandum to V/CAS, from DAI, 6 December, 1951.

since then has been conducted at the air bases in Europe.⁸⁹ Classes are voluntary but are conducted only in the Air Division in Europe, there being no plan comparable to the Army's where personnel may take extramural French lessons at public expense. A suggestion made to use the NATO language school in London to teach some RCAF officers French was turned down because it was felt that the RCAF had no need for such training.⁹⁰ Recently, however, a need for such training has apparently developed and the RCAF has started a French language training course similar to that used by the Army.⁹¹

89. Canada, RCAF, File No. 350-108, Memorandum from AMP to CAS, 3 December, 1963.

90. Canada, RCAF, File No. 482-4, Letter to the CAS from AOC TC, 6 May, 1958 and reply by message 9 July, 1958.

91. Canada, RCAF, File No. 350-108, Memorandum to the CAS from AMP, 3 December, 1963.

CULTURAL MILIEU

WW I to WW II

1. The RCAF is the youngest of Canada's three armed forces but has been developed from the same mold: British armed forces. Throughout most of its history the RAF has been the model upon which the RCAF has patterned its customs, training, organization and policies. In addition, it has been closely associated with the RAF in wartime to a far greater extent than was the Canadian Army with the British Army and even the RCN with the RN. The RCAF devolved directly from Canadian units in the RAF and retained many of the attributes of its parent service long after formal association with the RAF had ended. In 1920 the CAF designed its own uniform which was very similar to that used by the Canadian Army except for the colour. It also had its own distinctive cap badge which was worn by all ranks.⁹² Very soon, however, the RCAF (still the CAF at this time) began to adopt British symbols. When the RAF ensign was approved in 1921 the RCAF suggested that it should be allowed to use this pennant with a maple leaf substituted in the inner circle of the target on the fly. The RAF, when approached on this matter, readily agreed with the request but thought that the design should not be modified. The reason given was that the original design should be used so that the sentiment of the unity of the Empire would not be impaired. The RCAF agreed to this proposal as did the Minister of Militia and Defence. Formal application was made through the Department of External Affairs, and agreed to by the Colonial Office.⁹³

2. The RCAF proceeded to acquire British symbols in the following years. In January, 1923 formal application was made for use of the prefix "Royal" and assent received the following month. At the same time it was decided to adopt without modification the motto,

92. Air Board, op. cit., p. 26.

93. Ibid., p. 36.

dress, drill and ceremonials of the RAF except that the letters "RCAF" would replace "RAF" in all badges and buttons.⁹⁴ The final chapter of the early formative period was written in the preamble to Kings Regulations and Orders for the RCAF issued on 1 April, 1924. The preamble read in part: "... and that those regulations, rules and paragraphs of the Air Force Act, the Rules of Procedure thereunder, and the King's Regulations and Orders for the Royal Air Force... shall have the same force and effect as if they had been regulations made by the Governor in Council for the government of the Royal Canadian Air Force."⁹⁵ Thus was the cultural basis for the Royal Canadian Air Force set and that basis has changed little over the years.

3. During the interwar period the RCAF continued to use the RAF as its model; "The scheme of organization, training and equipment will also follow the example of the Royal Air Force..."⁹⁶ In 1927 an exchange scheme for officers was agreed to by the RCAF and the RAF and in the 1930s the RCAF began to act as a recruiting and screening agency for the RAF and by 1935 it actually nominated and screened more people for the RAF than it recruited for itself.⁹⁷ When the RCAF embarked on a modest rearmament programme in 1937 it was decided that most of the new planes acquired would be types recommended by the Air Ministry but this policy was no different than that followed by its sister services who had used English pattern equipment for many years. On the whole, little can be made of this equipment policy since Canada had no armaments industry of her own and the forces she would be associated with in any

94. Ibid., p. 126.

95. Canada, Department of National Defence, The King's Regulations and Orders for the Royal Canadian Air Force, 1924, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1924, p. 3.

96. Canada, Department of National Defence, Report, 1925, p. 47.

97. Air Board, op. cit., p. 396.

future war would invariably be British forces. In sum, when giving a reason for any change in the organization or procedures of the RCAF, the explanation was nearly always: the new Canadian situation now more closely approximates that of the RAF.⁹⁸

World War II

4. The Second World War did little to enhance the RCAF's cultural growth. The major part of the RCAF's energies were aimed at the operation of the huge BCATP and as a result it never developed as an independant allied fighting force in the European Theater as did the Canadian Army and even to some extent the RCN in its patrols of the North Atlantic. Except for the home defence units and the anti-submarine patrols flown from Canadian land bases, operational units of the RCAF were subordinated to the RAF. Indeed, it was only after vigorous insistence by the Canadian government in the negotiations over the BCATP that Canada was even allowed to form distinct RCAF squadrons in Europe.⁹⁹ The largest formation in the RCAF was No. 6 Bomber Group and all other Canadian units were of squadron or wing strength and formed part of the RAF command as, indeed, did No. 6 Group. Even with 48 distinct Canadian units serving overseas during the war, the majority of RCAF personnel still served in RAF units and not in RCAF units. The RCAF was the only one of the three Canadian Armed Forces where this was true. In 1943 Canada did take more responsibility for the RCAF overseas when it assumed financial responsibility for the RCAF units in Europe and at the same time RCAF personnel serving in RAF units came under the general supervision of the RCAF Overseas Headquarters.¹⁰⁰ Nevertheless the RCAF did not fully develop as a distinct allied air force during the last war.

98. For in the Annual Report of the Department of National Defence for 1934, p. 75 where it comments on the new method of issuing RCAF orders and also see Stacey, Cp, The Military Problems of Canada, Toronto, the Ryerson Press, 1940, p. 112 where he comments on the re-organization of the RCAF into commands.

99. Roberts, op. cit., p. 122.

100. Canada, Department of National Defence, Report, 1943, p. 17

Post-War Period

5. Following the Second War the RCAF began to slowly loosen its ties with the RAF although it has retained the RAF pattern uniforms, rank structures, customs and to some extent the organization which it had before 1940. The new independence of the RCAF is most noticeable in its equipment policy and its training procedures. Standardization talks were held between the RAF, USAF and the RCAF in 1951 and NATO talks were also held in that year. Since that date Canadian flying equipment has been predominantly American in design except for some Canadian designed equipment. While the RCAF continued with its pre-war exchange policy with the RAF the USAF was also included in this exchange programme.¹⁰¹ Also, where before the war virtually all external courses attended by RCAF officers and airmen were in RAF schools, the post-war RCAF began sending personnel to American schools and training establishments and as early as 1947 Canadians were attending more courses in the US than in the UK.¹⁰² This is also true of academic courses attended by RCAF personnel. In 1950 the RCAF had ten men attending academic courses outside of Canada, nine in the US and only one in the UK. Comparable figures for the Navy are six in the US and sixty-six in the UK and for the Army five, all in the US.¹⁰³

6. The strongest external influence on the RCAF came from the US although many of the old pre-war traditions of the RCAF-RAF continued. Canadian influence was also growing, especially after the passage of the National Defence Act in 1950 when the Armed Forces became based completely on a Canadian statute. The RCAF has developed its own training and operational patterns to suit its own needs and purposes, but while the actual functioning of the RCAF has changed to suit its own Canadian problems and the problems of its commitments

101. Canada, Department of National Defence, Report, 1948, p. 41.

102. Canada, Department of National Defence, Report, 1947, p. 49.

103. Canada, Department of National Defence, Report, 1950, p. 86.

to collective defence, and while direct reference to RAF practices and procedures is now virtually non-existent, the pre-war RCAF-RAF customs and manners persist. Whatever the influences now operating to form the RCAF's cultural pattern, it is still very much an English speaking organization (but not necessarily, as one high ranking ex-Army officer has stated, a "sort of colonial appendage of the U.S. Strategic Air Force,")¹⁰⁴ and a French speaking Canadian entering the service must conform to this pattern if he is to be successful.

104. Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Defence, 1964, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1964, p. 192.

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